MILNET: Country Studies
Libya
Libyian Military
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From information provided by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
of the United States.
For further information consult the Country Studies at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html
Origins of the Modern Armed Forces
The roots of the contemporary Libyan army can be traced to the Libyan Arab Force (popularly known as the Sanusi Army) of World War II. Shortly after Italy entered the war, a number of Libyan leaders living in exile in Egypt called on their compatriots to organize themselves into military units and join the British in the war against the Axis powers. Five battalions, which were initially designed for guerrilla warfare in the Jabal al Akhdar region of Cyrenaica, were established under British command. Because the high mobility of the desert campaigns required a considerable degree of technical and mechanical expertise, the Libyan forces were used primarily as auxiliaries, guarding military installations and prisoners. One battalion, however, participated in the fighting at Tobruk.
After Britain succeeded in occupying the Libyan territories, the need for the British-trained and -equipped Sanusi troops appeared to be over. The Sanusi Army was reluctant to disband, however, and the majority of its members arranged to be transferred to the local police force in Cyrenaica under the British military administration. When Libya gained its independence in 1951, veterans of the original Sanusi Army formed the nucleus of the Royal Libyan Army.
Until the discovery and exploitation of oil, beginning in the late 1950s, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world. Limited available natural resources and a small population provided little basis for viable defensive strength, and the new state was militarily insignificant during its early years. King Idris deliberately divided the security forces into a regular army and a variety of armed police forces. The primary mission of the armed police was to counterbalance dissidents within the faction-torn armed forces and thus preclude a coup against the monarchy.
With substantial British assistance, the army was slowly enlarged, and by September 1969 its strength was estimated at roughly 6,500--about half the size of the armed police. The police forces, composed mainly of conservative tribal elements that the king considered more reliable than the regular army, were extremely diverse. They ranged from several lightly armed territorial forces to the mobile National Security Force, which was equipped with helicopters and armored cars. Units of the prestigious Cyrenaican Defense Force, assisted and advised by British military specialists, were garrisoned at several places in Cyrenaica.
The small naval and air components were not developed until later. The air force was formed in August 1963, and the navy was established in November 1962. Consisting initially of only a few aircraft and two pilots, by 1967 the air force had increased to about 250 American-trained personnel and a few jet trainers and piston-engine transports. After the June 1967 War, demand for more sophisticated aircraft resulted in the purchase of ten American F-5 fighter-bombers in 1968 and 1969. Throughout this early period, the British were influential in the development of the Libyan navy, which, however, grew extremely slowly and even by the time of Qadhafi's coup in 1969 consisted of just over 200 men.
Partly because of the limited resources in trained personnel locally and partly because the monarchy was suspicious of the professional military, the idea of purchasing a sophisticated air defense missile system and training a few specialists in its operation gained popularity among the king's nonmilitary advisers. In 1968 the government entered into a contract with Britain for the installation of an air defense system to be delivered over five years at a cost of almost US$300 million. Under the contract, the British agreed to supply a complex antiaircraft missile system and radar detection and control equipment and to train Libyans to operate them. The high priority assigned to this project and the unprecedented expense involved were reflected in an accompanying decision to postpone the introduction of the monarchy's second five-year development plan until April 1969. Idris, however was unwilling to disrupt the balance between the army and the police by providing the military element with tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, recognizing that such equipment could be employed against his regime as easily as against a hostile external force. Ironically, when Qadhafi and his Free Officers Movement mounted their overthrow of the monarchy, the ostensibly reliable police did not interfere.
Assuming power after the 1969 coup, the new Qadhafi regime integrated major elements of the police into the army. Although he cancelled the British air defense project, Qadhafi began to build up the country's military strength through large equipment purchases from foreign suppliers. In 1970 the government contracted to buy 110 Mirage jet fighters from France. Thereafter, the air force grew rapidly and became an important component of the armed forces. Similar purchases provided tanks and artillery for the army and vessels for the navy.
Within a year after the coup, the size of the military establishment was estimated at about 22,000 men--over three times the figure immediately before the coup. Although this increase followed a major recruitment effort, it was primarily the result of the merger of the regular army with most of the former National Security Force and the Cyrenaican Defense Force, which between them had comprised about 14,000 troops.
In 1971 the government announced the creation of the Popular Resistance Force, a militia that was under the operational control of the chief of staff of the Libyan armed forces. Initially, the primary mission of the force was to guard government buildings, oil installations, and other important facilities in the event of war or internal disorders.
Less than a year after the 1969 coup, Qadhafi and his fellow Free Officers assumed control of British and United States bases in Libya and began to sever military supply links with those countries. France, politically less objectionable to Qadhafi, became the leading source of arms but, in 1974, Libya reached agreement with the Soviet Union for the purchase of equipment on a scale well in excess of France's production capacity, even if France had not been deterred by Qadhafi's increasingly radical and irrational behavior. Tremendous quantities of modern Soviet armaments were delivered beginning in 1975, and the flow was continuing in 1987. In spite of the fact that thousands of advisers from the Soviet Union and other communist countries helped with manning, maintenance, and training in the use of the new equipment, the sheer quantity overwhelmed the ability of the Libyan armed forces to introduce it into operational units.
Prodigious importation of new weapons systems was accompanied by a rapid buildup of manpower. When voluntary enlistments proved inadequate, the government invoked a conscription law calling for three to four years service for all males between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five. Consequently, the armed forces more than doubled in strength between 1974, when the first arms agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded, and 1986, when the total manpower of the three services was estimated at over 90,000. In addition to creating the most highly mechanized army among the Arab nations, by the late 1980s Qadhafi had procured a fleet of submarines, corvettes, and missile boats that constituted a significant new naval force in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union had also supplied Libya with modern fighter aircraft, a bomber and transport force, and a sophisticated air defense system.
The group of junior officers who seized power in 1969 wanted to
introduce a radical form of Arab and Islamic socialism. The
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) of Qadhafi and eleven other
officers assumed formal responsibility for drawing up general
policies. The initial civilian cabinet was frustrated by the RCC's
insistence on reviewing all of its decisions. After its
resignation, a new cabinet in January 1970 had Qadhafi as prime
minister, Major Abdul Salam Jallud as deputy prime minister, and
other RCC members in key ministerial positions.
Although the RCC always spoke with one voice and Qadhafi and
his associates generally succeeded in instilling a spirit of unity
and discipline among the military, there was internal dissent.
Differences came into the open in 1975 because of disagreement over
the priority being given to armament purchases over domestic social
needs in the use of oil revenues. As a result, the minister of
planning was dismissed, and others left their posts. By late 1975,
only five of the original twelve members were still serving on the
RCC.
Officially phased out in 1977, the RCC was succeeded by the
General Secretariat of the General People's Congress (GPC). At
first this new policy-setting body was little more than the RCC
under a new name. In the reorganization of 1979, however, when
Qadhafi relinquished his position as secretary general, Jallud was
replaced by a civilian as deputy secretary general and the other
three military members of the General Secretariat were likewise
replaced by civilians. They continued to serve as senior policy
advisers to Qadhafi, although their public role was curtailed. In
1987, the most senior positions of the military hierarchy were held
by members of the original RCC. Qadhafi retained the title of
supreme commander of the armed forces. General Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir
was commander in chief of the armed forces. Major Khuwayldi al
Hamidi was chief of the general staff and headed the People's
Militia or People's Army (formerly the Popular Resistance Force.)
Colonel (formerly General) Mustafa al Kharrubi was inspector
general of the armed forces and commandant of the navy and air
force. Major Jallud held no military position, but he headed the
revolutionary committees and was acknowledged to be Qadhafi's
second in command.
In the course of the post-coup reorganization of the military
into a single unified command, the RCC retired or fired--for
political reasons--the entire leadership of generals and colonels
along with a number of officers of lesser rank identified with the
Idris regime. Qadhafi and the other RCC members maintained that the
former military leaders had been involved extensively in various
forms of corruption, particularly in arms-procurement contracts. In
addition, the former high command had been largely in agreement
with the monarchy's position on such issues as the continued
presence of British and United States military bases on Libyan
territory and the country's rather limited involvement in the Arab-
Israeli disputes.
The former military leadership was also believed to have
tolerated and in many instances to have profited personally from a
recruitment and promotion system that awarded high posts to
individual tribal leaders and members of influential families.
Senior officers were chosen not on the basis of military qualities
or experience, but rather because of personal loyalty or political
favors provided to King Idris or in recognition of their political
and religious conservatism. These factors, which had brought the
senior officers their initial commissions and subsequent
promotions, caused much of the low morale among junior officers and
contributed to the eventual overthrow of the monarchy.
Unlike the former military leaders, many of whom were from the
middle and upper classes, and by virtue of their social status
could just as easily have chosen higher education or the
bureaucracy as routes to advancement, most of the RCC officers were
from the lower strata of society. For them, the most logical source
of upward mobility under the monarchy had been the military. Of the
original RCC members, most of whom were in their mid-twenties at
the time of the 1969 uprising, approximately half were from tribal
or peasant backgrounds. They reflected the country's three
traditional geographic divisions, with roughly one-third coming
from each of the major regions--Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and
Fezzan.
In political outlook, the military leadership that rose to
power after 1969 has been described as both soldier-revolutionary
and ardent pan-Arabist. In published interviews, the senior
officers, particularly Qadhafi, recalled that their identification
with the goal of regional Arab unity and the adoption of a more
militant posture toward Israel dated from their secondary school
years, when their hero was Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser.
The new military leaders frequently emphasized their passionate
commitment to the moral tenets of Islam and to their own concept of
Islamic socialism. Qadhafi and the other senior military figures
became the dominant influence group in the country, representing
both the modernizing and the traditional aspects of national life.
On the one hand, they have been committed to modernization,
reflected in their acquiring technical military equipment and
sophisticated weaponry and training personnel to operate and
maintain it. Commitment to modernization also was demonstrated by
their continuing emphasis on improving the literacy rate and on the
development of technical skills and training. On the other hand,
many of the top officers, including Qadhafi, have remained proud of
their desert backgrounds, their religious convictions, their social
relationships, and their traditional belief in the overall primacy
of Arab and Islamic attitudes and values. One important exception
to emphasis on traditional values has been Qadhafi's desire for a
role for women in the armed forces, a proposal that was rejected by
the normally obedient GPC.
In little more than a decade, Qadhafi effected a transformation
of Libya into a militarized nation. The armed forces were rapidly
expanded, acquiring greatly enhanced firepower and mobility. The
able-bodied civilian population was formed in well-equipped militia
units. Libya's new military establishment and arsenal have enabled
Qadhafi to project his radical vision and ambitions beyond the
country's borders. In spite of frequently irrational and
inconsistent behavior, he has advanced Libya to the forefront of
politics in North Africa and thrown its weight against peaceful
settlement in the Middle East.
As affirmed by Qadhafi's public statements, his primary purpose
in the Libyan arms buildup is destruction of Israel. The armed
forces, however, have not been shaped to confront Israel directly
nor has Qadhafi been eager to commit Libya to battle with Israel in
alliance with other Arab powers. To a limited extent, he has used
his arms inventory as a stockpile, supplying weapons selectively to
those countries and groups most opposed to Israel's existence. His
rhetoric has been devoted to appeals to develop a combined Arab and
Islamic force strong enough to wage a successful "holy war" against
Israel.
In 1987 most observers doubted that either the Libyans or the
Soviets viewed the stored Soviet equipment as an arms depot
prepositioned for eventual use by Soviet forces in action in North
Africa. The matériel has been purchased outright by Libya at a
considerable sacrifice to the country's economy. In spite of large
numbers of Soviet advisers and support personnel, the unused
equipment reportedly has not been maintained in an adequate state
of readiness to be employed at short notice. Anticipated use by the
Soviet forces presupposes close cooperation and approval by Qadhafi
of Soviet operations in North Africa, but other evidence suggested
that he was far from willing to agree to a more active Soviet role
in the area.
The traditional mission of Libyan armed forces has been to
protect Libya's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
Normally, the limited capability of neighboring states to threaten
Libya's borders would not justify a primed and powerful defense arm
(see fig. 12). Qadhafi, however, has inflamed relations with all of
his neighbors on one or more occasions. In the late 1980s, the
military remained ready for possible open conflict with Egypt,
whose moderate policy toward Israel Qadhafi viewed as a
provocation. Libya's buildup of naval and air strength helped to
protect the country's exposed Mediterranean coastline against
attack and gave Qadhafi a tangible means for enforcing Libya's
claim to the Gulf of Sidra and its natural resources as Libyan
territorial waters. Moreover, submarines and fast-attack craft with
missiles gave Libya a potential striking power that even major
naval forces in the Mediterranean were forced to heed.
Libya's arms buildup and demonstrated mobility provided the
indispensable underpinning to Qadhafi's efforts to play a leading
role in African politics by extending his influence, particularly
to the Sahelian nations to the south. Libyan involvement has taken
the form of subversion, military assistance, and direct military
intervention aimed at winning other countries to support Qadhafi's
radical policies or supplanting existing governments with others
more amenable to him. Libya's efforts to dominate the Sahel
presented a more imminent threat because of the military weakness,
poverty, and unstable government in the area. In addition,
territorial claims have been advanced against Chad, Niger, and
Algeria.
The military has been among the most representative
institutions in the country, drawing its membership from all strata
of society. The integration of the different forces, organized
before 1969 under separate commands, and the disarming of the
Cyrenaican tribes were generally regarded as significant first
steps toward establishing national unity. According to some
authorities, these steps will eventually breakdown tribal,
regional, and parochial tendencies.
Until the early 1980s, service pay, special commissaries, and
related benefits placed the average soldier in a privileged
position relative to the population as a whole. Military leaders
nevertheless sought to avoid the public display of material
ostentation with which many officers under the earlier monarchy had
been associated. Most of the senior officers were noted for their
austere, almost puritanical, personal habits. For more than a
decade after the coup, the rank of colonel, which Qadhafi assumed
after taking power, acted as a ceiling on grade level. Although the
rank of general was subsequently adopted by some service chiefs, it
was announced in mid-1986 that the rank of colonel would again be
the highest in the armed forces. Observers noted, for example, that
Kharrubi was being referred to as colonel instead of general. The
ranks of many other officers may also have been reduced, in some
cases as a result of dissatisfaction with their responses to the
American raid a few months earlier.
In his public conduct, Qadhafi was the archetype of the ascetic
behavior that characterized senior Libyan officers in the early
days of the revolution. He cultivated an image of incorruptibility
and of simple personal habits, promoting the idea that military
service was a patriotic obligation for which little material reward
should be expected.
In general, the morale of the military was high as a result of
Qadhafi's extravagant modernization program, which was accompanied
by new weapons systems, opportunities for training abroad for
younger officers, and major construction projects. Moreover,
experience gained in operations in Chad enabled the military to
address some of the deficiencies revealed in the clashes with Egypt
and in Uganda.
In spite of the historical importance of the military in the
overthrow of the monarchy and its participation in the government
during the first decade under Qadhafi, underlying tensions between
civil and military authorities became visible during the early
1980s. Although there was little discernible dissension among the
most senior military figures, whose fortunes were closely linked
with Qadhafi, there reportedly was disgruntlement among more junior
officers, who rejected the adventurist policies that had needlessly
provoked the hostility of Libya's Arab neighbors. The economic
austerity arising from the drop in oil revenues and Qadhafi's
bizarre economic theories contributed to the disaffection. As a
result of budget stringencies, military pay was often two or three
months in arrears, commissary stocks were little better than the
meager supplies in government-run shops, and military construction
projects were scaled back sharply.
On numerous occasions, Qadhafi declared that ultimately the
traditional military establishment should "wither away," to be
replaced by an armed citizenry. This eventually conformed with the
Third Universal Theory in that the populace would then be directly
involved in assuring their own security (see Political Ideology,
ch. 4). Accordingly, all members of society must be prepared to
function as soldiers. Although Qadhafi seemed to treat the
disappearance of the professional military more as a theoretical
goal than an imminent reality, his remarks added to the
deteriorating morale of the officer corps.
Qadhafi and knowledgeable observers recognized that only the
army represented a separate source of power that could threaten to
overturn the existing regime. A government journal warned in 1982
that "armies believe the power to bear arms is by proxy for the
masses and they thus create dictatorial classes which monopolize
the weapons and crush the masses with them." This was followed by
an extraordinary campaign unleashed against the military in 1983.
The ideological weekly of the revolutionary committees, Al Zahf
al Akhdar, branded officers as reactionaries, guilty of
corruption, smuggling, and smoking hashish. These fascists "must be
immediately removed," said the editor, because they "mock the
people and get drunk with the bourgeoisie." Although these views
could not have been published without official sanction, Qadhafi
refrained from associating himself fully with them. He said the
army was not corrupt and that the officers with a bourgeois
orientation were only remnants from the traditional royal army.
Although Al Zahf al Akhdar moderated its charges
following Qadhafi's intervention, its campaign, focusing on the
luxurious cars, dwellings, and working quarters of the officers,
was resumed in 1984. Assuming that Qadhafi could muzzle these
denunciations of the military if he chose, he may have failed to do
so because of suspicions of military disloyalty and a desire to
deflate the prestige of the military establishment as a potential
competing political force. Thus, in spite of his dependence on the
armed forces to execute his wide-ranging ambitions, Qadhafi may
feel constrained to seek some balance by giving freer rein to the
Revolutionary Committees and by strengthening the People's Militia.
The revolutionary committees introduced into workplaces and
communities were not at first extended to the military (see The
Revolutionary Committees, ch. 4). When they were later imposed,
there were complaints that they were controlled by officers with
insufficient revolutionary zeal. After the early 1980s, however, a
paramilitary wing of the Revolutionary Committees, the
Revolutionary Guards, became entrenched within the armed forces.
They served as a parallel channel of control, a means of
ideological indoctrination in the barracks, and an apparatus for
monitoring suspicious behavior. The Revolutionary Guards reportedly
held the keys to ammunition stockpiles at the main military bases,
doling it out in small quantities as needed by the regular forces.
The influence of the Revolutionary Guards increased after a
coup attempt in May 1985 (see State of Internal Security, this
ch.). The Guards, assisted by the Revolutionary Committees, set up
roadblocks and arrested thousands of individuals suspected of being
implicated. The Revolutionary Guards were believed to be no more
that 1,000 to 2,000 strong, but they were outfitted with light
tanks, armored cars and personnel carriers, multiple rocket
launchers, and SA-8 antiaircraft missiles. Most had been recruited
from Qadhafi's own tribal group in the Surt region.
The estimates published by ACDA give a figure of US$1.8 billion
in arms purchases in 1984. Accordingly, if the ACDA figure of
US$5.2 billion in total defense expenditures in 1984 is accepted,
true defense costs exclusive of new weapons acquisitions would
still be about US$3.4 billion or several times the officially
acknowledged rate of spending. This would include such items as pay
and benefits, military construction, fuel, maintenance, and the
cost of the Chadian campaign.
In 1987 the army--by far the largest and most developed branch
of the military forces--was still organized tactically in battalion
formations. These included twenty tank battalions, thirty
mechanized infantry battalions, ten artillery battalions, and two
special forces groups comprising ten paratroop battalions. Air
defense was organized into two antiaircraft battalions and six
surface-to-air missile battalions. Two surface-to-surface missile
brigades were equipped with free rocket over ground (FROG) and Scud
missiles acquired from the Soviet Union.
Although the pattern of equipment purchases and the creation of
divisional headquarters units suggested that a transition to a more
integrated structure of mobile armored and mechanized infantry was
contemplated, by early 1987 the shift to such an organizational
form had not yet occurred. During specific deployments, as in Chad,
units were brought together on an ad hoc basis. If the tank and
mechanized battalions were to be consolidated into a more unified
command structure, this would most likely be designed for planning
territorial defense rather than for desert combat operations; the
system existing in 1987 of independent battalions afforded more
flexibility for desert combat.
In early 1987, the Libyan army was well outfitted with modern
armaments, including rocket systems, armored vehicles for its
infantry and artillery, engineering equipment, up-to-date Soviet
infantry weapons, sophisticated fire-control systems, flame
throwers and chemical munitions, and antitank guided missiles.
Libya's more than 3,000 tanks gave it the tenth largest tank force
in the world. Its range of tracked and wheeled armor, tank
transporters, and air transport ensured it the necessary mobility
to bring its forces to bear rapidly against any threat to its
territorial integrity and enabled it to intervene in ventures far
beyond its borders (see table 10, Appendix).
The army was nevertheless confronted by grave deficiencies. The
high technological level of its equipment demanded a corresponding
level of technical competence in operation and maintenance that the
army lacked. Maintenance and repair problems were exacerbated by
the diversity of arms sources--British, American, French, Soviet,
Italian, and Brazilian. The numerous foreign advisers and
technicians were insufficient to overcome low standards of support
and logistics. To judge from the ability the Libyans demonstrated
in Chad to sustain modern combat operations over extended supply
lines, some progress was being made in correcting these problems.
The pattern of troop concentrations could not be determined
precisely from published sources. Some troops were at the
operational sites, including Tripoli, Misratah, Az Zawiyah, Surt,
Benghazi, Darnah, and Tobruk, that were established at strategic
points along the Mediterranean coast during World War II (see fig.
14). Others were at inland sites at desert oases, such as Sabha,
and farther south, at Al Kufrah, which became the main base for
operations in Chad. Areas adjacent to the Egyptian border,
particularly along lines of movement, were also well defended. Many
army units were scattered throughout populated areas, owing in part
to their responsibility for training People's Militia units.
Few details were available on army training. The military
academy at Benghazi, established before independence with British
assistance, offered its cadets courses in higher education and
military subjects to prepare them for active duty as junior
officers. Qadhafi and other members of the RCC attended the
institution, but it was closed after the coup. Later a military
academy opened at Tripoli.
In 1985 a military engineering college (at an unspecified
location) to provide training in all technical military
specialities was proposed. The college was to have a four-year
program leading to a bachelor's degree. At about the same time, the
establishment of a reserves college with a one-year program leading
to the rank of second lieutenant in the reserves was announced.
Admission would be contingent on the attainment of a university
degree or its equivalent and a demonstration of "adherence to the
great Fatah revolution." Because Libya is not known to have an
active reserve program, it remained unclear how the graduates of
this institution would be used.
The navy has always been the stepchild of the Libyan armed
forces, although its Soviet-supplied submarines and fast-attack
craft with missiles have endowed it with the potential for
inflicting damage on other naval powers in the Mediterranean. The
enormous firepower available to small vessels armed with missiles
and sophisticated electronic guidance systems has enabled Qadhafi
to assemble a modern flotilla at relatively low cost and with few
personnel. The navy consisted of no more than 200 officers and men
when the first warship was delivered to the Idris regime in 1966.
Under Qadhafi, naval personnel had increased to 6,500 by 1986 and
was expected to rise still further to meet the staffing needs of
additional ships on order.
Traditionally, the navy's primary mission has been to defend
the coast and to assist the other services in maintaining internal
security and public order. After the previously separate customs
and harbor police were joined with the navy in a single command
under the Ministry of Defense in 1970, the mission was extended to
include responsibilities for curbing smuggling and for enforcing
customs laws. The rapid naval buildup that occurred during the
1970s was intended to enforce Qadhafi's claim of sovereignty over
the Gulf of Sidra with its sponging and fishing grounds as well as
potential unexploited mineral wealth. The navy could also deter
landings or raids aimed against the country's oil fields and
vulnerable oil transport network. The purpose of acquiring
amphibious ships for landing infantry and tanks was less obvious.
One explanation might be to present a threat to Egyptian forces
near the border with Libya. The Egyptians' sole land supply route
is the coastal road from Alexandria.
The navy has always been dependent on foreign sources for
equipment, spare parts, and training. In 1972 a British naval
advisory mission that had assisted in the development of the Libyan
navy since its founding was terminated. Training was shifted to
Greece and to Egypt and later to the Soviet Union. The initial ship
orders, placed with British yards, were for patrol boats and
corvettes. The largest surface ship in the Libyan navy, a frigate
of about 1,500 tons with a crew of 130, was ordered just before the
1969 coup and delivered in 1973. Later, high-speed patrol boats and
corvettes equipped with surface-to-surface missiles were purchased
from France, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Between 1976 and 1983,
six Soviet Foxtrot-class submarines were delivered. Each required
a crew of seventy-five; in addition, twelve Soviet advisers were
reportedly assigned to each vessel. (For an inventory of ships of
the Libyan fleet, see table 11, Appendix).
Little information was available on the navy's organizational
structure, but Tripoli was known to be the site of the naval
command headquarters and of the principal naval base. Other bases
were located in the ports of Benghazi, Darnah, Tobruk, and Marsa al
Burayqah. A repair base was located at Al Khums east of Tripoli,
and a submarine base was under construction at Ras al Hilal.
As of early 1987, the Libyan navy had faced no hostile actions
except for the encounter with the American fleet in March 1986 in
which one missile boat and a corvette were destroyed and others
possibly damaged. Earlier, it was reported that the small Libyan
vessels were experiencing difficulty in obeying Qadhafi's order to
remain at sea to avoid the risk of being bombed in port by American
planes. The fleet reported breakdowns of engines and electronic
failures as well as shortages of food and fuel.
By early 1987 it was considered probable that the Libyan navy
was overextended, having carried out a rapid buildup without
sufficient trained personnel. More than one-third of the entire
naval complement of 6,500 would be required to supply a single crew
for each of the ships in commission in 1986. In addition, personnel
would have to be found to staff a number of other vessels on order.
Aggravating the problem of reaching a satisfactory level of
operation, training, and maintenance was the need to become
familiar with a variety of modern weapons systems from numerous
supplier countries, among them Britain, France, Italy, Yugoslavia,
and the Soviet Union.
Last of the military services to be established, the air force
has been obliged to struggle to develop trained air and ground
crews to match the rapid acquisition of modern planes and weaponry
(see table 12, Appendix). As a result, in spite of the significant
inventory of combat aircraft, amounting to more than 500 as of
early 1987, Libyan air units have been committed only reluctantly
and have not acquitted themselves impressively in air-to-air
engagements. However, the considerable air transport fleet, has
apparently been employed capably in Chad and elsewhere. Although
the air force has been extensively used in support of Libyan ground
units in the fighting in Chad, it does not seem to have played a
decisive role.
At the time of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, the
roster of personnel was only about 400 officers and enlisted men.
A recruitment drive undertaken in 1970 eventually brought a tenfold
increase in the force by 1978. As of 1986, its strength was
estimated at 10,000.
The country's burgeoning inventory of air force weapons
accounted for a considerable share of Libya's procurement efforts.
The hundreds of aircraft acquired since 1969 included American
helicopters and transports (although deliveries of United States
planes were blocked in 1975), later-model French close-air-support
fighters, and up-to-date fighter interceptors from the Soviet
Union. Of the combat aircraft, the United States Department of
State estimated in 1983 that 50 percent remained in storage,
including most of the MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers. According to
another report, the Mirage aircraft were so neglected that only
half were in flying condition, the others being cannibalized for
spare parts. Pilots from Syria and other countries reportedly
helped fly the Libyan planes, and instructors, technical personnel,
and maintenance teams included Soviets, Pakistanis, and Yugoslavs.
With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into one
medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor squadrons, five
forward ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron,
nine helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying
SA-2, SA-3, and Crotale missiles. (The three SA-5 launch sites were
operated by army units.)
The air force's primary installation was the huge Uqba ben Nafi
Air Base (the former Wheelus Air Base) near Tripoli. It had
excellent operational features and contained the service's
headquarters and a large share of its major training facilities.
Both MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers were located there. A large air
base at a site near Benghazi shared with the civil airport also had
some MiG squadrons. Most of the Mirages were located at Gamal Abdul
Nasser Air Base. Two airfields not far from the Egyptian border, at
Al Kufrah Oasis and at Jabal al Uwaynat in the far south, were
among the Libyan installations attacked by Egyptian air crews
during the 1977 border clash. The Soviets have constructed another
base in central Libya at the new army headquarters site of Al
Jufrah near Hun with a runway of over 4,000 meters.
An air force academy established at Az Zawiyah near Misratah in
1975 was reportedly staffed mainly by Yugoslavs. Institutions
referred to as "secondary colleges," possibly technical training
schools, were opened at Sabha and at Uqba ben Nafi Air Base in
1978. Basic pilot training was conducted on Italian-manufactured
SF-260 planes before the students moved on to the Soko G-2AE Galebs
(Yugoslav) and the Aero L-39 Albatros (Czechoslovak) at Az Zawiyah.
Additional training took place outside Libya. Several hundred
Libyan students were reportedly undergoing instruction with the
Dassault firm in France in 1983 as part of the Mirage contract.
This was at a time of confrontation between French and Libyan
forces in Chad.
Information on training programs conducted by the Soviet Union
was scanty but in light of the sophisticated weapons in the air
force inventory, it could be assumed that much time and effort were
invested in producing even a limited number of combat-ready crews,
backed up by ground support personnel. Soviet specialists
reportedly accompanied the Libyans during the 1980 incursion into
Chad and possibly were directly involved in missions of the Tu-22
bombers.
The performance of the Libyan air force in emergency conditions
cannot have been reassuring to Qadhafi. Libyan pilots have
reportedly experienced difficulty in finding and identifying
aircraft they have been ordered to intercept. They have been
reluctant to fly at night for fear of being unable to locate their
bases. To some extent, these problems may reflect outdated
navigation and radar aids in their combat aircraft, which are
mostly older, stripped-down versions of Soviet designs. The two Su22
fighters were handicapped in their engagement with carrier-based
American F-14s in 1981 because the equipment, instruments, and airto
-air missiles were outmoded in comparison with those of their
adversaries. In spite of Qadhafi's express warning that his air
force would repel the United States fleet in the Gulf of Sidra in
1986, his planes did not seriously challenge the American naval
units. In addition, Libyan planes did not take off to meet the
American fighter-bombers that attacked targets at Benghazi and
Tripoli in April 1986; consequently many planes were destroyed or
damaged on the ground. In Chad it was reported that many Libyan
bombing raids were carried out at excessively high altitudes when
met with antiaircraft fire.
The Military Leadership
International Military Concerns
The Armed Forces
Organization of the Armed Forces
The Army
The Navy
The Air Force
