Data as of April 1987
IN EARLY 1987, President Hafiz al Assad, in power since his November 1970 takeover in a bloodless military coup d'état, continued to lead Syria. His regime appeared to be resilient, if not altogether stable. Only a few years earlier, the regime had encountered several major threats. In 1982 the government of Syria endured nearly simultaneous major domestic and external challenges: the uprising of Muslim fundamentalist rebels and the Israeli attack on Syrian forces in Lebanon. Then, in late 1983 and early 1984, Assad became seriously ill, leading to splits within the regime as factions maneuvered to succeed him. These machinations proved to be premature, however, because Assad subsequently recovered and reasserted his power. Nonetheless, the domestic political infighting and external military clashes that occurred while Assad was incapacitated reminded Syrians of their nation's chronic instability of the 1950s and 1960s and foreshadowed the return of such instability after Assad. The crises also reinforced the perception that the strength of the Syrian government was not only vested in the president but derived from him personally. Consequently, although Assad had transformed Syria into a regional power in the Levant and had created domestic stability, his accomplishments could prove ephemeral because they were not buttressed by legitimate and viable institutions. Even more unsettling, in 1987 the question of a successor to President Assad was still unresolved.
Since 1970 Assad's pragmatism, ambition, and patience have helped transform Syria into a regional power. Syrian development has been motivated and hastened by the threat posed by Israel. In fact, in 1984 Assad announced Syria's determination to attain "strategic parity" with Israel and further stated that Syria would strive to match Israel's level of modernization across the wide spectrum of "political, demographic, social, educational, economic, and military aspects of life."
However, Syria's status as a regional power imposed costs and liabilities. For instance, in 1987 Syria was relatively isolated in the Arab world, primarily because of its maverick support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq War and its involvement in Lebanon. Also, its economy staggered under the weight of its military budget, and it depended heavily on the Soviet Union for military equipment.
Despite the outward appearance of radicalism and dogmatic rigidity, Syrian diplomacy was conducted on the basis of hardheaded and pragmatic calculation of perceived costs and benefits to the national interest. Its position on the ArabIsraeli conflict, once believed to be immutably rigid, changed not only in style but in substance. In the years after the October 1973 War, Syria modified its categorical refusal to negotiate directly with Israel. After 1973 it indicated its intention to negotiate, in return for Israel's withdrawal from all occupied territories and for a form of Palestinian selfdetermination .
The political effectiveness of Assad's leadership depended heavily on firm control of the pervasive military and internal security and intelligence apparatus--the only countercoup forces available to an incumbent regime. The officially sanctioned Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party, also played an increasingly important role in maintaining the regime.
Syria was a socialist state under the political influence of the Baath Party, which provided ideological legitimation and continuity to Assad's rule. However, Assad's implementation of Baath Party doctrines has been more pragmatic than ideological. To broaden the government's base, in 1972 Assad incorporated nonBaathist parties into the National Progressive Front. Although the front theoretically ruled Syria, the Baath Party remained the real power.
The authorities closely monitored political activities and dealt sternly with expressions of organized dissent or opposition--a source of grievance for the nation's intellectuals, students, some conservative Sunni religious leaders, and labor groups. Absence of open political channels other than through the Baathist-controlled framework made estimating the extent of popular support for Assad's regime difficult. Clearly, sectarian tensions persisted because the centers of power in 1987 remained in Alawi hands, whereas the majority of the population were Sunni Muslims who had traditionally held power until the Assad regime was installed in 1970. In 1987 Syrian popular opinion was split between those who supported and those who opposed President Assad's regime. However, those who opposed the regime did so vehemently, while those who supported Assad appeared ambivalent. The charismatic Assad continued to enjoy considerable personal popularity among the latter group, but its approval did not extend to his regime as a whole. Even many of Assad's supporters feared and loathed the draconian security measures that ensured the Assad regime's survival, and they were shocked at the regime's brutal repression of the Hamah insurrection in 1982. Yet this fear was mitigated by the feeling that any successor regime would be worse than Assad's, and his strong authoritarian and paternalistic management of political affairs was endorsed because it had provided Syria with its first uninterrupted period of stability since independence in 1946.
Between the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1916 and
promulgation of a permanent constitution in 1973, Syria adopted
several constitutions, all reflecting an amalgam of West European
(chiefly French), Arab, and Islamic political cultures. The
initial impetus to constitutionalism came from Syrian nationalist
leaders of the post-World War I era who had been educated in the
West during the late nineteenth century. These leaders proposed a
Western-style parliament and a separate, independent judiciary as
a counterbalance to the untrammeled power of Ottoman and later
French Mandate administrators. The system of government
envisioned by Syrian nationalists and legal scholars was to
provide for popular participation in the political process and
constitutional safeguards of personal and political rights.
Constitutionalism failed to take hold, however, because of
unremitting postindependence instability. A change in government
leadership through a coup or a countercoup was almost always
followed by a constitutional change intended to buttress the new
political order.
In 1987 the governmental structure was based on the Permanent
Constitution of March 13, 1973. This charter is similar to the
provisional constitution of May 1, 1969, as amended in February
and June 1971. The Constitution provides for a republican form of
government in what it calls "a democratic, popular, socialist,
and sovereign state" and stipulates that the people are the
ultimate source of national sovereignty.
The Constitution reaffirms the long-held ideological premise
that Syria is only a part of the one and indivisible "Arab
nation" that is struggling for complete Arab unity. Syria is
constitutionally declared still to be a member of the Federation
of Arab Republics (FAR), which was inaugurated in April 1971 by
Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Although the FAR was short lived, its
constitutional formula provides a framework for ongoing Syrian
efforts at unity with other Arab nations.
Among the principles in the Constitution is the stipulation
that the president be a Muslim, that the main source of
legislation be Islamic fikh(doctrine and jurisprudence),
and that the Baath Party be "the vanguard party in the society
and the state." In addition, the state is directed to safeguard
the fundamental rights of citizens to enjoy freedom and to
participate in political, economic, social, and cultural life
within the limits of the law. Free exercise of religious belief
is guaranteed as long as such exercise does not affect public
order. In keeping with the Arab character of the nation, the
purpose of the educational system is described as creation of "an
Arab national socialist generation with scientific training"--a
generation committed to establishment of a united Arab socialist
nation.
The Constitution's economic principles not only set forth a
planned socialist economy that should take into account "economic
complementarity in the Arab homeland" but also recognize three
categories of property. The three kinds are property of the
people, including all natural resources, public domains,
nationalized enterprises, and establishments created by the
state; collective property, such as assets owned by popular and
professional organizations; and private property. The
Constitution states that the social function of private property
shall be subordinated, under law, to the national economy and
public interests. However, expropriation may occur only with just
compensation.
Governmental powers are divided by the Constitution into
executive, legislative, and judicial categories (see fig. 13).
The Constitution is notable for strengthening the already
formidable role of the presidency; the framers of the
Constitution were clearly more concerned with the supremacy and
stability of presidential powers than with the issue of checks
and balances among the three branches of government. Official
concern for political and governmental stability is reflected in
the relatively difficult procedures for amending the
Constitution. A bill to amend the Constitution may be introduced
by the president or one-third of the members of the People's
Council (parliament), but its passage requires approval by a
majority of three-fourths of the People's Council as well as by
the president.
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK