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Remarks as prepared for delivery by
The Honorable John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
Current Strategy Forum
Newport, RI
11 June 1996
STEADY AS SHE GOES
Thank you for that kind introduction, Admiral Stark.
Admiral... Distinguished guests and participants in the
upcoming forum... Ladies and gentlemen of the Naval War
College...
I feel very honored to be here at the Naval War
College--founded in 1884 as the first Naval War College in
history. It is
great to be here at a time of profound change for the naval
service. I very much believe that we stand again at a seam in
naval history, when the Navy and Marine Corps are in the process
of reinventing themselves, much as they did in the naval
renaissance at the end of the 19th century. And today I hope to
provide some ideas to spark your discussions over the next three
days as you wrestle with the course our naval forces must steer
in this era of restless peace.
I think it very appropriate to be speaking here at the Naval
War College, given Theodore Roosevelt's long association with the
school during his service as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
There is a striking portrait of Theodore Roosevelt hanging
immediately outside my office door, and the wall clock he used is
in my office. So, I have occasion to think often of the
remarkable period of his service to our Navy.
As you may know, Roosevelt was particularly influential in
the early days of the Spanish-American War. While the Secretary
was out of town in early 1898, Roosevelt was Acting Secretary.
On his own authority and before war was declared, Roosevelt sent
Admiral Dewey, commanding the Asiatic Fleet, a cable telling him,
quote:
Keep full of coal. In the event of war your duty will
be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the
Asiatic coast, and then conduct offensive operations in
the Philippine Islands.
Try to picture that scene today. It would be as if I woke
up tomorrow morning to tell CINCPACFLT, Admiral Zlatoper, to load
up a couple of Carrier Battle Groups with Tomahawks, PGMs, and
2,000 pound bombs and send them off to the Arabian Gulf to stand
by!
The days are indeed long passed when Secretaries of the Navy
issue operational war orders, but the Service Secretaries are
still deeply involved in organizing, training, and equipping
forces for war--as well as articulating a vision for their
Service--in my case a combined vision of the Navy and Marine
Corps with the crucial assistance of the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Today, I would like to give you a status report on that
combined vision. I'll tell you up-front: our strategic vision
is on course and speed as we head into the 21st Century.
"...From the Sea" and "Forward...From the Sea" remain the
backbone of the Navy Department's strategic planning. I will
also remind you that our planning is a dynamic process. The Navy
and Marine Corps have a clear mandate to regularly refresh our
strategic plans and to update as necessary, keeping in touch with
the realities of the current budget, threat, and technology
situation. That's where the Navy's "2020 Vision" and the Marines
"Operational Maneuver From the Sea" concept come in.
But before we start entertaining a new round of grand
strategic planning... before we invest ourselves fully in 2020
Vision or SEA DRAGON experiments or Joint Vision 2010... Step
away from the problem for a few minutes to look again at our
existing strategic concept.
It is very interesting to think back to the
turn-of-the-century Navy, when a great deal of our blue-water
doctrine was
developed--by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Stephen Luce, and Bradley
Fiske--and championed by Theodore Roosevelt. As the American
Navy transitioned from a very limited role in the late 19th
century to the blue-water orientation of President Theodore
Roosevelt's Great White Fleet, fresh strategic thinking infused
American policy-makers. The American Navy essentially
re-invented itself in response to the changing world situation.
In essence, that's what occurred in the Navy and Marine
Corps earlier this decade. We had to rethink our approach to the
international security environment. The resultant planning
documents--our strategy white papers--were developed in this
context.
With that as background, let me talk briefly about where we
are now with our strategic vision... and where we're heading.
The current direction of the Navy-Marine Corps team is
powered by "...From the Sea." It's a proven strategy, one that's
remarkably responsive to changing threat and fiscal environments.
Furthermore, it's a strategy that serves as an enabling document
for the planning and preparation pursuant to the next conflict.
Let me re-emphasize the tenets of that strategic vision: to
provide the nation with Naval Expeditionary Forces... which are
Shaped for Joint Operations... and Tailored for National Needs.
These forces must Operate Forward From the Sea. I'd like to talk
briefly about how each of those four concepts have developed
during this decade.
"Expeditionary" implies a mind set, a culture, and a
commitment to fully integrated Marine and Navy forces that are
designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly. They are
structured to project power from the sea when required by
national demands. Perhaps most importantly, Naval Expeditionary
Forces are largely unrestricted by the need for transit or
overflight approval from foreign governments in order to enter
the scene of action.
So now let's talk about our joint contributions. The Navy
and Marine Corps are full partners in joint operations. For
example, a Naval Force commander can command a Joint Task Force
while the operation is primarily maritime or move that command
ashore if the campaign shifts landward at the discretion of the
Unified Commander. We're seeing that right now in Bosnia. With
Leighton Smith in charge, we've got a Navy admiral running a
predominantly land campaign--the first ever in NATO's 47-year
history.
As we see demonstrated time and again--and I don't expect
any changes for the foreseeable future--all of this is happening
now forward, and most of it is happening from the sea. As the
U.S. continues to withdraw from overseas bases, Naval Forces will
become even more relevant in meeting American forward presence
requirements. We have reduced our land-based forces dramatically
in Europe, Korea, and Panama--and we've withdrawn completely from
a number of overseas locations, like the Philippines. The bottom
line is that we must maintain maritime forces forward to balance
that loss of permanent presence.
Another key concern is that all of our forces be tailored
for national needs. Naval Forces can be continuously tailored to
developing events. The answer to every situation will not always
be a carrier battlegroup. As we do more and more in the
littoral, it may be an Amphibious Readiness Group and a surface
action group with Tomahawk missiles--or an Arsenal Ship. It may
be a group of minesweepers, with several Aegis cruisers or
destroyers for defense. Or it may be the overwhelming power of a
carrier battlegroup and an Amphibious Ready Group with embarked
Marines, operating with an Air Force composite wing and Army
forces. The key is continuously tailoring our forces to
anticipate and support national needs.
Now let me give you a sense of where all this leads us in
the organization, equipping, and training of our forces.
First of all, we are changing the way we organize, train,
and deploy naval forces. We no longer simply deploy a standard
carrier battlegroup for every contingency. As we demonstrated in
Haiti, we can tailor air wing load-outs on our carriers, or
deploy naval force packages that vary widely in composition and
capability. The key consideration is to satisfy the needs of the
Theater Commander. And, above all, we will have a renewed spirit
of cooperation and integration between the Navy and Marine Corps.
To prove that we're serious about the Navy-Marine Corps
team--and to demonstrate that even Washington can change--I moved
the senior leadership of the Marine Corps into the Pentagon
earlier this year. For the first time in history, the Commandant
of the Marine Corps, his Assistant, and his leading staff operate
in the Pentagon. The Commandant's office is next to mine... just
as is the Chief of Naval Operation's. We'll be a more cohesive
team--and be more cost-effective, as well. We train together...
we fight together... and now, we can also push paper together!
Second, we are enhancing our ability to operate in a joint
and combined manner. Let me again make this point clear: the
Navy and Marine Corps are full--and willing--participants in
joint and combined planning, exercises, and operations.
Consequently, we must continue to develop new and compatible
doctrine--via the Naval Doctrine Command. We must also train our
numbered Fleet and Marine Expeditionary staffs to command a JTF
and function as--or host--a Joint Force Air Component Command.
That's exactly the kind of work THIRD FLEET recently
completed with their highly successful JTFEX off Southern
California. It was the innovative and professional performance
of those VINSON Battlegroup Sailors that led Secretary of Defense
Bill Perry, who observed them for a couple of days, to state that
America "has the best damn Navy in the world, and no one should
ever forget that."
Third, we will focus our procurement process on equipment
systems to support our littoral warfare, without completely
abandoning our traditional blue-water role. This means, for
example, that we'll focus on integrating Navy and Marine airwings
and buy or update aircraft--like the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and
the F-14 Strike-Fighter--that are built for regional scenarios.
The next generation Joint Strike Fighter will be a true
multi-purpose, multi-service aircraft with key capabilities for
joint
strike and littoral warfare. The Marines have the V-22 and the
AAAV. We're updating our surface forces with Cooperative
Engagement Capability and our submarines with integrated,
dedicated surveillance assets like the UAV. And precision strike
capability--as I'll discuss in a moment--is key to our strategy.
In addition to platforms and hardware, we must stay engaged in
the global technological revolution in military systems. This is
an area increasingly available to our potential opponents in many
regional crisis areas.
These are all major changes for the Department of the Navy.
But this is a changing world, one in which all the services must
carefully--and frequently--examine their functions and
capabilities. We must continue to shape our forces and strategy
to deal with this era of restless peace.
That's exactly what we're doing in the Navy and Marine Corps
with "2020 Vision" and "Operational Maneuver From the Sea."
These are not stand-alone strategic plans. Rather, these are
visions which project the strategic and operational concepts
outlined in "...From the Sea" and "Forward...From the Sea" into
the future. The objective is to create a picture of the
Navy-Marine Corps team 15-30 years from now--in what I refer to
as the
Navy and Marine Corps after next--so that we can plan for our
long-term investment, training, and manpower requirements.
I mentioned earlier that our current strategic concept was
the backbone of our long-range planning. What we're doing
now--and will continue to do--is "grow" the rest of the skeletal
structure... the intricate architecture of supporting doctrine,
tactics, and strategy. That's part of the process as we attempt
to manage the changes in our security and budget environment.
I'm describing an evolutionary process in thinking--and in
force preparation. That's how I see it: the Navy and Marine
Corps will continue to refine our strategic concept, introducing
operational and programmatic changes to emerging requirements.
What we absolutely cannot do is take the pace of evolutionary
change for granted.
We often refer to an explosion of INFOTECH and a subsequent
"revolution in military affairs." Rapid changes in technology do
not readily suit the Navy's heavy capital investments. Navies
historically have needed long lead times in order to make
significant force structure adjustments. This is why our
combined vision of the future is so important.
Let me relate a story that illustrates this point. One of
my predecessors, the Secretary of the Navy during the 1920s, was
Curtis Wilbur. We had just prevailed in WWI, and he was making a
major thrust in Congress to fund Naval Aviation. Many people in
Congress were skeptical. We had just won "the war to end all
wars" and the last thing we needed was airplanes flying off
ships.
But Secretary Wilbur persisted, and got Naval Aviation off
the ground. And 20 years later, we won WWII--particularly the
war in the Pacific--in large measure due to our Naval Aviation
capability. Without Wilbur's vision and his dogged persistence
in the early 1920s to fund an emerging technology, the result
could have been catastrophic.
That's exactly the kind of vision we must have now to
prepare the Navy and Marine Corps after next for the challenges
ahead. That's the challenge I leave you with today.
These are indeed exciting times for the Navy and Marine
Corps. I wish you the best as you wrestle with these concepts in
the course of your time here.
Thank you very much for the invitation to address our common
strategic interest. God bless you... God bless our Navy and
Marine Corps... and God bless America.
-USN-