Milnet Main Intell

MILNET: U.S. Navy Strategy for the Next Century

Working With Other Nations

From the original document stored at: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ftsuwon.txt


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Department of the Navy Policy Paper
"...From the Sea" Update
WORKING WITH OTHER NATIONS
Fall 1993

     Reflecting dramatic changes in the geo-political landscape,
the Navy and Marine Corps have developed a new strategic vision --
"...From the Sea."  Published in late 1992, "...From the Sea"
shifts naval strategy away from global war at sea to regional
concerns in areas important to U.S. security interests.  The
operational focus of the naval services is now fixed on littoral
warfare, with a correspondingly greater reliance on rapid and
effective response to events which threaten U.S. interests.
 
     "...From the Sea" is a warfighting policy statement that
identifies littoral areas as the most likely location of future
combat.  This policy recognizes the fundamental importance of
establishing relations with security partners in peacetime before
the onset of a crisis, and being forward- positioned to deter and
react effectively to armed aggression. Traditionally these
functions have come under the category of forward presence.   As
discussed in "...From the Sea Update on Forward Presence,"
successful peacetime forward presence reduces the likelihood of
armed conflicts and the requirement to fight -- in the littoral or
elsewhere.
 
     This paper builds on "...From the Sea" and subsequent
"Updates" to address the important role of naval forces in
conducting combined exercises and operations.  Aimed at promoting
peace by sustaining and strengthening relations with security
partners, combined exercises and operations also help avert crises
in the first place.  Finally, if deterrence fails, there are
significant crisis benefits from an established pattern of combined
exercises and operations.
 
A CHANGED STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
 
     Much has been written about the differences between the Cold
War world and today's security environment.  Perhaps one of the
major differences is the fact that the United States is no longer
the leader of an alliance or coalition dedicated to thwart a rival
global power.  No longer do we seek support from friends and Allies
to counter a hostile global threat.  No longer is ours primarily a
"negative" alliance -- anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, etc.  More so
today than in nearly half a century, our nation is able to stress
positive international objectives -- pro-democracy, pro-trade,
pro-free markets, pro-human rights, etc.
 
FORWARD PRESENCE IN A CHANGED ENVIRONMENT
 
     In this new era, forward presence is more than just enforcing
peace and deterring aggression in places like the Persian Gulf.
Forward presence is now linked inextricably to the fact that we
live in an economically and politically interdependent world in
which information, capital, raw materials, and manufactured goods
must flow freely across borders and oceans.  In this environment,
our partners are equal beneficiaries of peace and of free, open
commerce and communication.  Forward presence today underscores
U.S. commitment to shared  objectives with our friends. Exercises
and operations with other naval forces reinforce the bonds of
partnership and promote peace.
 
PEACETIME BENEFITS OF COMBINED EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS
 
     Because of increased interdependence and shared objectives in
the post-Cold War era, cooperation and interaction with the naval
forces of friends and Allies offer new benefits.
 
* Promoting peace through enhancing trust, confidence, and
transparency.
 
     Combined operations and exercises demonstrate U.S.
partnership, and they foster confidence and trust in the U.S. Not
only do peacetime exercises and operations nurture U.S. bilateral
relations with participating states, but by including multiple
nations, the relations among nations within a region are improved.
 
     For example, during the annual U.S. Naval deployment to South
America, known as UNITAS, multilateral exercises are conducted
among Brazilian, Uruguayan, Argentinean, and U.S. naval forces.
Similarly, UNITAS brings Colombian, Ecuadorian, and U.S. forces
together, clarifying intentions and rendering  objectives more
transparent.  This  enhances bilateral and multilateral trust,
confidence, and understanding.  Nations that exercise and operate
together rarely fight each other.
 
     Similarly, the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces for the Central
Command has initiated an aggressive exercise program with the
forces of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and
Qatar.  Supported by all Gulf Cooperation Council members, this
program is instrumental in strengthening the existing coalition,
providing important security assistance to participating nations,
and improving U.S. access and relations in the region.
 
     In the summer of 1993 the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
expanded the annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) exercise from the
traditional core group of German, Dutch, Danish, and U.S. units to
include participants from Sweden, Poland, Russia, Finland, Estonia,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Norway.  The eager and enthusiastic
participation by the new players suggests that the expanded BALTOPS
exercise can help cement  improved relations among nations in the
Baltic region -- while also improving U.S. bilateral relations. In
addition to the established annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
exercises with the navies of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and
Canada, the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Pacific utilizes less
ship-intensive options to further the Pacific Unified Commander's
Cooperative Engagement Strategy in the region.  For example, single
ships are deployed to visit and exercise with some of the smaller
nations in the Pacific region. The Commander of U.S. Marine Forces
in the Pacific deploys units as small as a Company of Marines to
work with the ground forces of the smaller islands.
 
     Additionally, Seabee Civic Action teams, various Mobile
Training Teams, seminars like the SEVENTH FLEET Tropical Medicine
Seminar, and bilateral Navy-to-Navy Staff Talks are employed to
enhance relations in the Pacific region.
 
*  Reducing the burden of enforcing UN sanctions.  
 
     Independent of multilateral exercises in connection with
forward presence deployments, the U.S. Navy assigns ships to two
standing multinational naval forces - Standing Naval Forces
Atlantic (SNFL) and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM).
SNFL was established in 1968 and has successfully operated since
then, building interoperability among NATO navies.  Nine NATO
navies provide cruiser, destroyer, and frigate type ships to SNFL.
Building on the SNFL precedent, the SNFM squadron was commissioned
in 1992 and promptly deployed to enforce United Nations Security
Council resolutions in connection with the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia.  Eight NATO navies provide ships to SNFM.  The U.S.
Navy routinely provides a guided missile frigate. Through the
coordination of the NATO Commander for the Southern Region
(AFSOUTH), SNFL, SNFM, and Western European Union (WEU) units today
are jointly executing all United Nations maritime interdiction
missions in the Adriatic (Operation Sharp Guard), thereby
significantly reducing the burden on the U.S. Navy.  Reducing the
burden of enforcing UN sanctions can be an important benefit of
participating in standing multi-national naval forces.
 
*  Banked Good Will.
 
     Combined exercises and operations also build a foundation of
shared interests and good will upon which the U.S. can later draw
-- either during peacetime or crisis response  periods.  The rush
of nations to join the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Coalition in 1990
and to assist with Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in late 1992
was based, at least partly, on years of banked good will furthered
by exercising with U.S. forces.
 
*  Deter acts counter to U.S. interests.  
 
     Although there is no longer a global threat, adventurism by
rogue states is a danger we must guard against.  Whether motivated
by territorial, ethnic, or economic ambitions, an unscrupulous
ruler may conclude that the chances for success are better now than
they have been for decades.  However, combined exercises and
operations send a powerful signal to nations within a region that
might consider actions counter to the interests of the United
States and its friends.  Exercises and operations by regional
states with forward present U.S. forces signal that the United
States is not alone; nor are our friends and Allies.
 
CRISIS BENEFITS OF COMBINED EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS
 
     Should this deterrent fail, the accumulated experience of a
pattern of combined exercises and operations will enhance U.S.
political legitimacy, force credibility, operational effectiveness,
and access.
 
*  Legitimacy.  
 
     While the ability to operate independently must be preserved,
in this new era there will be many instances that demonstrate how
having regional partners facilitates the realization of U.S.
objectives during crises.
 
     These partnerships suggest shared values and international
consensus, and lend international legitimacy to U.S. interests.
This renders regional partnerships especially important; such
partnerships are cultivated by combined exercises and operations
like those discussed above.  Peacetime combined exercises and
operations lend legitimacy to U.S. presence within a region and
dispel any doubt a potential challenger might have regarding U.S.
interests and regional support.
 
     Power projection from the sea, and even effecting rescues from
the sea, often involve breaches of national sovereignty, i.e.,
entry into another state's territorial waters.  The only legal
authority for infringement on national sovereignty comes from the
United Nations Charter, which requires that the target state's
behavior constitute a ". . . threat to . . . international peace."
Without broad and visible international consensus and concurrence
by regional states, authorization to violate another nation's
sovereignty is unlikely.  Such concurrence is made more probable by
combined exercises and operations.
 
*  Credibility.
 
     Forces become credible when the intent to  use them seems
possible and imminent to observers in target countries.  The
appearance of a capable naval force from over the horizon is a
credible force which can be used for many purposes.  A force that
includes nations from the region is even more credible because it
implies regional political will and resolve to use force.
Participation by friends and Allies in routine peacetime exercises
with U.S. forces not only builds interoperability, but it also can
send a signal to would-be regional challengers that exercise
participants from the region possess the political will to join
with the U.S. to use force during crises.
 
*  Operational Effectiveness.
 
     Effective combat operations in the littoral will present
technical and tactical challenges that differ from open-ocean
operations.  These challenges can include the presence of short
reaction time enemy shore-based aircraft, tactical ballistic
missiles, diesel submarines in shallow water, mines, and
sea-skimming missiles launched from fast patrol boats easily
concealed, masked, and protected in the littoral environment.
Cooperation from friends and Allies can help meet such challenges
by complementing and supplementing U.S. expertise and equipment.
 
     Combined exercises and operations with the navies of friends
and allies directly enhance the combat effectiveness of the U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps in several ways.  Over time, Commanders are
able to develop  "situational awareness" -- a key element to
success in combat.  Such awareness includes familiarity with
specific environmental conditions peculiar to regional areas, and
an appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of systems and
equipments in the combined force.  Peacetime combined exercises and
operations also provide opportunities to practice and refine
procedures, tactics, and doctrine designed to increase the combat
effectiveness of the force.
 
     Finally, the mutual trust and confidence developed among
Commanders during combined naval exercises and operations are
essential to enabling prompt and effective coalition combat
operations.
 
*  Access.
 
     While "...From the Sea" emphasizes the importance of the
"enabling role" of naval forces, it also details the role they play
in  assuring that the operational effort can be sustained as long
as necessary.  Sustainability involves transport, munitions, and
communications adequate to support the operation. Sustainability is
greatly enhanced by the ability to base equipment and personnel
ashore.
 
     For example, availability of shore-based aircraft to
supplement carrier air wing aircraft offers obvious sustainment
advantages.  Yet, access to airfields and other shore-based
facilities, including permission to use foreign airspace, is not
normally granted without commonality of purpose, and high
confidence both in the proficiency of U.S. forces and the mutually
beneficial nature of long-term U.S. intentions. The U.S. case is
promoted in all these areas by routinely conducting peacetime
combined exercises and operations.
 
NAVY-TO-NAVY STAFF TALKS
 
     Flag level Navy-to-Navy Staff Talks also are instrumental in
enhancing relations with friends and Allies.  The Navy initiated
this program over 15 years ago to facilitate discussions of
tactics, doctrine, policies, equipment interoperability, and future
operations and exercises.  The program has grown, and today we hold
talks with 16 nations, including Russia.  The talks are conducted
on a 15-24 month cycle, with the location alternating between
Washington and reciprocal countries.
 
     Over the years these talks have resulted in close working
relationships, and greater  mutual understanding and trust.
 
SUMMARY
 
     Peacetime combined exercises and operations, coupled with
staff talks, further mutual political, economic, and security
objectives by demonstrating consensus and shared values between the
U.S. and its partners.  Combined exercises and operations also have
a deterrent effect. But, should deterrence fail, they serve as the
basis for politically and militarily viable coalitions to combat
nations that might challenge the interests of the U.S. and its
partners. Accordingly, our Navy and Marine Corps will continue to
pursue a robust program of working with other nations, and will
capitalize on current and potential opportunities for cooperative
interaction with our friends and Allies around the world.
                               -USN-