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In the mid seventies and throughout the eighties, U.S. and other
nuclear
weapons developers began to explore concepts learned from above ground
and underground nuclear tests. The theoretical nuclear chemistry
yielded the knowlege that a nuclear explosion created toxic substances
out of previously benign matter, such as dust or debris. In
addition, the nuclear fuel cycle produced large amounts of radioactive
waste which were deadly to humans.
Radioactive Fallout
Further research found that every type of nuclear blast produced this dangerous material with fission weapons typically producing more than hydrogen weapons. And of course this also led to the understanding of how to make some bombs more "dirty" than others. Generation of the hazardous material was a direct result of the nuclear explosion itself -- the nuclear chain reaction changing the nature of previously benign material into deadly radioactive material. Dust and debris became deadly toxins producing immediate death, lingering sickness, or in most cases an onslaught of various forms of virulent cancers.
Nuclear Waste
It was also realized that fuel rods removed
from a nuclear reactor contained material not useable as reactor fuel
nor
useful in constructing a nuclear bomb *1. The material that was
left
over was highly radioactive and even more deadly than the material
found
in "simple" fallout. It could be reprocesssed and then reused for
nuclear fuel or used to create nuclear weapons. The reprocessing,
however, was extremely expensive -- costing much more than simply
removing contaniments from uranium ore. However, a special kind
of reactor could be used in the reprocessing that would create
Plutonium and Uranium isotopes ideal for use in a nuclear weapon.
Spent fuel rods suddenly became strategic.
Making use of Unuseable Waste
In the sixties and seventies, think tanks looking at new weapons possibilities explored the concept of building a conventional weapon whose goal was to spread toxic material over a widespread area - obstensibly to disperse chemcial or biologial agents over a target. The typical problems included spreading the material without destroying its toxic abilities. For instance, early tests of biological or chemical dispersion type weapons showed that the temperatures of an explosion tended to sterilize or combust the very material you were hoping to distribute.
But dispersion of nuclear material seemed to be, for the most part, immune to such effects. In fact the burning of nuclear material tends to simply produce radioactive "smoke", very similar to radioactive fallout. In addition, the conventional explosion throws the nuclear material away from the device and thus spreads already radioactive material all around. This material then becomes dangerous to anyone nearby and requires extremely expensive and intrusive cleanup, as well as may cause death from toxic or radiation poisoning. Quarantine and cleanup of contaminents would be extremely costly and could easily cause economic damage by halting work and interrupting lives for weeks.
During the eighties, some experimentation was done in several countries to determine just how to build such a weapon so that an understanding could be had of its effects and to help design defenses against them. A side issue was also looked at -- how to detect them in development, production, and in transit.
Scientists also discoverd another fact. The RDW is an ideal
terrorist
weapon. The thought of exposure to a radioactive source frightens
most people more than the possibility of being caught by an explosion.
Actual Weapons
In the nineties, defecting Iraqi nuclear scientists brought back stories of a program to develop a deployable RDW sponsored by Saddam Hussein. The reason for this focus was an Iraqi logistical challenge. For Saddam, nuclear waste procurement was easy -- he already had such waste on hand from nuclear reactors used for power generation in his country. In contrast, weapons grade material required for creating a true nuclear blast was hard to come by. Thus a program was started in parallel with the nuclear bomb program -- a program to develop an RDW using the nuclear waste already on hand.
The Radioactive Dispersal Weapon (RDW) design is actually quite simple. A conventional set of explosives is surrounded by radioactive waste. A timer or altitude detector triggers the blast, which atomizes some portion of the material into an aerosol which travels like a cloud, as well as distributes large chunks of un-atomized radioactive material in a wide pattern. Typically the weapon would be designed to be detonated in the air, spreading nuclear waste over a fairly wide area -- say several blocks in city. Since terrorists might not have the means to deliver a device designed as a conventional gravity bomb, a more likely scenario for their use would be weapon designed into a large crate and placed near windows, high in skyscraper. The blast would produce a "spray" of cloud and chunks in a swath out onto the city below.
The target area would be coated -- cars, buildings, streets, you name it. And of course anyone in the area would most likely inhale the radioactive material. Cleanup would require quarantining the area, washing off the waste and isolating runoff so that the radioactive material wasn't swept into local sewage ponds or nearby lakes and waterways. Of course those who came in contact with the material would require decontamination as well, and then some would require lengthy and expensive medical treatment. Some would die.
Unlike a nuclear blast, however, the radioactive weapon will have a
very small blast damage area, and ignoring the cleanup issues, only
creates
a small number of victims. Some are killed or wounded by the
explosion
-- perhaps a few hundred maximum, and then some may die later -- mostly
from
the secondary effect - contamination. This is in contrast to
hundreds
of thousands who would be killed and injured in a nuclear blast and the
resultant
fallout.
Other delivery methods can be imagined -- an aircraft could crash land
on a building or a small SUV or van could transport the device to a
high point in a city built near hilly ground. Or for maximum
effect the device could be driven into a major financial district --
London, Wall and Broad in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, or any
other major city in the world which has a major center for trade.
Manufacturing
Manufacturing an RDW is quite simple. A trunk or a crate could
be made into an RDW. For instance, one could mount explosives in
a truck and surround those explosives with nuclear waste. While
this
type of weapon would have extremely limited dispersion, the terror
effects
remain pretty much the same. As indicated previously, a large
crate
exploded near the top of a skyscraper, say near a window, has a much
more
large dispersion area. The size of an RDW could be as small as a
bomb in an attaché case, to a large crate size bomb. The
size
will determine the amount of radioactive waste to be distributed around
by the explosion. This is what makes the RDW so worrisome.
A number of small devices could be planted around a city and produce
radioactive
hot spots and severe panic. A large single device could be used
to
"dirty up" an area of two to six blocks in diameter. Mutliple
explosions also create the problem of detection -- reports of multiple
explosions within a few miles of each other will result in
mis-identification and misdirection.
Since this type of RDW is totally unsophisticated, anyone can build and deliver the weapon as long as they have access to a large enough supply of nuclear waste and explosives. Estimates are that an RDW could be developed and manufactured in three to six months regardless of size as long as the manufacturing facilities were scaled appropriately. Once development was completed production manufacturing could deliver about two devices a week in a single line, assuming you had enough radioactive waste. Aside from the cost for the radioactive waste (if purchase of waste material is required), the device construction could be as low as $600 for a 1 foot square device, and up to $12,000 for a device nearing 4 foot across.
The waste material could range from radioactive slurry in nuclear
power
plant fuel rod production, to the material from depleted reactor fuel
rods
which is no longer useful for power generation and unsuitable for
weapons
production. While not as effective, even previously benign material
from
a reactor that has been exposed could be used as radioactive shrapnel
--
bits of reactor vessel linings, tools and fixtures exposed in a power
plant,
or infrastructure items from a pile. If radioactive material is
to
be purchased on the black market, it could cost hundreds of thousands
of
dollars for only a few ounces. Many pounds would be required to
make
an effective RDW.
Unfortunately, funding to terrorists does not yet seem to be a problem
for them, thus it is quite possible that a terrorist group not only can
afford to make the purchase, but there is speculation that purchases
may already have taken place.
Availability
Today RDW devices are technologically feasible weapons to
manufacture.
Except for the difficulty for the average person to obtain nuclear
wastes,
the weapons can be constructed with materials available to individuals
and governments alike. Through low level black market contacts, this
type
of weapon could already be available to terrorists -- for instance the
same dealers who sell terrorists their guns probably would be able to
find
someone to sell them the explosives and nuclear waste required for the
RDW. And of course in some cases explosives are
already
in the arsenals of most terrorist groups. Full up, ready to
deploy
weapons may soon find their way to the clandestine weapons market as
well.
With nations like Iraq, Iran and possibly Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and
North
Korea who have terrorist connections, the opportunity for both
component
and full device sales to terrorists is at an all time high.
Highly desired by those creating a RDW is Americanium-241.
Am-241 is extremely hazardous, giving off more gamma rays pound for
pound than any other isotope.
U.S. Director of Central Intelligence Tenet reported to Congress after 9/11 that while there is no conclusive proof any nation or terrorist group has created an RDW, there is also an alarming absence of proof that the devices have not been placed into production. Recent finds in Afghanistan show that the Taliban or Al-Qaida might have been experimenting with the design and the materials for an RDW.
Since it is expected that at least one nation has begun work on an RDW devices several years ago, it is quite possible the design is available to terrorists today. Construction and delivery-ready devices may also be available on the black market.
Statements from public and protected sources lead MILNET to believe
that RDWs will be used by terrorists in the short term. We
evaluate the risk as being high and our confidence in our sources is
also
high. Recent efforts by the intelligence community to find
manufacturing
facilities for such devices indicate that MILNET is not alone in its
analysis
and conclusions on the risk level.
*1 NOTE: Spent Fuel Rods may be reprocessed however
to produce
nuclear weapons material, however the expense is exhorbitant.
Unfortunately,
due to the observation that the process was extremely expensive and
terribly ineffective has produced a sort of blind spot in nuclear waste
material handling, applying focus on the toxicity rather than the
non-proliferation aspects of the rods. In the last decade,
however, it has been realized that a terrorist, who may not be able to
lay hands on the cost effective materials may decide instead to acquire
nuclear waste -- both for reasons of building a nuclear fission
weapon, or to preapre a RDW or dirty bomb. Unfortunately, this
realization may have come far too late -- there is significant
unaccounted -for nuclear waste that may indeed be a) still very toxic,
and b) quite useable for either purpose. This is compounded by
the fact that Am-241, a waste product of many reactors, is so much more
deadly than any of the other waste products. Plutonium-241, one
of the high value nuclear weapons material, decays into Am-241 and thus
is a byproduct of long storage of weapons grade material, either
waiting to be built into a bomb or indeed, while sitting in the bomb in
its storage facility. Thus nations with a nuclear arsenal which
makes use of plutonium, there is a constant production of Am-241
occuring (aobut 0.5% P-241 decays to Am-241 per year).
Sources:
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