MILNET Brief: SASC Hearings August 2004

MILNET Brief
Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 8/16/2004, 8/17/2004

"I also come to it with an adage in mind that I find useful: To those who would tear down what is falls is the responsibility to putting in place something better. " I would reimind that it is far easier to critique and find fault than it is to build "

- Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, SASC Hearings, August 17, 2004.

The following are the electronically submitted versions of written statements presented to the Senate Armed Forces Committee hearings on August 16 and August 17 of 2004. The hearings were held to discuss the "Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community".

August 16:

Dr. James Schlesinger, Chairman, Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations
Frank C. Carlucci, Former Secretary of Defense, Chairman Emeritus, The Carlyle Group
Dr. John J. Hamre, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, President and CEO, Center for Strategic and International Studies

August 17:

Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense
John E. McLaughlin, Acting Director of the CIA
General Richard B. Meyrs, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (electronic copy not submitted)

MILNET Summary of the Testimony

Nearly all the panelists were clearly against the concept of moving any current DoD intelligence operations outside the control (and budget) of the Department of Defense. The underlying tone was that they felt the addition of a National Intelligence Director was not needed and besides would compete, to the degradation of the National Security Advisor. All three panelists were of the opinion that the problems associated with the 9/11 terrorists were centered around inter-agency communication and specifically in the FBI and CIA, not in DoD organizations.

All the panelists believe that removing DoD intelligence operations from the Department would have major negative impacts to their operations.

Mr. Carlucci wrote, "Unity of command is essential to military operations" and cited the fact that the failures were also related to humint and analysis, recommending spending more resources in that direction as well as in better efforts to protect the sources and methods since it is clear potential human intelligence recruits are reluctant to talk with CIA officers due to disclosures.

Donald Rumsfeld stated in his written testimony, "what kept me up at nights was intelligence...My concern back in 2001 was, and remains today, that a combination of terrorists and states that wish to do us harm will exploit that global environment, and gain access to weapons of mass destruction." Rumsfeld felt the biggest causes for frustrating our in intelligence efforts are:

Our advesaries are keenly aware of our vulnerabilities
They need to succeed only occassionally whereas we are obliged to defend against them everywhere and at all times
Through a combination of espionage against the U.S., irresponisble leaks, demarches, official disclosures and the general advance of scientific and technical knowledge, advesaries have learned far too much about how we collect, analyze, and use intelligence
Adversaries have many advantages in denying information to and decieving intelligence analysts and policymakers alike about their capabilities and intentions
As a result they are capable of surprising us as well as friendly foreign countries.

Rumsfeld also stated, "It is also my impression that we must repair our HUMINT capabilities. They were especially hard hit in the budget cuts beginning in the early 1990s."

Dr. Schelsinger stated early in his written testimony, "The Commission has rightly observed that the events leading up to 9/11 represent "a failure of imagination". Yet, one should not assume that changing wiring diagrams is a sure fire way to stimulate imagination." and later stated, "...the accuracy, the immediacy, and the believability of intelligence is crucial." "To shift control over crucial intelligence asseets outside the Department of Defense risks weakening the relative military advantage of the United Staes -- and at the same time creates the incentive to divert resources into (likely inferior) intelligence capabilities, which would further reduce the available forces."

Acting CIA Director McLaughlin stated, "...intelligence support to the military, especially in time of war, should not be allowed to diminish...". He echoed much of what the SecDEF said, summarizing a bulleted list by stating, "I believe that short, clear lines f command and control are required in whatever structure you establish, regardless of what you call its leader. Tree words are key" agility, flexibility, and speed. You need to build these into any new structures and procedures.

Mr. McLaughlin also counseled patience, saying "But to quote a saying I learned during my Army years; if you want it bad; you will get it bad."

Former Secretary of Defense John Hamre was the exception to most of the panelists, stating that he thought the NSA, NGA, and the NRO could function outside the DoD, however placed caveats on the move, citing the need to a) continue to ensure military personnel are manning much of the operations to provide a means to rotate military officers into those roles for both experience and variety in an officer's career, b) appoint a very senior board to oversee the new department, c) keep a number of the new technical intelligence assets in the DoD for example UAVs, and d) strengthen oversightm foscusing on the outputs instead of so much focus on inputs to the system. "Your oversight will help insure tha the new intelligence system is responsive to the warfighters."

MILNET Analysis

It is clear that the majority (all but one) of the panelists were against moving NSA, NGA, and NRO out of the control of the Secretary of Defense. This is not surprising since the majority of witnesses benefit (or used to benefit) in one way or another from the budget afforded the DoD intelligence budget. Putting that aside, the majority made excellent cases for keeping military control of the current DoD elements of the Intelligence Community.

There is also the air of the classic military desire to keep control of all its assets. In this way, a commander can override resistance by issuing an order and maintain his responsibility to command. To do otherwise would be to abbrogate command and no commander wants to be placed in that position.

We must also put aside the natural tendency for the witnesses to resist changes that would effect the defense budget. While the witnesses are human, MILNET believes they are indeed very concerned with the ability of the military to get the intelligence they need, and fear the civilian control of what they believe need to be military assets. Take the NSA for instance. For both tactical and strategic reasons, the military needs to understand the SIGINT situation at any given moment. The NSA needs more analysts and linguists, not more bureaucracy or a different reporting structure. Some believe that if those resources were in abundance, the "dots" might have been connected, simply because intercepts languished due to a lack of personnel to decode and analyze them. If this is even remotely possible, we MUST NOT allow that circumstance to occur again.

The panel's underlying rationale seems to be that we must focus on REAL issues, like interagency communication and cross discipiline, cross-agency analysis. That will entice better imagination, not creating a new bureaucrat. Most were more in favor of separating the CIA director's responsibility from that of the leader of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

MILNET Conclusion

MILNET also believes that separating the Central Intelligence role from that of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency would be more effective than creating an NID. The Intelligence Leadership Act proposed in January of 2003 is perhaps a good example of legislation (with appropriate careful review to meet current goals). The panelists before the SASC appeared to support that idea over

It is MILNET's conclusion that the DoD should retain control of all of its intelligence operations. If an NID is appointed, he or she will have to convince the Secretary of Defense to reallocate resources. If there is a dispute, the National Security Advisor and ultimately the President can step in to resolve it. That process already works well and needn't be changed.

The written statements of the panelists did not address what MILNET believes is the real DoD failure during the events of 9/11.

MILNET believes the DoD's failure in 9/11 was not in the intelligence area, but rather in an almost slapstick approach to the defense of U.S. airspace when the threat was realized. Immediate improvements in that area appear to have removed that problem, and the stand up of the Northern Command and subsequent Continental operations look to be more on par with what the nation needs. Constant review and exercise of that capability needs to take place however. If the national command authority authorizes the shoot down of any aircraft, we need to be assured that the pilots with the capability know they "have a green light".

Further Reading:

The Intelligence Community Leadership Act, S.190, The Congressional Record, 1/18/2003 (MILNET Mirror)
U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Hearings on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, MILNET, August 2004.
Proposed Changes to U.S. Intelligence Community, MILNET, 8/24/2004
Senator Roberts Calls for Real Intelligence Reform with 9/11 National Security Protection Act, 8/23/2004 (MILNET Mirror)
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (The 9/11 Commission), June 23, 2004 (MILNET Mirror)
Intelligence Community Brief, MILNET, 8/23/2004