MILNET Brief
  NBC Sensors, 2/08/2005

"The thing we are trying to detect is evolving over time. It's a dynamic, abnormal needle in a haystack, and it's hard to develop a device that doesn't give false positives or negatives."

- Gary Resnick, Los Alamos Labs, July 2003 1

Updates

One of the pressing issues in Homeland Security is the detection of agents that are deadly to us in the from of a Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical attack.  Or for that mattter, to prevent such attacks by detecting movement of illicit, deadly cargos moving throughout the nation. Given the fact that human inspections are time consuming and detrimental to active commerce, the problem becomes to design systems that are always awake, automatic, and require little or no human intervention.

Of course combinations of those criteria or systems that use a small amount of human intervention -- such as humans taking samples and then placing the samples in automated detection machines -- are a first step to learning how to process information that later automated sensors will perform without human intervention.

And failing to be imaginative is not one of the problems researchers are taking in this critical area of research.  From nano-technology to micro-mechanical devices, new sensors are being developed that will soon lead to the ability to better guard Americans from a host of threats from biological and chemical to yes even nuclear materials.  By the way, in this briefing, we want to differentiate between science fiction's nanotechnology and micro-machines from the real thing 10.  These are not little robots in your bloodstream.  They are mechanical and extremely small, but are far from 100% autonomous and certainly don't crawl around on little legs.

The research is taking place as part of a much larger concept, the idea of building a huge sensor grid throughout the U.S., all networked to an automated analysis and fusion center that will enable Homeland Security to provide early warning of an attack in progress or perhaps more importantly, movement of hazardous materials nationwide.  Imagine an alarm sounding and the word going out that Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical weapons grade materials are on the move so that Federal, State, and Local authorities can respond in time to prevent a terrorist attack.  Much of the same technology could easily be used in key installations to detect an attack as it is happening.

That is the ambitious goal and part of a large U.S. funded program that includes both civilian and DoD contractors.  When could we see such a network in place?  Well a lot of this is classified, naturally, and more important, much of the technology required is still in its infancy.  Besides, the funding for such a huge network of sensors communicating to regional or a central location hasn't even been studied or proposed seriously yet.  It is all part of the concept being investigated at this time.

This briefing will cover this topic area by assuming that detecting transporation is the most difficult of problems, and will not address implementation of an attack warning system.  To this end, MILNET will cover several sub-topic areas:





What Has To Be Sensed

Critical to protecting the homeland are systems that will sense Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical materials, either in clandestine storage, or as they are generated into our environment -- read that as an attack is taking place.

While a nuclear attack is going to be pretty obvious from the get-go, a biological attack and many chemical attacks are simply undetectable using our human senses.  In fact, the human senses, if they were to detect the attack, would be far too late in their assessment -- like a smell detected, you can hardly run from it once it's reached your nose.

Thus the list of what has to be sensed is similar to things human sensory apparatus might detect, but of course sooner and by more robust systems than humans.  And of course, we want to detect the materials before they pose a danger -- waiting for a nuclear weapon to go off (dirty bomb or a fission/fusion bomb) is pretty stupid in the realm of protection scenarios.

Nuclear

Nuclear materials are perhaps the scariest of all the materials to the laymen, yet many believe the biological are far more dangerous.  n any case, setting your personal danger quotient aside, the nuclear materials do carry the worst overall threat to life and property. While you can scrub off radioactive contaminants, it is quite another thing to remove the effects from your blood, organs, and bone marrow -- the three areas that are attacked almost simultaneously by nuclear material.  Thus the concern over nuclear material is both rational and logical.

Nuclear material comes from two major sources -- weapons and industry.  We hope that weapons grade material is under such safeguards as to not pose a threat.  However, the truth of the matter may be dismaying. Accidents, thefts, and mismanagement are all possible in human endeavors and even the U.S. with its security conscious mentality and huge funding has not done the best job, despite being better than most nuclear nations.  Accidents with nuclear material during the cold war era were few and far between and of course no  high-order accidental detonation has ever occurred in world history, but the fact remains that accidents do occur.

Sensors however are not aimed primarily at accidental release of nuclear material, but transportation or delivery of nuclear materials in to our environment.  Intentional uses are the target, and thus we will focus on assembly, transportation, and delivery.  However, as MILNET has already done an excellent job on treating the issue of nuclear terrorism, we will summarize that briefing here.

Nuclear material sensors must detect radioisotopes such as produced by two types of primary sources -- nuclear reactors (nuclear power fuel cycle) or industrial applications. Note that industrial applications in this context does not include nuclear reactors.  We are lumping the nuclear fuel cycle in with weapons grade material producers -- a subtle distinction exists between the two and for our purposes lumping them together is important.

Much of the material of concern is found under scrutiny by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  The NRC is full of highly motivated and devoted workers intent on keeping the public safe from nuclear material.  It is undeniably one of the best organizations for "Safety-First" found in this country.  In fact some of the nuclear sensor research is being conducted with oversight by the NRC, who obviously has a keen interest in their development.

A set of tables from the report Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks, Monterey Center for Non-proliferation, are illustrative in this context.  The first is a table of nuclear reactor produced products that we wish to sense for:


Source:  Monterey Center for Non-proliferation 5

The next is a table of those radio-isotopes that are typically stored in industry in sealed containers or containers that act as generators (sealed but opened for short periods of time to allow alpha, beta, and gamma particles to escape):


Source:  Monterey Center for Non-proliferation 5

The last table deals with all radio-isotopes used in various industrial activities or devices and also includes those usually found in test tubes, applied to a surface or placed in position for sensing purposes.  It is interesting because it also shows us the radioactivity levels of the various radiation sources:


Source:  Monterey Center for Non-proliferation 5

As you can see, the list of radio-isotopes than might be sensed by a network of nuclear sensors numbers at around 8 non weapons grade materials.  If you add three isotopes of uranium and two of plutonium (used in nuclear weapons), you wind up with a total of 13 nuclear materials you would wish to detect. 

The technological problem for this sensing is that shielding can be used to hinder direct observation/detection.  Of course a heavy lead box around the sources might in-of-itself provide a means for detection -- it would be hard to carry a lead box aboard or place in the cargo hold of an aircraft or ocean liner these days. However, hidden inside a container would be extremely difficult detect without close inspection.  Recently, the television show, CSI: Miami aired an episode (CBS Television, 2/7/2005) where they demonstrated the Customs Service and Border Security division of Homeland Security using a gamma ray inspection device -- which essentially is able to peer inside a container with an x-ray like device.  This great new sensor is far from being automated, however, and is not exactly clandestine. It requires a crane and a human operator.  It does however illustrate how a lead box would stand out under container by container "manual" inspection, thus shielding a radioactive source will in-of-itself give away its presence.

Like explosives, nuclear materials leave a telltale reminder of their passage.   Only the use of a very high caliber clean room can prevent the carrying of minute amounts of radio-isotopes on the surface of storage vessels.  Once the vessel has been opened, things in the path of the source will be irradiated and then the objects irradiated will leave their own traces.

Thus another method for detecting nuclear materials is looking for the very small but barely detectable traces.  Again you have to get up really close to do this detection, and shielding can defeat that detection.  However, that is exactly where some research is going at present -- using micro-machines and nano-technology to differentiate between normal background radiation and that which is nefarious.



Biological

Biological agents are usually silent, undetectable by the human senses and deadly.  Worse, they are contracted without detection and carried and possibly spread before the human or animal displays symptoms.  This fact makes the biological agent extremely hard to detect in our environment.

Again nano-technology and micro-machines are the solution.  For example several medical manufacturers produce microscopic processing units that take in a sample and perform tasks that used to be found in a huge analysis machine, and only recently were reduced to a suitcase sized detector.  The micro-machine versions are on the order of micro-chips found in computers, processing biological samples quickly and efficiently, and with far less false readings.

The difficult task, again is looking at the complex and relatively large number of biologicals we need to detect.

The Department of Homeland Security has published a section on their homepage detailing the various biological and chemical agents of concern, and we take from that document the biologicals (reproduced in a more compete form in the MILNET Briefing: Chemical and Biological Weapons) 6:

Aflatoxin           This biological is produced by certain fungi found on grains, peanuts, or other foods under specific conditions (which we won't go into for obvious reasons). The toxin is a fast acting poison that once ingested, attacks the digestive system, and leads quickly to shutdown of the renal system, causing a painful death (typically death is from acute liver poisoning).
Anthrax Anthrax is a naturally occurring biological germ which attacks either the lungs and heart (pulmonary form) or the intestines (intestinal form). Anthrax is transmitted quite easily from meat animals to those hosts consuming the meat. The pulmonary form is ingested through the normal course of breathing. Both forms are deadly within hours, the intestinal form having typical toxic ingestion symptoms such as vomiting, intestinal bleeding, severe diarrhea. Coma and death are final stages of the attack.
Botulinum A germ with both useful and dangerous properties, Botulinum can cause botulism, a horribly efficient and toxic killer. The biological warfare agent is more toxic per quantity then nerve gas. Exposure (via aerosol) can be deadly within 12 hours, however incapacitation does not occur until the severe onset of symptoms, which may not show until up to 18 hours after ingestion. 
Smallpox In the 1980s, smallpox was considered no longer a threat, with no cases worldwide for decades. smallpox is a virulent, highly infectious disease, which if untreated quickly is extremely deadly. However, since there are essentially no natural occurring strains of the disease left, it is believed only cultured samples from health or older biological weapons laboratories exist and can be harvested.

We should also note that the biologicals can be divided into two areas, toxins, that is  chemicals produced by living organisms (botullism poisoning is caused by the toxin created by the Botulinum bacteria), and the organisms themselves -- germs and viruses that attack the living tissue and systems. 

The list does not include other possible agents, such as hemorragic agents like the Ebola virus, which could be bred in animals and then purposely spread into a population of humans. While fictional accounts of the use of such weapons ignores the simple fact that those types of agents kill so well that they actually reduce the spread.  These are better weapons of assassination rather than terrorism.

The sensors to detect these biologicals must work quite hard and fast if they are to save lives.  Like miniature DNA labs that work very quickly, the micro-machines must perform the series of tests necessary to both alarm and not false alarm, a task which is daunting.  Unlike CSI, however, the systems do not have to create results that stand up to the scrutiny of criminal court proceedings, they only have to give us highly accurate positive results that will sound the alarm when agents are suspected to be in our environment.


Chemical

Chemical weapons, like biologicals, can go undetected until the victims begin to show symptoms.  Worse, once most chemical agents do show symptoms in their victims, it is may be far too late to even treat the victims with any guarantee of success.  However, unlike biologicals, chemical weapons are apt to require a far more detectable delivery system.  A cloud of smoke for instance, or a crop duster like aircraft spraying a mist over its victims. 

Like biologicals, chemicals are susceptible to high heat, so an explosive device that uses high heat rather than pressure cannot be used. This does not prevent a pneumatic discharge of some sort.  One of the landmark cases of a chemical attack was the spraying via aerosol, of sarin gas by Aum Shinrikyo in a Japanese rail station.  While the death toll was relatively small relative to most terrorist attacks, the psychological effect on Japan at the time was tremendous, proving that even a small attack is more than effective for the terrorist's purpose.

Again, from the DHS, we reproduce our MILNET Briefing list of chemical agents:

Cyanide Cyanide is a gas manufactured from in large quantities quite easily. It is quite bitter to the taste, and acts almost instantly to stop respiration. In its gaseous form it is invisible, however dispersement (like most gas weapons) is best if produced by a fogger. Death is immediate and there is little if any time for an antidote to be applied. 
Mustard Gas/
Agents
and
Arsines
 Mustard Gas, used in World War I is a highly odorous gas which stings the eyes and causes severe fits of coughing. It has been linked to medium term diagnosis of cancer of the lungs in British Soldiers surviving attacks during World War I as well as workers where the gas was made. It is highly toxic to the eyes and lungs and immobilizes the unprotected in seconds, much like tear gas.  When mixed with the arsenic compound, 2-chlorovinyldichloroarsine, lewisite is produced which immediately shows burning of the skin and creates immediate effects which allow the victim to know they have been attacked.
Ricin Manufactured from castor beans, this natural occurring toxin which can be packed in just about any delivery system. It produces nearly instant paralysis once symptoms occur, followed by coma and death. It strikes in a manner similar to a dehabilating virus, and therefore can easily be misdiagnosed. 
Sarin Also known as Nerve Gas GB, is an oderless, straw colored liquid similar to modern pesticides typically found worldwide. Sarin attacks the respiratory system within minutes and is deadly in almost all cases. Minor exposure can produce long terms effects, and a non fatal dose can be aggravated by minor subsequent exposure later on, with a full onset of symptoms as a result. 
Tabun Tabun is a somewhat older nerve agent created in the 1930s initially as a pesticide with dramatic effects on humans. It is easily used in attack via aerosol application and is somewhat resistive to heat, making it deliverable via artillery shell or other explosive dispersion.
VX Nerve Gas  Nerve gases in general are extremely hazardous agents used in chemical warfare. The Nerve VX is just one of many and characterizes the worst of this class of chemical agents. It is odorless, colorless, and only detectable with special high technology gear. It attacks the nervous system almost immediately, producing dizziness, immediately followed by convulsions, paralysis and death. 

There are other chemical agents called psychotomimetic agents which cause hallucinations and disorientation, but whose effects pass and may not be of interest to terrorists.  And given the creativity of some terrorist organizations, there may be derivatives or equivalent chemical agents that could be used.  For instance, pouring hydrochloric acid or chlorine into the right conditions inside a closed space will certainly cause severe respiratory damage to those in the immediate vicinity.  Hardly a year goes by that some accidental discharge of such an agent does not occur, so clearly, an intentional release of such chemical mixes could be used as a terrorist weapon.

While the Aum Shinrikyo rail station attack was deemed successful, the ability to execute a chemical attack relies upon immediate exposure to the agents, which a fast and accurate detector can prevent for many would be victims. Certainly is the case for gas attacks similar to those DoD personnel train against. 

Moreover, like explosives, the chemical agents may be detected on the outside of containers being used to ship them.  Thus the nanotechnology and micromachine technology developments may produce results that can be used to detect transportation of the weapons before their actual use.



What Are The Collection Options

This topic is speculative at best.  Data on how Homeland Security does any sort of information gathering is highly classified and for good reason. Once the bad guys know how you REALLY do your job, they can design ways to get around those methods.  Therefore we will treat the subject in general terms and resist the temptation to cite even public sources of information, in the hopes that we too don't aid the enemy.

Having said that, much is obvious. If you can collect samples of air and diagnose your findings quickly and accurately, you will have a detector system that can be used to sound the alarm.  On the face of it, that sounds pretty simple.  However, the reality is that it is not quite as simple as you might expect.

First off, where would you place sensors.  If you had lots of cash to throw around, you'd place a sensor underneath key freeway overpasses in U.S. and Europe.


Roads

For instance, in Silicon Valley, a likely U.S. target, you check out the map and look for major highways that are used for transportation.  Highway 101 runs north and south for a spell, linking the south end and the north end of Silicon Valley (actually southeast and northwest to be exact -- what local residents call logical south and north).  Similarly, highway 680 winds east to west through San Jose and then swings north toward Fremont, then intersects 580 which cuts West toward Oakland and East towards Livermore, Stockton.  Highway 5 intersects 580 near Stockton and runs up the valley to Sacramento and south to L.A. 

A good detector system targeted at sensing illicit cargo moving on the roads in California would surely include sensors underneath key overpasses along those arteries.

Every state has such a list, and clearly Homeland Security has the means to look at this collection strategy.   But the numbers are daunting.  50 states with only 10 such roadways to watch creates a sensor network of 500 elements.  Many states would want to watch up to 50 roadways (eastern states have much denser populations and roadways), creating the need for a possible 1500 or so sensors to be watched.  Even with that number, coverage is only partial.  To truly cover the roadways, the number is more likely to be on the order of 3500 sensors.


Sea Ports

Naturally, cargo stops in ports are logical targets for collection as well.  In California again, there are plenty of good collection locations. There are the so called "outer" ports such as San Diego, Los Angeles  or San Francisco.  But California has several inland ports such as the Port of Stockton or closer to bay inlet, Oakland or Alameda.  There are also a number of minor ports such as Malibu Bay, Monterey Bay or Bodega Bay which serve pleasure craft and might be better ways to smuggle in illicit NBC weapons cargo.

The list of states with such ports is not small.  From Maine in northern New England, down to ports all along the Florida Coast, turning west toward the Texas panhandle.  The number is in the range of 100.  And within each port are numerous unloading facilities, and each processing hundreds of cargo containers of various types, or accepting entry of thousands of pleasure craft.  Again the numbers are daunting. Aside from the major cargo ports, the number of pleasure ports is probably in the range of just under 2000.

One effort that has gone into effect is the "secure-at-the-source" container program.  The idea is quite simple, however is certainly not foolproof.  The program essentially requires inspection by certified individuals at the source port -- where the cargo is placed in the container and left for shipping.  Special locks are used, and efforts are underway to improve those with microprocessor and GPS technology to further improve the reliability of the sealed container.  Unfortunately, the containers could be tampered with -- human's are involved and thus a bribe could fix one such shipment.  It only takes one and the "OOPS" occurs in Boston, Newport, Miami, Atlanta, New Orleans, Galveston, San Diego, Oakland, Portland, or Seattle.

We estimate the number of sensors required for U.S. cargo and pleasure ports is on the order of 2500.


Airports

We all have seen the security in airports, passengers standing with shoes off in some cases thanks to the idiot would be shoe bomber.  However, what the normal passenger is not seeing is the cargo side of the airport.  Already fairly secure, since 9/11 the areas leading to cargo aircraft have become virtual free fire zones for hidden security forces. 

There are many hundreds of cargo carrying airports in the U.S. Every major city may have one, and typically an alternate major cargo carrying airport is located nearby.  Some areas have several major airports very close.  For instance, the New York City area has La Guardia and Kennedy, as well as smaller feeder airports within a few hours drive.  Washington D.C. too has several competing major airports.

In fact, the major hubs all have alternates.  Even in spread out areas like Colorado (Denver has two major airports within an hours drive).

Thus the cargo carriers at airports mix trucks and aircraft, further adding complexity to the sensor problem.

However, some good news in this area.  Cargo x-ray machines are already in use in many of these stops, both for passenger and cargo aircraft.  Adding NBC sensors to this current process seems not only logical but imperative.  However, the numbers, once again are daunting.   If there were only five cargo stations requiring sensors, that would be another 500 sensors to add to our network.

We have purposely left out "pleasure airports", those small commuter and personal airports known as "General Aviation" destinations.  There are over a thousand of these. The Bay area in California has nine along highway 101 from San Martin to San Francisco.  Some states have upwards to 50 such airfields.  It is estimated there are at least 2000 general aviation fields in the U.S., bringing our air route total to 2500 sensors


Border Crossings

There are a dozen official U.S. border crossings covering the Southern and Northern U.S. land bridges.  Each has a range of 4 to 15 lanes of traffic handling capacity. However, we catch a break here.  The highways leading to the crossings funnel from two to four lanes into those inspection points, and usually "capture" the vehicles forcing them through the inspection point.  Therefore we need only look at the most, 4 lanes in let's say 30 crossing points.  That creates a number of 120 crossings to be sensed.


Summary

If we had a single unit sensor that could detect Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical agents, the total number of these sensors would be on the range of just over 8600 sensors.  If these sensors cost $500 each, the sensors for our network alone would cost $4.3 million.  A small price to pay?  Perhaps.



What Technologies Are Needed

We have mentioned the use of nano-technology and micro machines.  Those are only some of the technologies being explored.  To understand the technology, we need to understand first the processes for detecting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical weapons.

For the most part, we can treat much of the processing the same for all three.  One of the detection strategies involves taking air samples and processing them for the telltale clues.  Again, television watchers of CSI may have seen "sniffer" in use, devices that use a vacuum wand to collect a sample of air.  In the air is dust and dirt.  This dust and dirt will also contain contaminated bits of the agents we are looking for.  So to be accurate we are collecting debris from the air, not really the air.

The micro-machines mentioned use microscopic channels to take in the debris and analyze it.  The workings are highly technical and in some cases classified. However, we can simply say that what goes on inside the larger machines used for DNA analysis, Spectrographic Analysis, and blood analysis can all take place inside these little machines.  The micro-machines themselves are no larger than a microchip, literally microscopic in size. 

The technology works by using numbers against the target agent. Hundreds of microchip processors can be polled in a single sensor, and if one or more has a "hit", the probability that the agent is present is very high.  To test for multiple agents, of course, requires multiple microchips.  However, one estimate is that in the near future a single microchip can be used to detect biological, another for chemical and another for nuclear.  These three chips could be embedded right in the air inlet tube, making the air sampling the largest item in the sensor.  Think of a smoke detector sized sensor and that might be overly large!

The sensor unit might also contain a central processor to force repeated testing when a hit is made, and to perhaps control the communications channel, force a low power mode when the sensor goes into battery power mode, and even to eliminate suspect sensor chips in redundant sensor bank models.

Also the sensors might require something to actually move air into the unit itself, choosing not to rely on ambient air movement.  Like the wand used in television shows and real life, it is far more accurate and faster to create an air movement with vacuum.  This requires a low power vacuum pump -- a fan in an air manifold -- powered by a motor.  Ionic air movement systems have inherent effects on the samples however there may be methods that can be used to circumvent that problem.



What Are The Communication Requirements

There are costs to connect these sensors to regional collection points than the sensors themselves.  A typical cell network could be used -- perhaps even the current network would work fine, since the sensors are only rarely (or so we hope) "place a call".  A cell phone equivalent transmitter might cost in the range of $20. 

The phone center that receives the cell calls would have to be able to take a number of these calls per hour -- assuming a few falses every hour.  The network using cell technology is on the order of perhaps only $40,000 to purchase and install.  Maintenance, however, requires humans to go out and replace sensors.  Also, it would not be wise to try to use battery only operation, so power will be needed. Using the under the overpass idea for roads might find a light with an active power source there already, but someone will have to talk to the States about some funds to offset the cost --it is assumed the States will foot some of the cost.

Once the cell phone call is received, routing from regional centers to larger concentration points such as a State center or ultimately to Homeland Security could be accomplished via the Internet.  Technology already exists to embed Internet ready communications ability in the form of a modem dialer and intelligence or "broadband" connectivity.  The technology is in the range of $20 to $50 a chip, so can easily be embedded in an automated forwarder that would parallel any human interaction desired, allowing DHS to receive all sensor data automatically.

One problem is that the Internet, as robust as it appears, is a part of critical infrastructure. It is also not foolproof, and any avid user will tell you there are times when at the user level, it is not always available for one reason or another.  Backbone operation continues due to high levels of redundancy, however, it is clear that a sensor will be like many other everyday users -- perhaps unable to make the connection to the collecting authority. This fact would require a better performance model to the internet, or for that matter cell phone or land line networks. 

It is critical and any one sensor must be able to "get through" to the collecting authority.  A missed "call" could be a missed illicit shipment and therefore result in the deaths of hundreds if not hundreds of thousands.

This may require not using the existing cell and internet networks.  Re-frequencied cell phone devices could be used, but then this would also require setting up new cell repeaters, perhaps in the same cell sites.  That expense is horrendous, estimated to be in the billions of dollars. 

Point-to-point RF radio transmission is an alternative, however, lacks the same infrastructure already in place with cell phones.

The solution would appear to center on dedicating a channel in the current cell phone system. A channel that rejects all callers except those with the correct encrypted ID.  That would appear to be a software change which might have a one time cost associated, with the hopes that cell carriers might foot part of that bill as a public service.



What Are the Potential Timeframes

If we started today to simply implement the communications changes, it would take at least six months to one year.  Installing sensors would take at least a year for the freeways (the largest effort in MILNET's opinion).  A piece meal approach, phasing in coverage to key arteries and then slightly lesser roadways would reduce the expense per year, but extend the overall readiness and of course completion date.

Some work was most likely done near the end of the last decade, as the DoD explored a battlefield C4I connected detector system which may in fact have been implemented.  The system Joint Warn 9 was funded for minimal researach (publicly) from 1996 through 1997, and could easily have been the precursor to a more robust nationwide system. Surely something value was learned from that project.  It could very well be that such a DoD system was in place during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to protect Coalition personnel.

The technology for sensors themselves is in its infancy.  While very promising and working well in controlled environments, it will be several years (based on publicly available data)  before the necessary level of accuracy and reliability are achieved.  Again, piecemeal implementation could be used to field test devices in key locations and perhaps in that case, it will help improve the technology.  Some indicators point to this very strategy being either discussed or perhaps, under the dark cloak of secrecy, already being executed.

Given the dearth of actual implementation information suddenly, it might appear that things are moving faster than we suspected a year ago when data collection for this briefing began.   And not wishing to speculate too accurately, let's just say that perhaps in this decade there will be a level of technology capable of detecting movement of NBC materials at the major intersection points in our country.

This would., at least, force terrorists to use less traveled roads and ports of entry in order to smuggle their illicit goods into the U.S.


Updates:

02/2007:  CNN reports that officials in New York City will be installing sensors around the city to detect nuclear materials in hopes to proactively detect such materials entering the city.  Previous efforts have focused on entry of such materials via the Port of New York, an obvious way to move bulk materials or small amounts hidden in large shipments such as containers.  The new sensors and their locations are "for obvious reasons" not discussed in any detail, save for saying that they "will be placed along highways, at truck stops, in weigh stations and at other sites on the perimeter of New York, as well as locations closer to the city center" 25

2/2005:  The Congressional Reporting Service released a report, Nuclear Terrorism:  A Brief Review of Threats and Response (PDF 100KB), in February of 2005 22 that details the threat from nuclear terrorism.  On page 13 the report discusses briefly work being done on nuclear detection sensors.

In April of 2004, the U.S. President George Bush issued HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century 23, in which sensors for biodefense are to be integrated into existing EPA air quality sensors.  The systems has already gone online, and expansions are being added as time goes on. 

There are two programs that have been initiated in the realm of sensors:

BioWatch is described by John Marbuger (October 20, 2003, keynote address on national preparedness at BioSecurity 2003 in Washington, D.C. 24) as:

"Project BioWatch is a cooperative effort among the Department of Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) Laboratory Response Network to provide an early warning system for bio-threats. There are currently over 4000 atmospheric monitoring stations nation-wide for the detection of atmospheric pollutants. Under the auspices of Project BioWatch, atmospheric samples in numerous cities are monitored around-the-clock for select agents. Filters from the sampling apparatus are analyzed by the CDC network for numerous biological threat agents. If any such agents were to be detected, mechanisms and protocols are in place for DHS, CDC, and EPA to reach crucial public health decisions rapidly, and promulgate a uniform course of action for local public health officials on the ‘front lines.’ This network was established very rapidly, and much work remains to take full advantage of it, but it is functioning today." 24
BIOSENSE

BioSense is described by the Marburger  24  as:
"Project BioSense is still in its infancy. It is intended to reduce the lag time between the detection of a possible bio-agent and an appropriate response. Distinct from Project BioWatch, but integrated in function, Project BioSense relies upon multiple streams of information to facilitate rapid decision-making. Monitored parameters will include environmental data from Project BioWatch, epidemiological information from hospitals administered by the Department of Defense and the Veteran’s Administration, reports from pharmacies across the nation, and other sources of relevant syndromic and non-traditional data. All this information will converge at the CDC’s Biointelligence Center, first for analysis, and then, if warranted, for coordinated response. Having this single center examine data from many different sources permits the detection of patterns and anomalies that may not be apparent through other means. Moreover, the CDC has long been entrusted with both gathering information from and disseminating information to front-line health-care providers. This new role is a logical extension of that mission, in which the CDC will work hand-in-glove with clinicians at the local level to determine if an emergency response is warranted, and the necessary magnitude of that action."




Further Reading


Sources:
  1. Planned U.S. sensor network targets terror threats, Rick Merritt, EE Times, 7/14/2003
  2. Band C Sensor Requirement Priorities, National Institute of Health
  3. Homeland Security Issues, American Association for the Advancement of Science
  4. MILNET Briefing:  Nuclear Terrorism, MILNET, 2/7/2005
  5. Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks, Monterey Center for Non-proliferation
  6. MILNET:  Chemical and Biological Weapons, MILNET, undated
  7. Chemical and Biological Defense Program, U.S. Department of Defense, March 2000 (MILNET Mirror)
  8. Nonproliferation and International Security Division (NIS), Los Alamos Laboratory, University of California/U.S. DoE
  9. Joint Warn System, Defense Technology Objectives, U.S. Department of Defense, 1997 (MILNET Mirror)
  10. HP Uses Nanotechnology for New Circuit, John G. Spooner , CNET, 9/9/2002
  11. Nanotech to Pave Way for Micro-Machines, Michael Kanellos , CNET, 2/24/2003
  12. Agilent Lab-on-a-chip, Agilent Life Sciences/Chemical Analysis, undated
  13. Nano LC Columns, LC Packings, undated
  14. Reverse Phase HPLC Basics for LC/MS, Andrew Guzzetta, Micro-Tech Scientific, Inc., 7/22/2001
  15. Classification of Former Chemical Warfare, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Contamination Survivability Information, Army Regulation 380-86, 1 February 2005 (PDF 54KB) (MILNET Mirror)
  16. Radioactive Cesium Seizure in Thailand: Riddled with Uncertainties, Alessandro Andreoni and Charles D. Ferguson, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 7/17/2003
  17. Agents, Diseases, and other Threats, Center for Disease Control, undated
  18. Information on Potential Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents, California Department of Health and Safety, undated
  19. Department of Homeland Security Selects Contractors for New Biological Detection Systems, U.S. DHS, 4/1/2004
  20. Information Bulletin: Guidance for Response to Ricin Delivered by Mail, U.S. DHS, 2/9/2004
  21. Background Information on Smallpox, U.S. DHS, 12/04/2002
  22. Nuclear Terrorism:  A Brief Review of Threats and Response (PDF 100KB), Jonathan Medalia, 2/10/2005
  23. HSPD-10, Bio-Defense For the 21st Century, Presidential Directive, The White House, 4/23/2004
  24. Projects BioShield, BioWatch and BioSense, Idaho Observer, 1/2005
  25. Nuke Detectors to Ring New York City, Official Says, CNN, 02/09/07
  26. Nuclear Terrorism - - United States Steps to Counter Nuclear Terrorism's Threat, About.com



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