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It is this simple, if they are willing to kill people and break things, and you are not, they win. One ugly fact about human nature is: If someone will not fight for what is theirs, they lose it. This book is about some of the men who choose to be ready to fight. Next to my wife and children, I am more proud of becoming a member of this group of men, then anything else I've done in my life.
Around fourth grade I saw a movie, it was "The Frogmen" with Richard Widmark. When I walked out of that theater, my life's ambition was firmly fixed in every cell of my body. You could have offered me GOD'S job, the presidency, anything, I would have turned it down. I was going to be a United States Navy Frogman.
This book is about the test to become a Frogman, the men I took it
with, and the men who gave it to us. We were tested by the BEST, and I
thank them. 5" - John Carl Roat, Class 29
So begins the forward for John Carl Roat's new book, CLASS-29 a gritty look at the U.S. Navy Seals training regime.
This section of MILNET is dedicated to the Special Warriors worldwide, whose job is usually hidden by politics, yet plays one of the most important roles in defense of a nation's people.
And while this section may seem a bit critical, realize that our purpose is to lay out the criticisms as they have been expressed, with a fervent hope they have been heeded, and every confidence that years from now we will finally hear more about the actual changes that while obscurred today, will be visible then.
When the U.S. Special Operations Command began operation in April of 1987, it was clear that a lot of adjustments were needed to make the command an effective force in face of the needs of the rapidly changing world. And while U.S. operation in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq proved the services could and did play well together in an all out effort to wage war, undercurrents during special operations conducted probably indicate that the military leaders have not been trained well enough on how to use the potent Special Forces weapon.
However, looking at the U.S. statements on the Special Forces place in the military have become increasingly more positive and rational. For instance, from the 1998 Annual Defense Report:
Special operations forces have a dual heritage. They are one of the nation's key penetration and strike forces, able to respond to specialized contingencies across the conflict spectrum with stealth, speed, and precision. They are also warrior-diplomats capable of influencing, advising, training, and conducting operations with foreign forces, officials, and populations. These two distinct missions are complementary, allowing SOF personnel to gain regional expertise and access that enhances their ability to react to any contingency in any region of the world. One of these two generic SOF roles is at the heart of each of the following special operations core missions:
With this current framework in mind, let's look at some inside information on the makeup of the special forces community circa 1996.
Below we present a narrative describing the current U.S. Special Forces structure as relayed to us by a retired Army officer cognizant of the structure as reported in 1996.
Under USSOCOM there are component commands. Army Special Operations Command, NAVSPECWAR, etc. These elements exercise direct command and control under normal conditions. They write regs, handle training standards, do strength evaluations, and all the other stuff a command would do. These are normally run by a 3 star (Lt. General).
Under these are various smaller commands. I will discuss the Army as that is what I am most familiar with, but the AF and Navy are similar. SF Command (formerly 1st SOCOM) has command of all SF assets in the continental US. This is a 2 star (Major General) billet. SF Cmd has recently been gutted and all the control passed to ASOC (Army Special Operations Command). There is also US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command or USACAPOC. This is considered SOF but no one really believes it. They, along with SF CMD and ASOC are located at Ft. Bragg. Rangers are placed under ASOC but their string is a little different as they are subject to direct tasking by other elements. But they are listed under ASOC.
All of these command relationships are discussed in Joint PUB 3-05, which is unclassified. You can also get it through various books and magazine articles and on the internet under XVIII Corps and Ft. Bragg. There is an ASOC page which has many regs and such to look at.
Obviously then there are still separate units within USSOCOM, units that have their origins in the individual services, and should be quite familar to those with interest in special forces:
We, so far, have not been able to discern the disposition of the U.S. Marines Force Recon.
In his book COMMANDOS, Douglas C. Waller describes the makeup of USSOCOM circa 1994:
The Navy's contribution to the command are some 5,500 SEALS, and their support forces, which specialize in amphibious commando raids and waterborne operations.
The Air Force allocates 9,500 Air Commandos who provide special infiltration helicopters, transport planes, aerial refueling tankers, and gunships.
Then there are the 1,300 members of the most secret part of the command - the Joint Special Operations Command. The Pentagon refuse to acknowledge that most of its forces even exist; the Army's Delta Force, and the Navy's Seal Team-6 which specialize in counter-terrorism and special commando missions, a Ranger unit for surgical combat assaults and a secret Army and Air Force helicopter force and intelligence unit. 2
It's all quite confusing, so here is a diagram to illustrate the SOCOM and other special ops groups in the U.S.
Note: We are not experts on Special Forces thus we are at the mercy of those who have researched the special forces subject. We have tried to confirm much of what we say with others in the special forces community, however, we are not always able to get straight answers...the community is rightfully close mouthed. We invite those in the know to correct any misconceptions we have or indicate that changes in the areas we discuss HAVE indeed been made since the events which highlighted their deficiency. We ARE fans of Special Operations, and feel these folks deserve much better than they have gotten, and hope fervently that their mission capabilities are increasing daily. It is our opinion that times will force a larger dependence on these unique capabilities.
With that, on with the discussion.
The rationale for better supporting the Special Forces capability is the effectiveness of your initial warfighting capability (i.e. in taking out discrete elements of command and control such as key "inbound route" radar sites) as well as supply missions for small units in need of resupply, pathfinders, or other such groups on the ground or leading from the front in the air.
Kelly talks about an opportunity that General Schwartzkopf availed himself of during Desert Storm, a pathfinder mission of Air Commando Pave Low helicopters that lead Apaches to radar sites on the route F-15E Strike Eagles needed to use to lead the attack on Baghdad. While the General's agreement to use the pathfinder method proved to be adequate, it is clear that a lower profile, and perhaps less risky mission (both in terms of assets and time) would have been better served by a typical Air Commando supported Special Forces raid, making use of sabotage ground forces ferried in by Pave Low helicopters.
The General 's reluctance is no indication of any less a capable commander (We really love ya' General), but indicates a high level (i.e. not just one but most higher ranking military leaders) lack of education or perhaps lack of understanding of the nature and capabilities of our special forces units.
Note: Late in 1997, General Hugh Shelton was named the new Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Shelton is well versed in the arts of the special warrior having been in Command of U.S. Special Operations. One would assume he brings a new attitude to the Joint Chiefs which should be reflected in any operations that may occur during his tenure. We also hope that his leadership will further the integration of the special operations forces into the overall U.S. Military capability. Congratulations, General!
To illustrate some the changes that seemed necessary as late as 1996, we present the following opinion expressed by a retired Army officer (in an email interview, in 1996):
It was primarily a Ranger-oriented (which is to say light infantry) political arrangement. Bad blood. Also, the arrangements in place at that point were not "official" but just done as a favor. No way to do business and highly unprofessional." 1
Note: We have taken some liberty with the direct quote to ensure anonimity of the source.
In looking at the warrior's statements above, as well as noting statements made by Kelly and Waller (see below), it is apparent that the Special Forces command structure must learn from lessons in Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm. To be specific without going into too much detail (which is better handled by the two authors) the problems are essentially unintentional mission segregation...that is, planning as a unit rather then as part of an overall multi-service, multi-role team. We'll cite one example from Kelly's book that was confirmed in part by Waller.
In Panama, during Operation Just Cause...
"Suddenly, the SEALS came under murderous fire from a small group of Panamanians hiding in the darkened hanger. Four SEALS fell mortally wounded, and nine others were injured..."
"...Looking back on the incident later, Gary Weikel, commander of the 20th Special Operations Squadron, a Pave Low helicopter unit from Hulbert, was frustrated that he had not been able to have one of his Pave Lows accompany the SEALs, peering ahead and telling them exactly what kind of resistance they could expect to encounter as they approached the hanger." 3
Here's a case of "all someone had to do was ask." Or let the appropriate commander know about that particular mission, and he'd have sent the needed assets along on his own nickel.
However, this particular lesson should have been learned quite awhile ago. Let us hope the command structure within USSOCOM has implemented changes to fix this one.
According to our research, there are a number of things that have needed correction in the last few special operations missions:
(i.e. fewer folks talking on the nets or better radio discipline, only a few channels ...i.e. "evac", "airgun", "armor", "cover", etc. with appropriate units providing that service monitoring).
I.e. ensure collateral commanders know of the individual operations so that theycan offer assets they may have in spare in order to facilitate a more effective attack.
Sometimes it takes better than 48 hours for overhead intelligence to get to the field commander, requiring far more "feet on the ground" than might otherwise be necessary. This can be tac-sats better aerial recon, or a magnitude greater RPV recon coverage.
This is essentially the planning for additional assets during operations so that they can react to typical combat flexibility requirements. An extra chopper for miscellaneous duty, or perhaps some extra humvees not committed to a particular aspect of the operation. How about sending a few extra choppers to counter breakage that will force abandonment of the operation (i.e. Iran Hostage Rescue).
Kelly talks about "gun tape" that marks the friendlies. Obviously this doesn't work since we know of two occurances, one where Army Apaches during desert storm were unable to distinguish between friendly and enemy vehicles, resulting in the killing of soldiers in a U.S. vehicle.
