Kenneth R. McKune Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, D.C., May 15, 1997 U.S. Department of State

From the original document at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/mckune_970515.html

"Sudan and Terrorism"

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on our counterterrorism policy toward Sudan.

Before commenting on Sudan specifically, I would like to briefly provide a context by outlining several key elements of our overall counterterrorism policy. They apply to Sudan and other countries on the terrorism list, and to individual terrorists.

First, a fundamental principle of U.S. policy is to make no concessions to terrorists. We have a longstanding policy of not giving in to terrorists' demands and not making concessions that would reward terrorist actions, including payment of ransom for hostages. Of course, we will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of American citizens held hostage, but without making concessions.

These principles have guided our counterterrorism policy and actions for many years. We urge other governments to follow these principles, and we apply them in practice.

Second, we treat terrorists as criminals, consider their acts of violence as crimes, and make every effort to apprehend international terrorists who attack U.S. citizens or interests so that they are prosecuted according to the rule of law.

Third, regarding countries that support terrorists, we seek to bring pressure on them to end their assistance by imposing a variety of economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions.

Sudan was brought under this sanctions regime in August 1993, when the Secretary of State formally designated it as a country that has repeatedly provided support to groups engaged in acts of international terrorism. Sudan thus joined six countries already on the list: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba.

Sudan was designated under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act and related Foreign Assistance and Arms Control legislation because it provided--and continues to provide--safe haven to terrorist groups, training facilities, and a transit point for these groups. Although we do not have information that Sudan provides the level and type of assistance and active support for specific operations as do some countries on the state sponsor list, the type of hospitality Sudan grants to terrorist groups makes it easier for them to maintain their viability, to train, and to carry out terrorist actions--such as the June 1995 attack by Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya against President Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

Sudan harbors a number of terrorist groups. They include an "old line" secular group, the Abu Nidal Organization, but most of them are militant Islamic extremist organizations. Among them are: HAMAS, the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Egypt's Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya. The Sudanese government also supports Islamic and non-Islamic opposition groups in Algeria, Uganda, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

Sudan did take a positive step last year by expelling ex-Saudi financier Usama Bin Laden and expelling members of some terrorist groups. However, Sudan has yet to comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070 which call on Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia the three suspects in the June 1995 assassination attempt against Egyptian President Mubarak and end its support for terrorism. Sudan has not cut off its support for terrorist organizations that continue to have a presence there.

The United States has the most stringent set of laws of any country in imposing trade and other sanctions against state sponsors of international terrorism. There are more than a dozen such measures imposed against the seven countries designated by the Secretary as state sponsors, including Sudan.

These measures include the Export Administration Act, which curbs the sale of dual-use items that could enhance a designated country's military capability or its ability to support acts of terrorism, as well as provisions prohibiting economic assistance, export of military equipment, and GSP trade treatment.

Furthermore, as noted on U.S. income tax forms, U.S. individuals and companies are denied any foreign income tax credits for doing business in terrorist list countries. Judging by the inquiries we receive from companies and law firms in the course of a year, this seems to be a considerable disincentive to establishing a business relationship with a country, such as Sudan, that has only a minimal trade with the United States--about $30 million--each way.

Other sanctions which apply to Sudan and the other terrorist list governments include using our voice and vote against loans or grants by international financial institutions. In addition, U.S. laws also prohibit American economic assistance to governments that provide economic aid or lethal military equipment to Sudan and other governments on the terrorism list. We have been monitoring whether there is any such assistance to Sudan, and if we find such cases we will take appropriate action.

These measures are aimed at the potential pressure points of state supporters of terrorism: foreign assistance, international loans, and items which might have military use. The combined weight of these measures imposes severe limits on the U.S. relationship with Sudan and are designed to persuade Sudan to change its behavior in supporting terrorists. Already our trade relationship with Sudan is relatively minor; we mainly import gum arabic, which is used to provide the backing for stamps and post-it notes.

With these economic sanctions as a background, we have continued our efforts to put political and other pressures on Sudan. One arena, as I mentioned, is in the United Nations. But we also work bilaterally, both in our contacts with Sudan and with other governments that have relations with Sudan, to persuade the Sudanese leadership to end their support for terrorism.

The United States believes that the Government of Sudan, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), has not taken sufficient steps to stop its support for terrorist extremist groups or expel them from its territory. Until Sudan ends such support, it will remain on our state sponsors of terrorism list.

Mr. Chairman, at this point, that concludes my overview and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

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