George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, D.C., May 15, 1997 U.S. Department of State

From the original document at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/moose_970515.html

"U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Toward Sudan"

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to participate in this hearing on U.S. counterterrorism policy toward Sudan. My colleague, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ken McKune, will address the particulars of our counterterrorism policy. I would like to complement his presentation by describing the broader concerns we have with Sudan and the numerous actions we have taken in response, including our fight against terrorism.

Background

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, as large as the eastern portion of the United States. Its 27 million people belong to numerous ethnic and religious groups, many of which fit together uneasily. The most distinct division in the country is between a predominantly Arab/Muslim north and a predominantly non-Arab/non-Muslim south. The desire of many southerners for greater autonomy, control of resources, and liberation from the imposition of Islamic law lies at the heart of Sudan's continuous civil strife. Since independence in 1956, only the period between 1972 and 1983 saw a country at peace with itself. We estimate that the conflict has taken about one-and-a-half million lives. Today, there are approximately two million internally displaced persons in Sudan, as well as several hundred thousand Sudanese refugees living in neighboring states.

The tragedy of Sudan is compounded by the fact that a potentially prosperous nation has failed its own people and contributed negatively to the region's welfare. Decades of economic mismanagement have resulted in an inflation rate of more than 100%, and the largest arrears to the International Monetary Fund of any country in the world. Endowed with the potential to generate food surpluses, poor policies and civil war make Sudan a net food importer. The threat Sudan poses to its neighbors has forced those countries to divert scarce resources from productive to military ends.

Sudan Under the NIF: Fundamental Problems

Since 1989, when military officers aligned with the National Islamic Front (NIF) overthrew Sudan's last democratically elected government, Sudan has implemented a wide range of policies which have further alienated it from its citizens and earned it the opprobrium of the international community. Our concerns, and our responses, fall into four broad categories:

First, the NIF regime supports international terrorism, primarily by providing safe-haven to terrorist elements. We have taken unilateral actions and worked through the UN Security Council to mobilize international action on this issue.

Second, Khartoum actively seeks to destabilize its neighbors by providing material support and haven for violent insurgent groups. President Clinton's response is to provide the neighboring states of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea with non-lethal defensive military assistance in 1996 and again this fiscal year.

Third, Khartoum has one of the worst human rights records in the world, inflicting numerous abuses in both the north and the south of the country and allowing slavery to continue in certain parts of the country. The United States has urged Sudan to wipe out slavery and we have taken the lead in the UN Human Rights Commission and General Assembly denouncing its human rights violations.

Fourth, the NIF has prosecuted a costly civil war rather than seek a just solution that recognizes the rights of all its citizens. In its conduct of the war, Sudan also hinders the delivery of humanitarian assistance to war-affected civilians. Since 1988, we have provided more than $600 million in humanitarian assistance, primarily to the war-affected people in southern Sudan.

Certain of these abhorrent policies and practices are not new or unique to the current regime, and our approach to Sudan considers the root causes of conflict. A complex reality, however, in no way absolves the NIF-led government of responsibility for its actions. Our objective is to isolate and contain the threat that the NIF regime poses as well as to try to compel it to change its unacceptable behavior. Failing that, we have made it clear to Sudan that they will face growing international pressure, and that our bilateral relationship will further deteriorate.

I now would like to go into greater detail on each of our concerns and actions we have taken in response.

Terrorism

In 1993, the Clinton Administration placed Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and we have applied unilateral sanctions consistent with that designation. Sudan was known to provide refuge, logistical support such as training facilities, travel documents, and weapons to a variety of radical terrorist organizations.

Since 1995, Sudan has failed to cooperate with the international community to help extradite to Ethiopia three suspects in the assassination attempt in Addis Ababa against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. After demands from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that Sudan facilitate their extradition to Ethiopia went unheeded, the U.S. played a leading role last year in the adoption of three UN Security Council resolutions. Resolution 1044 required that Sudan act "to extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution" the three suspects and that it "desist" from "activities of assisting, supporting, and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter or sanctuary to terrorist elements." The United States emphasized at the time that we would consider Sudan responsible for extradition of the suspects even if they allowed them to leave the country, as may now have occurred.

As a result of Sudan's failure to comply with Resolution 1044, the Council considered and adopted Resolution 1054, calling on member states to adopt travel restrictions on Sudanese government officials, and Resolution 1070, which conceived of a ban on flights by Sudanese Government-controlled aircraft. The United States Government reduced the number of Sudanese diplomats in this country, restricted their travel here, and imposed a restrictive visa regime for government and military officials.

In the face of mounting international pressure, Sudan has taken some steps to respond to concerns about its involvement in international terrorism. Its most significant action was the expulsion of exiled Saudi terrorist financier Osama bin Laden and many of his so-called "Arab Afghan" followers. However, bin Laden remains linked to a number of businesses in Sudan and retains ties to some NIF leaders. Khartoum also took steps to tighten what has been an extremely porous border, establishing new visa requirements to control foreign travel into and out of the country. However, we consider these largely tactical steps. Sudan has far to go to meet our concern that it cease its support for international terrorism.

Regional Stability

A central U.S. objective is that Sudan end its sponsorship of insurgent groups which seek to destabilize the neighboring countries of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Despite regional efforts to promote mediation, both within Sudan and with its neighbors, Sudan's regional policies have to date frustrated efforts to achieve a reasonable accommodation.

To help these neighboring countries contain Sudanese-sponsored insurgencies, in late 1995, President Clinton authorized the transfer of $15 million in non-lethal defensive military assistance to these countries for FY96. A transfer of $4.75 million of such equipment is taking place this fiscal year. The aid to date has consisted of boots, backpacks, field radios, and tents. The first shipments of this assistance for Eritrea and Ethiopia arrived in February 1997.

Human Rights

In April, the United States and other members of the UN Human Rights Commission passed a consensus resolution expressing "deep concern at continued serious human rights violations by the Government of Sudan." The Resolution identified a litany of ongoing abuses by the government, including "extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, detentions without due process, enforced or involuntary disappearances, violations of the rights of women and children, slavery and slavery-like practices, forced displacement of persons and systematic torture, and denial of the freedoms of religion, expression, association and peaceful assembly." The Commission expressed "serious concern" over reports of "religious persecution, including forced conversion of Christians and animists, in government controlled areas."

Last year, we succeeded, through the actions of the Human Rights Commission, in getting Sudan to readmit the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan. As a consequence, the Special Rapporteur was able to produce important information on ongoing abuses in Sudan that contributed to the international consensus on Sudan's record.

Civil War and National Reconciliation

Key southern and northern opposition forces have recently formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Their avowed aim is to oust the NIF from power. This is an important development in Sudan's civil war which has historically been a struggle by southern Sudan's socially distinct, non-Arab population against what they see as northern government policies of "Arabization," "Islamicization," and political exclusion. Active northern opposition to the NIF regime indicates the extent to which its radical policies have alienated large segments of Sudanese society. Rebel forces recently engaged and defeated GOS forces in several areas of southern and eastern Sudan separated by hundreds of miles.

The U.S. Government does not provide any support to any party to the civil war. We have supported efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in a manner that recognizes the legitimate interests and rights of all Sudanese. We do seek to mitigate the devastating impact of civil war on the Sudanese people and we are the largest provider of humanitarian aid to Sudan. We continue to protest frequent Sudanese bans on the type and destination of relief aircraft, based on allegations, which we consider unfounded, that the assistance will go directly to rebel groups.

I would like to note here that we remain very skeptical that movement toward resolving the civil war will emerge from a peace agreement signed on April 21 between the government and a number of the smaller rebel groups. Although the agreement contained a positive step in its recognition of Sudan's multi-racial, -ethnic, and -religious nature, it did not spell out how and to what extent these rights would be respected in the context of the current NIF policies and practices. The GOS professions of a desire to negotiate, moreover, must be viewed against the backdrop of repeated, failed mediation efforts. As in the past, the most important elements of the opposition--in this case the NDA--have not been persuaded that the process or the agreement itself will satisfy their legitimate interests.

I would also like to mention President Carter's trip to the region last month. President Carter undertook this mission in his capacity as a private citizen, and his efforts carried no official U.S. Government sanction. At the same time, we welcome his interest in Sudan's continuing conflict and his efforts to promote a just solution. The insights he gained during his travel have been considered with interest by the Secretary.

The Importance of a Comprehensive Domestic Peace

The U.S. Government believes that the NIF government is fully culpable for the abuses it has inflicted on its people, the aggressive acts it has committed toward neighbors, and the support it has given international terrorism. We believe that it can and must cease these activities.

It may be, however, that the radicalism of the current regime will continue as long as the NIF-controlled government represents an embattled and narrowly based segment of society. A just resolution of Sudan's internal conflict--one that gives a voice in government to more moderate elements in the north and to the major political and ethnic forces in the south--would thus do much to eliminate the sources of Sudan's unacceptable domestic and international behavior. For this reason, our own contribution to regional and international efforts to resolve Sudan's civil war can contribute to the achievement of our other goals vis-a-vis Sudan as well.

U.S. Leadership

U.S. objectives are clear and unequivocal: to isolate Sudan and to contain its support for insurgents and terrorists and to oblige the Sudanese Government by exacting a price for unacceptable behavior, to change its domestic and international conduct.

Our ongoing diplomatic contacts with Sudanese officials are aimed at making our serious objections known directly to senior levels in Khartoum. As the Secretary said in another context, "engagement does not mean acceptance."

Ambassador Carney and others have expressed our concerns in detail to the Government of Sudan. To date, the Sudanese responses have been inadequate and appear to have been largely tactical, intended primarily to relieve domestic and international pressure rather than to reflect a real reconsideration of policy.

The international community has made it clear that it will not accept cosmetic changes from Khartoum and will insist on real improvement in Sudan's domestic and international behavior. It remains our hope that Sudan, in the face of this pressure, will recognize the need to make such a fundamental change. Failing such a change, as I said earlier, we have made it clear to the Government of Sudan that they will face growing international pressure and that our bilateral relationship will further deteriorate.

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