MILNET Brief:
U.S. Anti-Satellite Capability, 02/23/2008
"The last option -- damaging or destroying satellites -- can be accomplished with direct impact (“kinetic kill”) projectiles or directed energy weapons such as high-powered lasers. This is the most appropriate method to pursue for an operationally deployed ASAT capability.   Attacking a satellite is still an attack against foreign property, but it is far less controversial than destroying aground facility and people on sovereign soil"

- Lt. Col. Robert Dillman, U.S.A.F. War College, 1996 1

Prompted by  the singular event of the U.S. destroying a troubled U.S. KH-11 spy satellite, this briefing looks at the declassified and public information in the topic area of anti-satellite programs.

It should be clear from the start, that while the U.S. denies any "in place" anti-satellite capability, the ability to reach into space and take out an asset is clearly there.  In fact, it has been there in one form or another for decades. 

As early as the late 1980s, the U.S. has had the ability to carry aloft a system similar to the Pegasus rocket booster, with any number of space maneuverable payloads that could be placed near enough to a space target, and upon detonation, would kill that space vehicle. 

However, it has only been in the last few years that a truly mission capable kill vehicle was in the inventory.  This is of course, the controversial (to some) Ballistic Missile Defense interceptor, a high speed, kinetic kill vehicle that is intended to take out incoming ballistic missiles.  The interceptor can be launched from ground or ship based launchers.

On February 20, 2008, the U.S. fired a SM-3 (Standard Missile Mod 3) surface missile from the AEGIS cruiser U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70).  The missile was tipped with one of the interceptor kill vehicles, which in just short of ten minutes, impacted against the KH-11 satellite at a speed equivalent (two colliding objects in space) of about 22,000 mph.  The kill vehicle's impact set off the hydrazine tank, the real target of the entire exercise.    The satellite was said to have been reduced to football sized objects that would eventually burn up in reentry.  However, there is some possibility that some of the chunks would remain in low earth orbit for some time. 

The "shoot down" of the satellite was immediately cause for both speculation and in some quarters (expectedly, Russia and China had plenty to say about it) condemnation as a new weapons test.  The vehicle used by the Navy is the LEAP (Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile), part of the Missile Defense Agencies intercept flight test series.  It is also known as the AEGIS LEAP program.
LEAP (Wikipedia Commons) KV Hover Test


It should be clear from the outset that there is currently nothing to prevent the U.S. from conducting such a test as no nation has signed any sort of treaty against space weapons (other than the ABM treaty in which anti-satellite weapons are not covered), and second the exposure of a failed satellite and its destruction by use of a already in inventory missile destined for the Ballistic Missile Defense system is by no means a "new weapons" test.    However that did not prevent previous cold war antagonists of the U.S. to quickly condemn the actions of the U.S. .  China, who launched a test of their anti-satellite system, destroying the FY-1C weather satellite on January 11, 2007, echoed the Russian propaganda that the U.S. was testing a new weapon in space.  The FY-1C was destroyed at an altitude near 537 miles, well within the so called low-earth orbit region of satellite orbits.

The U.S. capability has been brewing publicly for some time.  Experimentation began in the late 60s, early 70s, with real, testable systems arriving in the 1980s.  And there has been a resurgence in the concept for the need for anti-satellite systems. 

According to the 2002 (begun in 2000) Commission To Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, "it is in the U.S. national interest to...Develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests." 

The Commission's recommendations eventually led to U.S. President Bush's review of the 1996 National Space Policy and update space situational awareness and defense.  This review was eventually declassified and released as the U.S. National Space Policy on October 6, 2006.  In relation to this topic, the policy states, "Develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries".  That is a pretty clear statement for defense of space assets as well as develop the ability to go on the offensive if it should become necessary.  Pre-dating these latest developments, there have been numerous USAF and NAVY officers who have proposed anti-sat systems as an adjunct to protecting our allies and ourselves from ballistic missiles.  We'll discuss one of those papers in some detail later in this briefing.

And while the U.S. denies the shoot down of the satellite was any sort of test, it was, indeed, not a test but a demonstration of a system designed to do things very much like it did.  Intercept an object in space while outside the atmosphere and well before it could reenter and threaten the U.S. population, destroy and render harmless that space object.

Of course, that is essentially an anti-ballistic missile defense, and not so coincidentally perhaps, an anti-satellite capability that goes along with that system's inherent capabilities.  And not just one on paper, but one clearly demonstrated, and demonstrated in a real world circumstance.  Of course, much to the chagrin of the Russian and Chinese militaries, spectacularly successfully.  No wonder they are grousing.

Wrapped up in this discussion, of course, is the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense system, otherwise known as the Missile Defense Shield.  First proposed and touted as a piece of the co called Ronald Reagan era Star Wars Defense Shield, the idea is a simple one.  Provide a mechanism to defend against attacking ballistic missiles with a low threat to indigenous ground personnel.  The scientific community at the time said it was impossible to do or so costly out of reach it was a waste of taxpayers money.  Many scientists (led by the founders of the Federation of American Scientists and others) attempted to apply pressure and "scientific" proofs to ridicule the entire concept with the objective to sway the U.S. Congress away from funding the basic research required.  However while a number of overt programs were short lived, the necessary few remained under black budget.

Today we have the kinetic kill interceptor, its fast action launch vehicles and the key element  of the detection, tracking and targeting hardware and software necessary to do the job.  After a few initial failures (which the anti-weapons scientists claimed was proof that the technology was a failure and should be scrapped) the system has satisfied all its more recent milestones to date.  The fact that the system's first use has been in a peaceful protection regime probably fails to be noticed by the critics.

This latest event, the satellite shoot down, an effort said to be put together on short notice, is further proof that the technology is not only capable, but nearing the point where deployment of actual systems can be made.  So much for the whole thing being Ronald Reagan's folly.  Clearly the man's vision is being vindicated in this decade.

Other capabilities from the so called Star Wars era that can also be used in future anti-satellite capability are also being realized...today's results from that early research.  The DDX -- the future U.S. Naval Destroyer, is destined to have a gun powered by electromagnetic energy -- the so called rail gun.  This weapon uses an electromagnetic field to accelerate a specially shaped projectile along a track and exit the "barrel" at tremendous rates.  The lack of need for propellant eliminates the powder magazine as well as the possibility of explosions in the delicate moments of loading the cannon with propellant (gunpowder in linen bags) or in pre-primed brass shells.  This allows the DDX to reduce the amount of space devoted to ammunition, or carry more "rounds" in the same space, either a huge advantage.

The Rail Gun is a huge advance and its applications in anti-satellite capability would be tremendous. The major technological hurdle remaining for its use in space, however, is power.  The rail gun's EM power source is huge and carrying that power supply aloft is daunting.  A tuned down version was in the works in the 1980s called Brilliant Pebbles, shooting much smaller projectiles, which can be devastating in space.  That program funding vanished from the official public funding, however speculation is that it remained in development under classified "black budget" program funding.  In the on-orbit section of this briefing, the rail gun will once again be discussed as a viable tool for use in an anti-satellite weapons system.



Anti-Satellite Basics

There are really three main targets of any anti-satellite program:
  1. Satellites in low earth orbit (1000 miles up or less) -- typically your basic "spy" satellite -- SIGINT, ELINT, or PHOTOINT that intercept signals, categorize and catalog various electronic emmisions, and of course, the oldest spy satellite, the imaging satellite, which uses sensitive camera or other devices to take images of ground targets.
  2. Communications Satellites in geo-synchronous orbits (22,000 to 40,000 mile orbits) -- It seems most of the wealthier nations have communications satellites or lease time on those satellites from countries who can manage to orbit a geo-synch satellite. 
  3. Command and Control Satellites in geo-synchronous orbits (22,000 to 40,000 mile orbits) -- Major military powers either have their own or lease time on ally's C&C satellites.  These provide communications between elements of global military or battlefield operations.

Satellite Basics

First we'll discuss the utility of the three types of satellites -- what makes them so important and moreover, what would be the effects of the loss of these satellites.  Note that we are being overly simplistic for purposes of illustration only...the satellite business is complex to a fault...and requires incredibly redundant systems and essentially overkill in operational specifications.  It is no accident that space operations as a whole operate in reliability regimes higher then 97%.

Spy Satellites

Spy Satellites are what put a lie to the "peaceful use of space". The first satellites added military spy capabilities to civilian satellites and today spy satellites practically litter earth orbit...many dead and returning to earth a few every year.  They are designed to "look down" and see things from the ultimate high ground with eyes that are hard to fool.  Some even have the capability to see through cloud cover and other inclimate weather.  Today, all spy satellites are defenseless...they have no ability to ward off attack and this has military planners worried -- we have become dependent upon our "eyes in the sky" and loss of one let alone a number higher would be a huge disaster for military capability, especially in the global sense.  These can be both strategic and tactical in nature.  This class of satellite may include such thing as nuclear detection satellites which warn of both missile launches as well as help in non-proliferation by detecting nuclear explosions on the ground or when underground tests "breach" the surface.   Loss of any of the spy satellites is cause for great concern, both for the loss of "eyes in the sky" but also could mean other military satellites are next as part of prelude to war.   For a look at public information on spy satellites, see the MILNET page on military satellites.

Communications Satellites

There are plenty out there, and many nations (even those who don't own them) have become dependent upon them.  For instance, in the U.S., network television and radio broadcasts, telephone and the internet all make use of these satellites, many people dependent upon the satellite for their daily news and information.  Typically these satellites are found ion high, geo-synchronous orbits that maintain a "spot beam" focused on a coverage area.  Providing highly reliable, always available communications, these satellites power the world's modern high tech communications capability.  While your cell phone usually connects to a local wireless tower, your signal may wind up on a com satellite to enable long distance.  Loss of a commercial communications satellite is world changing event for some people and in terms of military notice, could also mean a prelude to war, and a warning that military satellites may be next.  For a look at public information on communications satellites, see MILNET's communications satellites page.

Command and Control Satellites

The military uses C&C sats to relay data between globally available forces.  They are supplemented by low frequency underwater communications and are hardened against EMP blasts from possible nuclear explosions within range.  More than just communications satellites, these carry vital strategic and tactical information for communication between all levels of the military.  Loss of a C&C sat is almost always a destabilizing effect -- creating angst as to how and why, both of which could be preludes to war.



Anti-Satellite Capabilities


This briefing will look at three types of anti-satellite capabilities:
  1. Aircraft to orbit anti-satellite capability
  2. Surface (ship or ground based) to orbit anti-satellite capability
  3. On-orbit anti-satellite capability  (one might call this indigenous space anti-satellite capability)
Looking at the three satellite types we have cited for this briefing, you will see there are actually two (grossly exaggerated) basic satellite orbit levels: 1,000 miles high and less, or between 22,000 and 40,000 miles up.  There are of course orbits lower or in between those two limits...for instance the space station is located in orbit at somewhere between 189 to 248 miles (350-460 km) up. And not all orbits are the same.  Most are elliptical in nature, with a low range (perigee) and high range (apogee) of orbit altitude above the planet.

However, let's go with the two "basic" altitudes for now.   An anti-satellite weapon capable of "taking out" targets at 1,000 miles high or less, has a clear set of targets, spy satellites.  This is important both strategically and tactically.  If you are about to move your forces into position and do not want the enemy's 'eye in the sky' to see you, then you could take out the satellite with that capability.  Even if that act itself gives warning, the loss of the ability to "look down" and "see" the forces moving may put your enemy at a huge disadvantage.  Thus the Chinese ability to take out such satellites is worrisome, destabilizing and as probably begun a secret new arms program to match capabilities.  Contrary to the claims that the U.S. is NOW creating a new arms race, this actually probably occurred decades ago during the final years of the Soviet Union.  In any case, taking out spy satellites is probably the most difficult in terms of detecting, tracking and targeting, since these satellites are, by their orbital nature, moving fast and in less predictable locations at any time of the day.

The ASAT (Anti-Satellite) weapon aiming at spy satellites is certainly a threat, and somewhat destabilizing, however, according to then Lt. Colonel Robert Dillman in his USAF War College thesis, an attack on command and control satellites is far worse in terms of destabilization.

When command and control assets of any kind vanish "from the net", it is impetus for much angst.   Does this mean there is an attack on our country is underway?  How was it done and more importantly, who did it?  Should we, and do we have time, to mount our own anti-satellite operations in order to take out our enemy's space assets in response?  Is there a level of response to consider, or do we just go whole hog and eliminate their space capability all together?  Does that elimination include planetary ground stations for up/down links and do we include launch sites?  Should we go on nuclear alert too?  Sound paranoid?  It is necessarily so.  In today's environments, a rogue nation could reach our heartland in minutes with a nuclear missile.  Without our eyes in space, we'd never know the missiles were launched, losing valuable time in our response.  To be blasé about the whole thing invites disaster.  Better to think and prepare for the worst so that you can have a happy time when you discovered you were perhaps a little overanxious, or in the worst case, glad you managed to react fast enough to perhaps avert total disaster.

Brief History of U.S. Anti-Satellites Systems

The table below covers the publicly known U.S. efforts to test and if viable, deploy anti-satellite systems:

#
 Timeframe
 Name
 Description
1
 1963 Program 505 The first operational system, pre-dated Program 437 by going into operation on August 1, 1963, using Nike Zeus missiles which were originally designed to take out incoming ballistic missiles. It was abandoned in favor of the USAF system used in Program 437 (see below) in 1964.
2
 Late 1963 thru 1964
 Program 437
 Concept based upon the Thor Ballistic Missile launcher using a nuclear warhead that would be delivered within its minimum safe distance and detonated to take out the target satellite (spy satellite or space based weapons platform).  Originally approved secretly by the DoD (McNamara).  Modified USAF Thors were to be moved from deactivated missile silos in England, moved and setup on Johnston Island in the Pacific. Four tests occurred (sans warheads) beginning on February 1, 1964 by the Air Force.  The system was declared fully operational under the U.S. Air Defense Command.  Placed on 30 day standby status on October 2, 1970, and then deactivated April 1, 1975.  The system was at one time also contemplated (MILNET: not confirmed) as a recon operation...to launch systems that would photograph other nations' satellites up close and returning the images in film capsules similar to (or the same as) those used in the Corona overhead surveillance program (Program 437AP).  This add-on program was eventually canceled in November of 1966.
3
 1970s
 Project Spike
 USAF SAMSO designed a follow up system that was not based upon a nuclear weapon, thinking that an F-106 fighter interceptor could "toss" a two-stage missile which in turn would release a homing solid motor vehicle which would intercept and detonate close by the on-orbit target. The missile chosen was the standard Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM) used to home in on radar emitters as SAM suppression weapons. While SPIKE never entered service, the test vehicles were key in development of the later Air Launched ASAT which began development in 1974 (See ASAT Below)
4
 1976-1988
 ASAT/ALMV
 An air launched, miniature homing vehicle launched into space by, again, a two stage missile released from an F-15.  This program was also known as the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle program or ALMV.  The program began development in 1976 and resulted in tests beginning in the late 1970s, with the intent of operating some 100 F-15s armed with the interceptors.  The program ran into final guidance problems and cost overruns and eventually was scaled back and then canceled despite several successful tests.  The flight vehicle consisted of  a two stage rocket that would put the kill vehicle (Miniature Kill Vehicle -- MKV, the third and final stage) into proximity of the on-orbit target at 350 miles altitude and lower.  The MKV had 64 thrusters used to precisely navigate the vehicle to its target where it killed by high energy collision at speeds approximating 15,000 to 25,000 miles per hour.  The September 13, 1985 test came within 6 inches of the aim point destroying the 1800 pound P78-1 satellite (photo of F-15 and the ALMV). The program was canceled in 1988 with some 15 missiles built and 6 expended in testing.
5
 1990-present
 KE ASAT
 Kinetic Energy ASAT program - A ground based system that consisted of a booster, kill vehicle, and a shroud for mounting the system on a compatible launch vehicle, part of a competitively bid program in 1990.  By mid 2001, three prototypes had been built, and the program was transferred to the U.S. Navy, with the prototypes going into storage.  The Army then awarded a program called the Counter Space Technology Testbed in 2004, with work to be completed by mid 2006.  In addition there was/is a support contract known as the Space Control Test Capability program (SCTC), which among other things is the primary in counter space system planning capability.

1990-present
 MIRACL
 Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser - a high energy (greater than 2.2 million watts) Deuterium-Flouride chemical laser that was contemplated for a test against a U.S. satellite in in September of 1997.  This ground based (White Sands, New Mexico) laser has enough power to reach out into orbit and can either heat or totally destroy its target.  While the test did not occur, it is clear the capability is there.  Perhaps now that the fallacy of worrying about a space arms race is pretty much a dead issue, the facility will once again be tapped to prove it's usefulness in an Anti-Satellite mission.
6
 1980s-present
 LEAP
 Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile, a kinetic kill interceptor intended for use as part of the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense program.   The current anti-satellite capability mounts LEAP on top of a Navy Standard Missile Modification 3 (SM-3) and is launched from a vertical launch system (VLS) cell from an AEGIS equipped cruiser of destroyer.  This successful system was used to destroy a malfunctioning KH-11 satellite in February of 2008, and was launched from the U.S.S. Lake Erie, CG-70 in the Pacific near Hawaii.  The U.S. has not announced a regular "unit" of such anti-satellite capable ships or even a mission of that type for the U.S. Navy on any permanent basis.  However, it is clear the capability exists, and speculation is that the system is perhaps the first such system both capable and cost effective, as well as can be deployed easily on any number of U.S. Navy AEGIS installed cruisers and/or destroyers with VLS (plenty in the fleet).
Much of the data in the table is from Global Security.org's pages on Anti-Satellite Weapons 12 


So what are these different anti-sat capabilities and what does it require to field them?


Aircraft to Orbit

The aircraft to orbit idea has been publicly acknowledged as an off the shelf capability since the late 1960s.  Simply put, once you have a target in mind, you strap a kill vehicle (in the 70-s and 80-s this was AGM-69 Anti-Radiation Missile or equivalent radar homing missile) to a rather large but fighter haulable rocket booster that fit under the belly of a fighter.  Then you flew to just the right spot at high altitude and cut 'er loose. The booster arcs the payload into orbit, and it matches orbit with the target.  Once near the target, it explodes. 

Unfortunately, the technology for getting close and exploding were the key problems with this technology.  Maneuvering in space of this kind is mostly a manual operation.  It can be done with automation, however in the 1970s and early 1980s, the size of the equipment used to automate that operation was both size prohibitive and consumed a lot of power, which in turn created additional weight problems.  While successful, the cost and operational requirements were a bit too daunting, and the threat did not appear significant nor pressing.  There is also speculation that while successful, the program was just so, and that reliability of the kill and cost overruns killed the program before it could be used to kill an enemy satellite.

There is no public record of anything other than testing of such a system, and certainly while speculation and rumors said there was a wing of fighters equipped to do this job, we could not confirm it.


F-15 Launching ASAT Test
(FAS)

Today, speculation would tap the F-15 again as the mother ship for a Pegasus rocket, with the current known quantity, the kinetic kill interceptor (see LEAP below).  This would essentially mirror the capability of the SM-3 Navy missile and interceptor pair that was used to destroy the broken satellite.  It is not clear if there is an available software load for the Pegasus, however, the rocket booster is capable of putting the kinetic kill vehicle into low earth orbit.  Indeed, the former project, known as the ASM-135 ASAT carried the AGM-69 SRAM on an Altair upper stage to guide it within strike range of its target.  The first launch occurred in January of 1984, and the first (and only that we know about) occurred on September 13, 1985, the F-15 launching at a heroic 80,000 feet, vertically launching the ASAT.  The program was canceled in 1988.  The Soviets (and their Russian successors) began experimenting, like the U.S. in the late 1960s, with several viable systems taking form.  They have had operationally viable units off and on, however, again, there is no public knowledge of a dedicated operational unit.  Thus both countries are thought to have off the shelf capability, but not units on alert for such operations.

For further out orbits, it is pretty clear that a three stage rocket is a minimum, one to achieve orbit, one to boost that orbit to geo-synchronous altitudes, and then of course the kinetic kill vehicle.  Even the venerable B-52, the workhorse of NASA's rocket testing days would not be able to lift the three stage rocket required to achieve geo-synch strike capability.

So in summary, the aircraft to orbit ASAT is useable, most likely, only for low earth orbits of 1,000 miles or less.  It could perhaps defend the International Space Station from an attacker, assuming of course we knew well enough in advance it was coming, or take out a spy satellite were it so desirable.


Surface to Orbit

This is the most likely scenario for a true deployment of an ASAT system.  And now, we know it is more than a capability, it is a reality.  The Navy missile used to down the faulty satellite was the Standard Modification 3 -- SM-3 missile.   It has been in the Navy inventory for some time.  It did, however, according to several sources, include specially prepared software for the satellite shoot down mission.  The SM-3 is launched from the Bunker Hill sub-class of Ticonderoga Missile Cruiser which makes use of the AEGIS system for normal missile attacks.  In this case, the U.S.S. Lake Erie, CG-70 was given the honor of making the attempt.  The Bunker Hill "flight" of missile cruisers features rows and columns of "vertical launch cells" which are simply missile silos mounted vertically in the deck.  The cover hatch opens, and the cell has a lightweight seal to keep out contaminants until the rocket is fired.  When fired, the membrane is punctured by the missile, the cell reflects the flames, smoke, and gases up alongside the missile as it shoots up and out of the cell (see the pictures below).

On February 20, 2008, the U.S. fired a SM-3 (Standard Mod 3) surface missile from the AEGIS cruiser U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70).  The missile was tipped with one of the Ballistc Missile Defene kinetic kill interceptor vehicles, which in just short of ten minutes, impacted against the KH-11 satellite at a speed equivalent (two colliding objects in space) of about 22,000 mph.  The kill vehicle's impact set off the hydrazine tank, the real target of the entire exercise.  The satellite was said to have been reduced to football sized objects that would eventually burn up in reentry.  However, there is some possibility that some of the chunks would remain in low earth orbit for some time. 

The "shoot down" of the satellite was immediately cause for both speculation and in some quarters (expectedly, Russia and China had plenty to say about it) condemnation as a new weapons test.  The vehicle used by the Navy is the LEAP (Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile), part of the Missile Defense Agency's intercept flight test series.  It is also known as the AEGIS LEAP program.
64 Vertical Launch System (VLS) Cells
(U.S. Navy Spec 2nd Michael Hight, Fox News)
 SM-3 Missile From U.S.S. Lake Erie Kills Satellite
(U.S. Department of Defense)
LEAP
(Wikipedia Commons)

A similar capability is under development for the Ballistic Missile Defense System.9  A ground based interceptor uses a small ballistic missile to achieve orbit.  However in the BMD role, (and perhaps also true for a REAL anti-satellite weapons capability), the guidance package (the last stage that puts the kill vehicle in line with the target) must take into account the incoming missile's arc as well as the potential for it to add vectors -- that is to say -- actively avoid being shot down.  For instance, a MIRV package may have decoys and the actual warhead may be both masked and maneuverable "on its way in", creating the need for an even more robust mechansim for making terminal course corrections.

The U.S. is already working on ground stations with the launch and kill vehicle pieces already in the works (PDF 5.3 mb, MILNET Mirror).  Adding the new software to focus on a satellite instead of a ballistic missile would seem to be made a lot easier now that they know how to take out a relatively stable and predictable space object such as the KH-11.

The U.S. Navy fielded solution is quite interesting however.  It means you can mount a missile defense or an anti-sat capability just about anywhere in the world where a naval cruiser can go.  There are certain to be limits...the more time it takes for the missile to maneuver in place will exhaust its ability to be fired from too far off the eventual intercept point.  And of course, longer maneuver time means more of an opportunity for a future counter-weapon to be deployed.  Currently however, and perhaps this is what irks the Russian and Chinese so much -- there is no defense from the capability demonstrated on October 21, 2008.

We should note that we mean no viable, demonstrated capability to defend against an anti-sat weapon.  One might be able to kludge something together in short order, or perhaps a secret project is working on or already has prototypes of such a defense.  The publicly known facts are that the U.S., China nor Russian have no defense against such an attack against their own satellites. It is like having a multi-million dollar car, that is extremely difficult, costly, and lengthy to replace, and having no means of keeping it from being easily destroyed.  In the case of the U.S., that is a failure in duty to the American taxpayer for one thing, and downright irresponsible in terms of National Security for another. 

The key advantage to the Navy ship fielded version is obvious.  Sail a ship to where it is needed and wholla, you have an offensive anti-satellite capability.  Of course, detection of such a launch is possible -- the firing of an SM-3 missile is most likely quite visible from space, especially in that firing window, allowing some sort of counter measure to be employed (assuming you have one).

The ground version may or may not be as timely.  It all depends on the orbit of the target.  It may take a full one or two (up to 180 minutes) revolution of the globe for a ground launched (fixed station) anti-sat weapon to make its way into proximity of a satellite.  Ballistic Missile Defense, in that respect is easier -- your target is in the defense window of the geography your ground station is defending.  Whereas an anti-sat device must attack in orbits that are most likely crisscrossing your allies territory and perhaps is also being modified at will.

Also remember altitude...that is key in many orbit strategist's mind...we are working in three dimensions and the Z axis, so to speak, is the real killer. This is due to the fact that modifying the altitude of an orbit uses up lots of fuel overcoming the effects of orbital velocity and gravity.  Skipping "sideways" in orbit is far easier.

A far "easier" method for taking out an on-orbit asset from the ground is to use an extremely powerful ground based laser, such as the U.S. Army's MIRACL (Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser).  Based at White Sands Missile Range (The High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility  25) in New Mexico, the Deuterium-Flouride chemical laser burns something akin to rocket fuel and using a special lasing cavity and mirrors, creates an extremely powerful laser beam (exceeds 2.2 million watts).  The first test of the system occurred February, 1996 when it was used to destroy a light, short range rocket.  A more direct test was contemplated in September of 1997, targeting  MSTI-3, a satellite scheduled to be shut down, however there was some questions on whether it would go forward.  A report from the book Militarization and Weaponization of Space 26 by Matthew Mowthorpe indicates the test was carried out on October 17, 1997  MSTI-3 was fired upon in its orbit at 265 miles with power levels intended to gradually increase to above 2.3 megawatts for up to or beyond ten seconds.  The idea was to find the minimum value for blinding the sensors aboard the satellite rather than destroy the satellite, some presuming the Army wanted to avoid creating space debris.  The test occurred on schedule, however various problems reduced the effectiveness of the test, although MIRACL was certainly on target. Damage to the MIRACL complicated the firing as well, however it remains in full operation today.   Mowthrope also says that  during the Clinton Administration, antisatellite capability was not deemed important and MIRACL may have received less-than-enthusiastic support.  This we know is in direct conflict with then Secretary of Defense William Cohen who was an avid advocate of U.S. strength in space. This has produced our own speculation that perhaps a disagreement between the Secretary of Defense, the President and of course Congress, all contributed to MIRACL being put on the back burner to becomea more "down-to-earth" test device from that day forward..  Mowthorpe, however, goes on to speculate that MIRACL has been available as a contingency for anti-satellite purposes should the need arise.




On-Orbit

This capability makes sense only if you happen to be on-orbit relatively close to the target vehicle to begin with.  Having a platform that could place interceptors into any orbit beyond its own is not only quite difficult, it would be extremely costly.  The original Star Wars system might have include thousands of platforms in order to adequately protect against a Soviet strike.  And of course there is the matter of keeping such a system up-to-date and effecting command and control.  The weakest link of such as system, after all, is that unless it is manned, it relies upon either full automation (hardly reasonable with deadly missiles on board) or radio links to ground stations. 

In the case of automation, our trust in such software systems is just not there yet, and most likely won't be there for some time.  Even on board a Navy ship firing a missile, there is a human operator at a "permission" button, that allows the AEGIS system to release the "bird" in attack mode.  All the operator has to do is remove his hand and everything stops.   Humans controlling the deadly software and hardware systems will be the norm for some time to come.

In the case of radio link controlled on-orbit missiles, the weakest link also is the easiest link to force into failure.  A nearby radio jammer can eliminate the capability to control any satellite, and in many cases (this is speculation) a powerful enough transmitter in an aircraft or at a ground station can also jam the instructions to such a satellite.  Experience with Amateur radio and satellite transponders shows us that the hobbyist can do this with commercial satellites, the question is how "big" a transmitter is necessary to do the same with a military satellite.  There are means to overcome this problem, however.  For instance, the on-orbit anti-satellite platform could take its orders from any number of other on-orbit satellite relay stations, and in a pinch, from several commercial units or even NASA birds as well.  Thus in order to effectively ensure the anti-sat bird is rendered hors de' combat, you'd have to take out loads of satellites.  Jamming a large number takes a nuclear answer either in space or on the ground, or hundreds of directional transmitters aimed at all the possible relay satellites.  While not impossible, it does not seem too feasible.  Brute power aimed at the anti-satellite platform seems a better alternative.

There have been a science fiction like idea floated for an on-orbit weapons system -- using giant lasers that focus onto a mirror which in turn reflects to either another mirror or directly onto an on-orbit target.  While that particular idea waits for the power supply issues to be resolved, the laser necessary is already being tested aboard the Airborne Laser Laboratory -- more than enough power to wipe out a satellite, or in low power mode, permanently "blind" the sensitive sensors or cameras.

However, if you overlook the technical issues of how to put a kill vehicle in proximity of the target (this is orbit mechanics and I know of at least one person in the U.S. who does that kind of calculation in his head), and the safety and reliability of command and control of such a platform, the actual destructive part of the weapon becomes almost trivial.  A lead weight used on a scuba diver's weight belt will just about tear the hell out of any satellite known to be on orbit today.  Given a dozen or so in a small "cloud", sort of like a shotgun blast, you can pretty much eliminate any target in space.  This relatively low tech solution is viable today.

Obviously, anyone familiar with how a shotgun barrel works, could design such a weapon for space.  The Kinetic Kill vehicle used in the latest event is probably a tad more sophisticated, however it is clear that the idea works all too well.  Especially at closing speeds approximating an accumulated 22,000 mph.  Our lead weight  idea is perhaps a little tame, substitute copper or worse a depleted uranium penetrator at these speeds, and you wind up with a plasma temperature mass that would incinerate any metal known.

Thus the physical weapon is perhaps the easiest part of this solution for anti-satellite capability.  It's getting it there that is the problem.  Having said, that, getting there is also, in some ways easier.  For instance, the International Space Station takes about 91 hours to circle the earth at an altitude of 180 something miles.  If you take its orbit as a basis for an on-orbit anti-sat platform (most satellites at its low-earth orbit altitude take about 90 minutes to circle the earth), then if you had four such platforms one quarter the way around the earth from each other, then they are, at worst case, only 22 hours from taking out your target.  This, of course, assumes the altitude can be adjusted equally easily and in parallel within the same time frame.  Eight platforms reduces this to 11 hours, and sixteen yields 5.5 hours.  This is still a little long for defense, but for offensive purposes, this means you only have to plan your anti-sat attack some 6 hours before the ground movement becomes visible.  That is an effective advantage for any nation with space assets.  For proper defense, you probably want 32 or even 64 such platforms.  If they cost as much as say an F-22, no problem, these are well worth the defensive capability -- if we could assign an F-22 to fly up into space and defend some of our valuable satellites, we'd do it in a heartbeat.

The key advantage to on-orbit systems is surprise.  It is extremely difficult to manage full time observation of any on-orbit object, unless of course it is geo-synchronous.  By placing an anti-sat in non geo-sync, you require your opponents to launch another on-orbit platform to keep watch on yours.  That watcher now becomes a target for that which it watches.  Thus, unless your enemy is watching with such an on-orbit device, you can release an anti-sat weapon with little or no warning until it gets close enough to observe, in which case, it is already too close to do anything about it.

Of course, there is the other wrinkle, a manned platform for this purpose.  Take a next generation space shuttle.  You can have one on the pad and have it launched and in just about any orbit (less than 22,000 miles up) within a few hours worst case.  Then a human pilot can maneuver a self powered kinetic vehicle close enough, wherein the kill vehicle leaves the orbiter and commences its attack.  Far off scenario?  Not according to the students at the U.S. War Colleges.  See MILNET's Space-Based Attack Weapons page for more information.


The Rationale For Anti-Satellite Systems

As Lt. Col Gillman so aptly described the politically correct assumption of previous era, "During the cold war, ASAT opponents postulated that the US deployment of an operational ASAT would trigger a reciprocal series of U S.-Soviet ASAT developments and deployments that would constitute a new dimension to the arms race. This argument held some credibility since any U.S ASAT was obviously meant to counter Soviet military satellites, particularly those that provided intelligence gathering capabilities against U.S. and allied forces ’ Now, with the end of the cold war and the proliferation of imaging satellites and services, this argument has lost what substance it might have had..." 

Since China has already an anti-satellite capability, an event that probably was not in Gillman's knowledge when writing his paper, there is even less reason to suppose we could prevent an anti-satellite arms race.  It has already begun.  And as the 2002 Commission presciently pointed out, to not have a defense and our own capability is a refusal to protect our own assets.  Gillman goes on to say, "If an adversary has an ASAT capability and the U S does not, the U.S. will simply be in the undesirable position of having to defend its satellites while the adversary's satellites go unchallenged. As always, what really raises the probability of ASAT attacks against U.S. satellites, is not the U S. possession of an ASAT capability, it is that U.S. satellites provide tremendous warfighting enhancements to U.S. and allied surface and air forces.  Any adversary would love to negate these warfighting enhancements.  And this is exactly the reason the U.S. needs an ASAT capability today -- because potential adversaries have or can get access to space capabilities that threaten to enhance their military effectiveness against the U S and its allies."  One might add the logical conclusion to that statement...not only do we need anti-satellite capabilities ourselves, but we also need to consider how such resources play and do not play in the role of defending our on-orbit assets.

As usual those more concerned with peace than national security would argue that we simply enable the space arms race by participating.  This is very much in line with Neville Chamberlain's thinking, don't give Hitler a reason to come after us.  Play along to get along, instead of play to win.  While this is no game, and certainly Great Britain found out the hard way that appeasement simply never works, neither will assuming the Chinese and Russians are not pitched irrevocably at removing the U.S. advantage in space.  Indeed, any advantage we hold today is at tender odds with the increasing Sino-Russian appetite to build an advantage in the new frontier.  If this sounds all too much like a new Cold War, you're right.  MILNET has been warning of this for several years now, and it has become increasingly apparent in the last year.


Conclusions

Clearly, the U.S. has the capability to take out a relatively stable space platform using a surface launch missile.  The fact this is a Navy Ship's missile might be irrelevant other than the fact that a ship is a, albeit slowly, moving platform that go practically  anywhere in the world..  The irrelevance stems from the fact that a Standard Missile Launcher can be bolted to a concrete foundation and you have yourself a ground based anti-sat system.  A housing construction contractor could do that for you tomorrow.   While we admit that planting an AEGIS system on that same concrete pad is not quite as easy a matter, it certainly does not take ANY new technology development.  Just plant the deck of an AEGIS cruiser on the ground and away you go!  Anyway, it is not clear how much AEGIS plays into achieving the kill...perhaps the system is self guiding once it achieves orbit.  It may be true that all you really need to do is get close, and the interceptor takes care of the rest.

An aircraft "lofted" version requires fitting the software to a fighter carryable missile such as the Pegasus (assuming it can carry the burden of the kill vehicle and maneuver as accurately as the SM-3) and you know have the anyplace, anytime feature that a modern fighter brings to the picture (you don't have to have a relatively slow naval ship move into position, you can fly out of any number of bases worldwide and get there in hours).

On-orbit anti-sat systems require additional development of control systems (for safety and reliability -- remember jamming) but are also ideal in terms of permanent installations and the difficulty to defend against--a sort of silent killer, really.

Thus you would be quite foolish to say there is a danger of a space arms race picking up.  It already has.  By necessity, the U.S. is in it for better or worse.  Clearly China has already been exposed, and most in the know will tell you Russia's anti-sat capabilities while crude and decades old, still exist from their Soviet era developments and will shortly reveal themselves as Putin attempts to convince the Russian people he is the leader for posterity.

The old rationales for not building an anti-sat system have vanished.   We ARE the premier power in space assets and there are those countries (Russia and China just to name two big contenders) who are not only actively, but hotly pursuing capabilities to remove that leadership role, and most likely doing so in the next ten years.  Now is NOT the time to listen to peace-nik's hopes for a peaceful space.  That fallacy has been proven time and time again to be wishful thinking, arrogant believe in unspecified and particularly failure ridden diplomacy, and leads us to wondering how it could happen that we have lost billions of dollars of on-orbit assets.  Now is the time to invest in protecting our space assets and providing the ability to take out those of our enemies if the need arises.  Just because everyone WANTS to believe Russia and China are not our enemies, the reality is that Russia, China and Iran all have the lift capability to put anti-satellite weapons into play, and anyone who believes China or Russia would not sell that capability to Iran needs to get off the drugs and return to reality.


Sources:
  1. Deploying an Operational Anti-Satellite Capability: Filling a Vulnerable Point in U.S. Defense (PDF 617KB), Robert Dillman, U.S.A.F. War College, 1996 (MILNET Mirror)
  2. Anti-Satellite Capabilities of Planned US Missile Defense Systems, David Wright and Laura Grego, Union of Concerned Scientists, 12/09/2002
  3. Chinese Anti-Satellite Capabilities, Global Security.com
  4. Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon, Craig Covault, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 01/17/2007
  5. Belarus Says U.S. Tested New Space Weapon, RIA Novosti, 2/21/2008 (known russian propoganda outsource)
  6. International Space Station, Wikipedia
  7. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, National Studies Space Center, the USAF Air University, January 11, 2001
  8. The United States National Space Policy (PDF, ) The Executive Office of the Presidnet, The U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy -- OSTP, October 6, 2006 (MILNET Mirror)
  9. Ballistic Missile Defense, Major Terrence M. Dorn, United States Army
  10. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat, at the direction of the 104th U.S. Congress, fiscal year 1997 (MILNET Mirror)
  11. Global Ballistic Missile Defense - A Layered Integrated Defense, Missile Defense Agency, The Pentagon, April 4, 2006
  12. Spacecraft: Military: IS anti-satellite system, Russian Space Web.com, undated
  13. U.S. Plans anti-satellite lasers, Jeff Hecht, NewScientistTech, 05/03/2006
  14. Space-Based Attack Weapons, MILNET Brief, updated, 4/17/2005
  15. Weapons for the 25th Century, MILNET Brief, 2/10/2005
  16. Unmanned Space Vehicles, MILNET Brief, 3/1/2005
  17. ANTISATELLITE SYSTEMS, Federation of American Scientists, undated
  18. U.S. Antisatellite Weapon to be Tested, Dailywireless.org, undated (Note this story is a cover for a wider "expose" on the U.S. Space Program)
  19. An Assement of China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Dr. Michael P. Pillsbury, 1/19/2007
  20. Anti-Satellite Weapons, GlobalSecurity.org, undated (excellent list of resources covering a number of anti-satellite systems)
  21. Star-Tek--Exploiting the Final Frontier: Counterspace Operations in 2025, Zelinski, et all, Air Force Vision 2025, August, 1996 (MILNET Mirror)
  22. Yeltsin Letter Reveals Anti-Satellite Weapons, Bill Gertz, The Washington Times (reprinted on GlobalSecurity.org), 11/7/1997
  23. Shooting Down a "Star", Program 437, The U.S. Nuclear ASAT System...",C.K. Chun, Air University, April 2000 (MILNET Mirror)
  24. Military is Hoping to Test-Fire Laser Against Satellites, William J. Broad, New York Times, 9/1/1997 (reprinted on GlobalSecurity.com)
  25. White Sands High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility -- HELSTF, White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico
  26. Militarization and Weaponization of Space, Matthew Mowthorpe, Lexington Books, 2004, ISBN 0739107135


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