IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century

Staff Study Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives One Hundred Fourth Congress

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. MASINT: Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

Executive Summary

As part of the Intelligence Community of the 21st Century study (IC21), the Committee reviewed the Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) discipline for its relevance in the Intelligence Community's (IC) future. The results of the study reaffirmed some long held beliefs about the relatively unpredictable future -- especially in terms of specific technologies the Community will have to face. One truism that seems to hold is that the sophistication of the technologies employed in the future weapon system (threats that the IC will be tasked against) will be radically improved, and perhaps even more radically different than those we attempt to understand today. The resulting need for a more sophisticated IC collection capability is clear. Clear also, is the need to unambiguously identify these specific weapons or capabilities -- often before they are ever used. Less clear, but undoubtedly true, is the vital role conventional technical intelligence disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT, etc.) will continue to play in the identification and location of the more dynamic targets. However, as the sophistication of these targets increases, or as countries (or transnational players) employ effective denial and deception techniques, we will need to employ new capabilities to ensure we can continue to answer the consumers' questions. One such capability is MASINT. This study concludes that MASINT will take on a more important role than it does today in providing critical information on these future threats. Accordingly, this discipline must be focused and well-managed to ensure the Community can provide the necessary information to its various users.

The study's major findings include:

The study's major recommendations include:

MASINT: MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE

Study Purpose

One can argue that the requirements levied on the Intelligence Community (IC) in the twenty-first century will not be radically different than those levied on it today. The basic information needs of "who, what, where, when and why" will likely not change. However, most can easily agree that the sophistication of the technologies employed in the future weapon systems (threats) that the IC will be tasked against will be radically improved, and perhaps even more radically different than those we attempt to understand today. Increasingly, even unsophisticated countries are gaining access to relatively inexpensive, but high technology weapons. Weapons that can be "launched and forgotten," weapons of mass destruction -- including nuclear, chemical and biological, or weapons that are difficult to detect or are stealthy. The resulting need for a more sophisticated IC collection capability is clear. Clear also, is the need to unambiguously identify these specific weapons or capabilities -- often before they are ever used. The IC's ability to specifically locate, identify, characterize, and determine the intentions of such weapons or threats is, and will become even more, critical. Conventional technical intelligence disciplines -- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), etc. -- have played, and will continue to play, a vital role in the identification and location of such targets. However, as the sohpistication of these targets increases, or as countries (or transnational players) employ effective denial and deception techniques, we will need to employ new capabilities to ensure we can continue to answer the consumers' questions. One such capability is Measurement and Signature Intelligence, or MASINT. MASINT is a very scientific and technically-based discipline that can provide unique contributions to the IC in terms of specific weapon identifications, chemical compositions, material content, etc. Such unique identifications will be a major factor in answering the future questions of "who, what where, when and why." In fact, some believe MASINT will be the most important "technical INT of the future."

Despite the clear criticality, both present and future, of the MASINT discipline, it is the least well known of the technical collection/analysis disciplines. Many have questioned the nature of the discipline: is it a true collection discipline or is it a unique product based on specialized analysis? Few who have had the opportunity to review MASINT products, however, can dispute their utility, or the current and growing need for these products. The purpose of this study, therefore, was to determine several specific issues relative to MASINT. First, was to identify the viability and need for MASINT-unique collection and processing in the 21st Century. Second, was to determine the IC's strengths and weaknesses in providing such necessary MASINT support. This was to include making any recommendations for necessary changes to systems, architectures, management, technologies requiring emphasis, etc. to ensure the discipline's viability. Finally, we wanted to address the budget implications of attempting to achieve these goals.

Study Approach

It should be first noted that this is not a scientific study, but rather an assessment based on community expert inputs. To get substantive input for the study, the staff team sponsored several round-table panel discussions, numerous individual interviews, and formal presentations with MASINT Committee members, the Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Arms Control professionals and former community officials. The effort was designed to "think out of the Future Years' Development Program (FYDP) box." That is, there was no attempt to indict the past, present, or programmed organization and efforts, but rather to look "beyond" into the future. The team developed an outline and series of questions to prompt inputs/discussion from each of the invited participants. The approach viewed MASINT as a distinct collection discipline even though the discipline is not well bounded by specific (and unique) collection and exploitation definitions. Our effort focused on identifying the current capabilities and systems trying to determine their individual contributions and where each should/could be best employed in the future. However, the sciences and rapidly evolving technologies involved eventually focused us more toward a review of MASINT management, including the abilities to coordinate and program for new sensors/technologies, to task sensors, and to use and disseminate MASINT information. Recommendations from participants were noted and, to the extent possible, identified in this report.

Secondly, it also needs to be noted that the recommendations offered below were originally focused on a MASINT management and operational structure that was generally maintained within the current IC organization. And, although these recommendations were made before the completion of the Intelligence Community Management staff study, they work well within the construct of that study's more consolidated community organization. Specifically within the context of that study, all references to the "Central MASINT Office (CMO)" are assumed to be describing a division (or office) within the Technical Collection Agency (TCA) under the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM). If the TCA construct is not adopted, the CMO references describe the Community's MASINT management organization assumed to be within the DIA.

Finally, in addition to the panel discussions and interviews, the team reviewed and used the following supporting documents during the study:

  1. MASINT Handbook for the Warfighter, prepared by the INCA Project Office, November 1994
  2. CMO Biological and Chemical Warfare Intelligence Collection Strategy Briefing, R. Paul Schaudies, Ph.D., November 1994
  3. CMO Investment Process Briefing, Mr. Dale Helmer, August 94
  4. CMO MASINT Master Plan, January 1994
  5. MASINT 2010 Study, October 1995
  6. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/11-1, December 1992
  7. DoD Instruction 5105.58, February 1993
  8. DoD Instruction 5105.21, May 1977

Background

A general understanding of the genesis of MASINT and its official definition is appropriate prior to a study regarding the future of the discipline.

Recognizing the need to ensure proper exploitation of complex, technically-derived data, the IC classified MASINT as a formal intelligence discipline in 1986. At that time, the IC Staff MASINT Committee was formed to oversee all MASINT activities. To further consolidate MASINT management, the Central MASINT office (CMO) was established in 1993 by the Director, DIA, with specific responsibilities detailed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directives. The CMO is a joint IC and DoD activity within DIA, that directs and implements national and DoD policies and procedures on MASINT matters. With that quick background, it is useful to identify the IC's current official definition of MASINT:

Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is technically derived intelligence (excluding traditional imagery and signal intelligence) which when collected, processed, and analyzed, results in intelligence that detects, tracks, identifies, or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. MASINT includes the advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and SIGINT collection sources. MASINT sensors include, but are not limited to, radar, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear, radiation detection, spetroradiometric, and seismic systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid material sampling systems.

Despite this definition, many in the IC (and policy community) are confused as to what MASINT really is. Although MASINT can be described as the highly technical exploitation of traditional disciplines, the MASINT collection techniques cover areas not addressed by other disciplines. In many respects, there is a clear distinction between MASINT and the other disciplines. MASINT can be considered analogous to the individual who relies on all senses to gain information about his or her environment. Where SIGINT is akin to sound, and IMINT to sight, MASINT is akin to touch, taste and smell. The areas where MASINT expands on the traditional disciplines (IMINT and SIGINT) can be thought of as providing aids to improve upon or add dimensions and capabilities to the sight and sound senses that would not otherwise be possible. Is MASINT a true collection discipline, or is it actually specialized processing of other collection disciplines? Is it a separate field of specialization, or more appropriately classified as additional processing and analysis of existing data? These questions were a fundamental basis for the study that went into this report. Specifically, we tried to determine how to correct this "identity crisis," while ensuring the community will be served by the truly unique product MASINT can provide.

General Conclusions

Based on the various inputs, the group identified six general conclusions that appear to sum up the general issues relative to MASINT. Each of the general conclusions are later broken down into specific conclusions and recommendations.

  1. MASINT is difficult to bound by strict definitions. In fact, MASINT collections can, in part, legitimately be labeled as SIGINT, Infrared Intelligence (IRINT), IMINT, HUMINT, etc. However, MASINT does not fit neatly into any one or all of these recognized "traditional" intelligence disciplines. MASINT is both a true, unique, collection/analysis discipline and highly refined analytical techniques of those traditional disciplines. Despite these gray lines of demarcation, MASINT may be the "intelligence discipline of the future" -- that is, MASINT is a discipline that is becoming more important in identifying and characterizing new and emerging threats, particularly as weapon system technologies become more complex and capable. Without a robust and focused capability, MASINT's support to future needs, such as "brilliant" weapons and national information requirements (e.g., weapons proliferation, arms control, force modernization, strategic programs, scientific and technical needs, environmental and humanitarian concerns, and counter-narcotics/terrorism), may be inadequate.
  2. MASINT is perceived as a "strategic" discipline with limited "tactical" support capabilities. But, by application of real-time analysis and dissemination, MASINT has a potential ability to provide real-time situation awareness and targeting not necessarily available to the more classic disciplines. Because of these perceptions, MASINT does not get the attention of the tactical consumers, and has less constituency support than the more traditional intelligence disciplines. Lacking proper constituency, MASINT sensors and analysis will likely not be properly supported or maintained. Results will include a lack of targeting templates for smart weapons.
  3. MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not well understood by the IC as a whole. Therefore, although it provides significant intelligence products, its contributions, or the potential of its contributions may have been and will likely be limited. The full extent if its future application to national and operational intelligence will not be realized.
  4. Funding levels for the current MASINT systems, and those projected into the future are not reflective of the importance of this discipline to the Nation's general intelligence/ dominant knowledge efforts. This is primarily because users do not have direct tasking over, and therefore understanding of, MASINT sensors.
  5. The roadmap for specific MASINT technologies appears to be fairly well thought out and necessary for the 21st century. However, there may be insufficient funding flexibility for reacting to, or pursuing new, emerging, or fleeting technologies. Additionally, there is a need to ensure a balance between the requirements and technologies that support military battlefield requirements, and the often more exacting requirements and technologies that are needed for IC national monitoring and detection of weapon or agent developments.
  6. Although the CMO has the necessary legal authorities, it is not properly staffed commensurate with its responsibilities. Additionally, a fractured organizational structure provides little to no focused MASINT management, budgeting oversight, tasking control, or coordination of effort. This may potentially cause inefficient expenditures of resources and duplicative developments.

Specific Conclusions/Findings

A) "MASINT is difficult to bound by strict definitions. In fact, MASINT collections can, in part, legitimately be labeled as SIGINT, IRINT, IMINT, HUMINT, etc. However, MASINT does not fit neatly into any one or all of these recognized "traditional" intelligence disciplines. MASINT is both a true, unique, collection/analysis discipline and highly refined analytical techniques of those traditional disciplines. Despite these gray lines of demarcation, MASINT may be the "intelligence discipline of the future" -- that is, MASINT is a discipline that is becoming more important in identifying and characterizing new and emerging threats, particularly as weapon system technologies become more complex and capable. Without a robust and focused capability, MASINT's support to future needs, such as "brilliant" weapons and national information requirements (e.g., weapons proliferation, arms control, force modernization, strategic programs, scientific and technical needs, environmental and humanitarian concerns, and counter-narcotics/terrorism), may be inadequate."

  1. One discussion point focused on whether to maintain MASINT as a separate discipline or to break it up into the separate disciplines (i.e. Radar Intelligence (RADINT), SIGINT, IMINT, etc.). This discussion focused on whether or not to make MASINT professionals organic to the traditional intelligence disciplines or keep them separated within the distinct discipline. Some believe that doing away with the unique professional MASINT discipline that cuts across the other disciplines' collection spectra would be counterproductive. They believe better coordinated MASINT products are possible when viewed across the various collection disciplines. Their argument for maintaining a separate MASINT discipline states that such "cross cutting" is providing positive results in terms of all-source analysis. Upon close inspection this is apparently true. However, there is a counter-argument that includes the issue of refined "technical" exploitation of the "traditional intelligence disciplines" (explained below). This counter-argument focuses on the need to "proliferate" the MASINT exploitation potential to other disciplines. Regardless of the whether MASINT remains a distinct discipline or not, there is a need to redouble efforts to get people of different "intelligence stovepipe" expertises together doing true all-source (including non-intelligence sourced information) analysis.
  2. As touched on above, a counter-argument is that MASINT, as a term and as a separate discipline, may not be what is needed for the 21st century. A specific case can be made that MASINT is simply more refined, more scientific and more technically challenging analysis of existing collection/1/ (although much MASINT collection is done outside the realms of other existing collection disciplines). However, one respondent (favoring maintaining a separate discipline) stated, "Frankly, the MASINT odds and ends (e.g., phase history data) that could belong to other intelligence disciplines would probably not exist today if the MASINT phenomenologists had not pursued them." This may be true, but the question still exists which asks "Is MASINT a separate collection discipline or is it IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, IRINT, or other disciplines in their various forms?" Further, if the answer to the latter is "yes," then one has to ask whether MASINT is then the more detailed exploitation of those available collections. This argument becomes less clear, and the apparent answer to the first question becomes "no" when one studies the clearly MASINT-unique collection systems, entities and missions such as seismometry, nuclear and soil sampling. The argument for subsuming the MASINT discipline assumes that the MASINT product is not-so-simply the result of more in-depth analysis of the "traditional" intelligence disciplines. For example, although COBRA BALL is clearly a MASINT platform, its collection media are multidisciplined, and include IMINT (visible and non-visible spectra).
    The product distinction is more in the resulting analysis and use of the data collected via these disciplines' means. The product then, rather than being used for the traditional intelligence support functions of counting tanks, locating battalions, and targeting ATACMS missiles, is used for scientific/technical refinement to do signature and capability analysis. The basic sciences (between MASINT and the other disciplines) are not altered or different, but the state of refinement is. Another example is effluent analysis based on hyper-spectral collection. The collection is, arguably, IMINT in its various (non-imaging) spectra, but the product is fundamentally different analysis of the effluent content -- not just the detection (or imaging) of presence. This argument would question whether MASINT tasking, analysis and expertise need to be better developed within the existing "traditional" intelligence disciplines.
  3. Another argument for maintaining MASINT as a distinct discipline is captured in the following. Specifically, MASINT seeks to collect metric data and signatures. Metric data are derived from the direct measurement of the kinematics performance of targets of interest. Metric data provide information on the dynamic capabilities of targets and/or the tactics for their use. Signature data typically are -- or are derived from -- "high-fidelity measurements of targets of interest, in the context of their application, use or production, to allow the current or future unique identification of such targets." SIGINT, as its name implies, is based on the desire to intercept or collect signals -- the transmission of information from one place to another. Intercepted signals could contain information on a wide variety of topics that overlap information collected by IMINT or MASINT means; but the collection is still SIGINT. IMINT endeavors to provide pictorial representations of targets and areas of interest -- not the spectral analysis of material content. All three technical collection disciplines employ electro-optical (EO) - and radio frequency (RF) -- based systems to provide unique MASINT, SIGINT, and IMINT collection capabilities. However, and additionally, MASINT also makes use of a wide range of other measurement techniques such as seismic, acoustics, magnetic, and nuclear, to provide capabilities against targets that cannot be prosecuted using EO- or RF-based systems. In summary, intelligence disciplines are differentiated on the basis of the type of information being collected and extracted through processing and exploitation -- not on the physical basis of the collection system employed or the intelligence problem being addressed. This argument attempts to justify the need to maintain MASINT as a separate discipline. This is a good argument and position, but perhaps one that is bound by the "current think" box.
    Findings/Recommendations (There are several, possibly conflicting recommendations which need to be discussed/debated)
  4. There are several possibilities for ensuring the MASINT capability into the future. The first would be to delete the term MASINT from the IC's vernacular. This option would place MASINT collection and exploitation functions within the auspices of the other collection disciplines. This would require replacing the term with a deeper understanding, and, moreover, appreciation for the fact that more exploitable information is available (much within the current discipline collections) than what is being used today by the "traditional exploiters" (those unique collections traditionally identified as "MASINT" not withstanding). This understanding will require the employment of scientific and technical people (the current "MASINTers") within the traditional intelligence organizations (the services, NSA, CIO, etc.), and force more "traditional collection" in the areas of sampling, etc. This is to say that specific, technically-astute (MASINT) individuals need to do this; it most likely cannot be done by people who are experts in the known collection and exploitation functions of the traditional disciplines. However, there is a danger in deleting the term, and putting "MASINTers" in with the more traditional disciplines. These people may eventually "get lost" in the traditional disciplines' focused charters and the technical and scientific exploitation will be lost. This was the reason the MASINT discipline was created in the first place. Additionally, deleting the term would force other approaches at non-traditional collection such as seismic, thermal, etc.
  5. The second possibility is to maintain the status quo and retain MASINT as a specific discipline. This does not improve the problems we see today with the identity of MASINT.
  6. The third is a "hybrid" of the two options above. That is, MASINT should remain a specific collection and processing discipline with its core of professionals and management staff. However, the more traditional technical disciplines of IMINT and SIGINT should specifically address, in their charters, the recognition of the MASINT ability to glean additional data from their collections (this would be facilitated by the TCA construct). This would require the deeper understanding, and associated dedicated people identified in the paragraph above. Additionally, MASINT should be treated just as are the other technical disciplines in that the IC should Create a "U.S. MASINT System" with associated functional manager (the CMO). This would still be logical within the structure of a TCA. Finally, based on the outcome of the Intelligence Community Management staff study, the Committee recommends the MASINT functional manager (FM) (the CMO) be subordinated to the TCA for logical management.
  7. The basic sciences (between MASINT and the other disciplines) are not altered or different. It is the state of refinement (of the technical or scientific analysis), often the collection source (e.g. the case of soil or effluent sampling) and nature of data being pursued that are the differences.
  8. MASINT tasking, analysis, and expertises need to be better developed within the existing "traditional" intelligence disciplines. Specifically, the more traditional disciplines need to have a better understanding and appreciation for the facts that additional exploitable (MASINT) information may exist within their current collections. This requires the deeper understanding recommended above, but also requires a specific oversight organization (the current CMO) to ensure this refined analysis and IC direction.

B) MASINT is perceived as a "strategic" discipline with limited "tactical" support capabilities. But, by application of real-time analysis and dissemination, MASINT has a potential ability to provide real-time situation awareness and targeting not necessarily available to the more classic disciplines. Because of these perceptions, MASINT does not get the attention of the tactical consumers, and has less constituency support than the more traditional intelligence disciplines. Lacking proper constituency, MASINT sensors and analysis will likely not be properly supported or maintained. Results will include a lack of targeting templates for smart weapons."

  1. As stated previously, MASINT is, in some cases, the more scientific analysis product of the more traditional collection disciplines. Because of the highly technical means utilized, most MASINT systems' focus has been on the longer-term (i.e., not "real-time") analysis of data to determine characteristics, signatures, target templates, etc. With the advent of modern processing techniques and capabilities, MASINT systems have an increased potential for doing their analysis in near real- or real-time. Such potential MASINT contributions to the requirements of tactical customers is poorly known -- and in some cases not being pursued.
    One example of MASINT contributions to real-time identification is the application of MASINT signature data for non-cooperative target identification (NCTI). Today, U.S. systems have a capability to identify hostile fighter aircraft based on MASINT techniques. However, it is poorly known that this analysis was done by MASINT resources. Because of the "unknown sources" for such capabilities, constituency concerns can arise during budget formulations when the participants have a poor or no understanding of MASINT (or other intelligence) applications. Decisions whether to fund intelligence sensors or additional technologies -- such as NCTI -- on offensive weapons can be skewed, based on these lack of understandings. For example, funding debates that are "pro-intelligence" (versus "operational") may be short-lived and the original contributing capability (e.g., a MASINT sensor) is the loser. It must be continuously recognized there is a basic difference between the general sensor approach for "warfighting" and the specific, often more sophisticated, sensors necessary for intelligence collection and knowledge-making. Intelligence sensors must have the ability to measure and define fully the target threat or signature needed. Therefore, these must have full spectral coverage, dynamic range, etc. The resulting "battlefield sensors" employed by users often can be more simply designed to recognize the presence of a threat based on the signatures provided by intelligence. The importance of this thought cannot be underestimated.
  2. Despite its "strategic" intelligence past, MASINT has a critical and growing role in future real-time "warfighter" support. Specifically, MASINT "sensors" have unique capabilities to detect missile launch, detect and track aircraft, ships, and vehicles, do NCTI and battle damage assessment, and detect and track fallout from nuclear detonations. Often, these contributions are the first indicators of hostile activities. The shootdown, for example, of the two EXOCET-equipped Mirage F-1s during the Gulf War was attributed to a MASINT collection and analysis.
  3. MASINT, or the "MASINT applications" of SIGINT and IMINT (etc.), will become more important in providing the future inputs for smart weapons target templating. That is, MASINT is critical for providing future weapons with the signatures (fingerprint) of the targets they are seeking (IR signatures for example).
  4. MASINT sensors are often the same systems as "warfighting systems." The difference is often only the level of sophistication of the data analysis. A specific example is the use of data available from operational radars incidental to the targeting functions for which these radars were built. AEGIS radar returns contain data that can provide significant metric data for assessing weapons system performances.

Findings/Recommendations

  1. MASINT planning must focus on not only the technical analysis that is necessary for long term signature development, but must also plan, at the outset of any capability development/use, the need to satisfy immediate information requirements for the tactical consumer. This means that MASINT planners must coordinate with the information users at the inception of a program to determine, at a minimum, the needs to be satisfied, the format for display of the information required, and addressing human factors issues such as amount of data, timeliness of data, etc.
  2. MASINT systems should be provided with the capability to communicate with/broadcast directly to customers just as do the "traditional intelligence disciplines." This should include an assessment of the utility of broadcast systems such as the Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS) and other data links. The specific implementation of this recommendation should be developed by the DDCI/CM's Infrastructure Support Organization (see Intelligence Community Management staff study).
  3. MASINT culture must be changed to think of analysis in terms of seconds and hours AS WELL AS its current months and years. This requires school house concentration on MASINT curriculum, and an everyday appreciation with the traditional disciplines. This also demands that users be involved and informed relative to MASINT capabilities.
  4. Specifically identified MASINT systems are not the only sources of MASINT data. Targeting radars, for example, can provide ancillary data useful to the national collection/analysis efforts. CMO must have 1) insight not only to specifically identified MASINT systems, but also to those offensive weapons systems (radars for example) capabilities that can contribute to technical and scientific (MASINT) information data bases; 2) when necessary, have the wherewithal to request/suggest/ask for tasking authority for these systems. Additionally, CMO should have a funding ability to provide "seed" money to determine or improve MASINT exploitation of existing weapon system data. This will require a "rethink" that "intelligence and its sensors" are not something strictly unique, but rather "intelligence and its sensors" are the totality of information available to the U.S. government. The national defense psyche must not continue in the "we" (operations)/"they" (intelligence) construct.
    CMO needs a better understanding of user needs, not just stated requirements. This demands that the intelligence and user communities (particularly the MASINT community in this case) coordinate and talk more. The security barriers to effective communication must be broken down. (They are to some extent, but this must be expanded.)

C) "MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not well understood by the IC as a whole. Therefore, although it provides significant intelligence products, its contributions, or the potential of its contributions may have been/will be limited. Its future application to national and operational intelligence will not be maximized."

  1. Despite the formal definition, MASINT remains an intelligence discipline enigma. It is more diverse and unique than the more focused IMINT and SIGINT disciplines. It is characterized by some as having some similar sources and methods (of the more classic disciplines), but much more complex, particularly with respect to analysis than those others. MASINT has many of the collection characteristics of the other technical disciplines, however, it is the unique exploitation and unique techniques that distinguish MASINT results. One respondent stated that MASINT products are the intelligence bits remaining after the expected results of collection are removed. Another stated that MASINT provides alternatives that supplement "conventional" collection to provide "the rest of the story."
  2. Some would say it is the unique data retrieved from additional processing -- the technical and scientific data -- that can set the MASINT discipline apart from the host intelligence discipline." However, MASINT collection and processing are not limited to the phenomena of the electro-magnetic (RF) spectrum. Significant MASINT information is derived from seismic sensors, acoustic sensors, nuclear radiation sensors and material/effluent sampling. This identity crisis becomes troubling when there is a choice to be made, particularly in funding issues. Some state there is no identify crisis for MASINT, that there is, instead, a need for IC and customer education. This education need does, indeed, reflect the identity crisis discussed above.
  3. The CMO and INCA have developed a guide called the MASINT Handbook for the Warfighter. This document has been printed and distributed to "demystify the world of MASINT." This handbook is a critical start toward educating the community and users in the art of MASINT. It needs to be "standard issue" throughout the IC.
  4. As stated briefly above, the MASINT "identity crisis" is also apparent when there are budget cuts to be made. As one respondent noted, MASINT is the "soft underbelly," which is "easily cut" during budget cut drills. Whenever there are cuts to be made within the IC (i.e., GDIP), MASINT (particularly Research and Development (R&D) funds) are some of the first to be targeted.
    There was much discussion on the need to improve formal initial and continuing education within the IC/2/ for MASINT professionals. Formal scientific/technical, mathematical and engineering skills are critical backgrounds for MASINT professionals who do the detailed exploitation of MASINT data. Training for these backgrounds is not typically done within the IC; it is more a function of academia. To get the necessary professionals, the IC must be able to recruit "MASINTers" from the professional (research/laboratory) and academic worlds. Continuing education needs to be both "in-house" and fostered within the private/professional sectors.
  5. MASINT has no formal/viable method (i.e., metrics) for evaluating MASINT contributions to the IC or user communities. That is, there is no formal method for determining whether MASINT analysis and products are satisfying the needs of the customers. This was specifically characterized by the unbalanced MASINT results of the recent Community-wide Capabilities Analysis. There is a need to develop a metric or set of metrics to determine the impact of MASINT products toward stated knowledge goals.

Findings/Recommendations

  1. The services and agencies need to do a better job of educating the user and, moreover, the IC, on the capabilities, applications, and specifics of MASINT. MASINT (familiarity) should become a formal course of professional education for all IC school houses. Existing courses, that include MASINT content, should be increased in scope and duration. Specific tailored courses should provide a curricula that cuts across the spectrum of general user overviews to in-depth analytic instruction.
  2. The MASINT User's Handbook should be required reading within the IC. Additionally, recommend the MASINT User's Handbook be developed in both all-source and unclassified versions.
  3. Continuing IC education should emphasize the unique collection and products of MASINT, and more specifically, the MASINT (technical and scientific) applications of individual "traditional" disciplines. That is, IC professionals within the IMINT and SIGINT fields should be made more aware of the contributions MASINT analysis can make to existing IMINT/SIGINT collections. They need to be made aware that additional information may be gleaned from existing collections once the "expected information has been stripped away."
  4. Education, particularly continuing education, of the IC cannot be overstated. The CMO has developed an updated video tape that highlights MASINT contributions. This video tape is an information sharing source that should be exploited to the extent possible. The IC should share this tape with all IC components and users. This tape, or like, should be shown at the school houses and at operational intelligence organizations to publicize the contributions of MASINT collection and analysis.
  5. CMO should pursue an adjunct training capability, with trained instructors, like that of NSA to ensure MASINT training is conducted and maintained. This training facility should be reviewed for both "in-house" and exportable training efforts. CMO should be a "clearing house" for developing such training materials, including "for credit" courses. Funding for this should be a CMO responsibility, with the necessary resources programmed and provided.
  6. There is a need to develop and maintain evaluation criteria (metrics) to gauge MASINT customer needs satisfaction. The National Intelligence Evaluation Council (NIEC -- within the recommendations of the Intelligence Community Management staff study, the NIEC is an organization subordinate to the DCI and responsible for evaluating the Communities satisfaction of requirements) should develop both evaluation criteria and a program for measuring MASINT product effectiveness. This is necessary to determine future needs and the ability to satisfy those needs.
  7. CMO needs to provide more community emphasis on educating the user (warfighter and policy makers) on the utility of MASINT products and services. Specifically, the service War Colleges, for example, need to increase the blocks that teach intelligence to all future leaders of the Armed Forces. MASINT must be a formal block of instruction in such courses. Again, without a basic understanding of what the product can provide, the customer typically has no appreciation of the need for MASINT and the associated expenditures of funds. Without such an appreciation, the discipline may be under-utilized.

D) "Funding levels for the current MASINT systems, and those projected into the future are not reflective of the importance of this discipline to the Nation's general intelligence/ dominant knowledge efforts./3/ This is primarily because users do not have direct tasking over, and therefore understanding of, MASINT sensors."

  1. R&D is the lifeblood of MASINT. However, MASINT R&D funding is one of the most vulnerable to being cut within the GDIP program. Low obligation rates and lack appreciation for R&D's future contributions make this an easy target which is often hit during cut drills/actions.
  2. Funding levels are considered by the group as relatively reflective of the current need. CMO's long range technology plan, with associated expected costs, is good, but does not allow for the unknowns of scientific breakthroughs or unforeseen technology needs. The disparate organizational "ownership" of the funding does not allow for coordinated/effective expenditure of the available funds.
  3. MASINT requires, in many cases, single (to several) technical collections systems, this forces paying "prototype costs." This is a cost intensive effort that needs to be acknowledged up front. Pure scientific research is the bread and butter that must be funded at a continuing level. There is a need for level-effort-funding like that of the laboratories, that is not cut for convenience. Additionally, the MASINT community must do better in terms of coordinating efforts with the national laboratories.

Findings/Recommendations

  1. MASINT resources and funding needs must be better managed and coordinated between the services, agencies, and laboratories. CMO must be provided (or assume) better insight into each of the MASINT programs. This should include providing recommendations into MASINT system POM builds. However, the recommended DDCI/CM's Community Management Staff (CMS) should construct the coordinated budget.
  2. MASINT R&D efforts must be better coordinated to ensure proper level of effort and minimize redundancy. CMO should be given authority to have specific insight into the national laboratory and ARPA developmental and research efforts, and should have the ability to focus or request research and experimentation. This should include a level-of-effort funding program, controlled by CMO to do required research or to assist a promising technology. CMO should be given the authority to directly obligate funding. This recommendation is greatly facilitated by the TCA and Technology Development Officer (TDO) organizations under the DDCI/CM.
  3. CMO should be given additional budget authority to control a "to be determined" amount of funding to be applied to existing intelligence and operational systems to determine/improve their MASINT data collection potentials.
  4. CMO must be directed to specifically prioritize MASINT systems (agency and service included) for funding purposes. Such authority must recognize that CMO does not have jurisdiction over "multi-role" platforms (those that can accomplish "MASINT collection" as incidental to their primary tasks).

E) "The roadmap for specific MASINT technologies appears to be fairly well thought out and necessary for the 21st century. However, there may be insufficient funding flexibility for reacting to, or pursuing new, emerging, or fleeting technologies. Additionally, there is a need to ensure a balance between the requirements and technologies that support military battlefield requirements, and the often more exacting requirements and technologies that are needed for IC national monitoring and detection of weapon or agent developments."

  1. CMO has developed a technology roadmap, complete with projected cost data. This effort appears to be logical and complete with necessary analysis. However, the roadmap does not provide well for the unknown. That is, there are always the possibilities and probabilities for future new and emerging technologies or requirements that cannot be specifically planned for. There is a need to be able to capitalize on these unforeseen breakthroughs. This is the need to "plan for the unknown."
  2. Relative to "intelligence versus operations," there appears to be a specific coordination problem with MASINT versus counter-proliferation efforts against weapons of mass destruction and, more specifically, chemical and biological weapon (CW/BW) proliferation. Current efforts are not well coordinated and resources are scattered throughout the U.S. government. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Policy has significant resources available for the defense of or counter proliferation efforts against CW/BW weapons. CMO has little to no insight or direction into the "intelligence-related" activities. Additionally, without better insight, the CMO's MASINT roadmap will pursue duplicative efforts.
  3. There is a critical difference between battlefield support to military operations (SMO) MASINT requirements, and those requirements for detecting, for example, the early stages of a weapon or chemical agent development. Much MASINT and, indeed, all other disciplines' emphasis is placed on SMO. However, the criticality of developing and maintaining extremely sensitive sensors for ensuring the Nation's ability to monitor, detect, characterize and classify developmental weapons/efforts, such as biological, chemical and nuclear, cannot be overemphasized. There are specific requirement differences, for example, in designing battlefield chemical detectors that "simply" identify the presence of agents, and the more sophisticated sensors designed to provide the in-depth collection and analysis for knowledge of the characteristics of these agents. This requires a balance of emphasis to ensure that "non-SMO" intelligence requirements are met.

Findings/Recommendations

  1. CMO should be provided with a level-of-effort budgeting capability. That is, CMO should request, and Congress should provide (via legislation) for, a budgeting mechanism that is that equivalent of "ready cash" or venture capital. This account should be used to pursue new or unexpected technologies, react to unforeseen requirements, etc. Such a funding mechanism is becoming increasingly critical as technology turnover times decrease. CMO should have the specific authorized ability to direct funding against, or to pursue such promising technologies or R&D efforts (without penalty for those technologies/or scientific breakthroughs that do not bear fruit). This authority needs to be analogous to a capital venturer.
  2. As with the "tactical" systems, CMO should have direct insight and influence over Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) efforts -- most specifically on the intelligence related issues. There is a great potential to more closely coordinate efforts and provide a more cohesive national defense. A CMO specialist should be assigned to organizations working WMD programs to improve the cross-flow of information on current and planned capabilities/operations. Barring this, CMO should be a formal invitee to any/all discussions that focus on this area.
  3. Bistatics (RF) need more attention. Bistatic RF solutions are poorly understood/appreciated within the traditional disciplines. This area needs more study and resources put against it. Bistatic solutions provide a unique opportunity to provide real-time NCTI and for reducing friendly fire losses.
  4. CMO needs a continuous, broad review of all government, and to the extent possible, commercial developments to determine the most logical and cost effective MASINT potentials.
  5. The community must maintain proper emphasis on both SMO and "non-SMO" aspects of collection and analysis. The often more sophisticated and difficult processes of intelligence collection and processing for detailed knowledge of weapons systems, material content, molecular compositions, etc., require markedly different sensors and techniques which the IC must pursue. Such collection and analysis capabilities cannot be overemphasized. It is these techniques that provide the knowledge base for developing the battlefield SMO systems.
  6. Promising technologies which need current and future emphasis include:

F. "Although the CMO has the necessary legal authorities, it is not properly staffed commensurate with its responsibilities. Additionally, a fractured organizational structure provides little to no focused MASINT management, budgeting oversight, tasking control, or coordination of effort. This may potentially cause inefficient expenditures of resources and duplicative developments."

  1. As stated earlier, MASINT as a discipline was created in 1986, with attendant start up of the MASINT Committee. Three directives provide guidance relative to the MASINT discipline. Specifically, the DCI Directive 2/11 gives CMO the authorities to provide for the "common concern (re: MASINT) on behalf of the Intelligence Community." The Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5105.21, as amended, empowers the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with the conduct of MASINT, and DoD Directive 5105.58 provides the CMO with authorities for MASINT within DIA. These directives proscribe specific responsibilities (for CMO) and MASINT management duties. Some of these duties include: providing direct and advisory tasking; developing MASINT policy; coordinating plans and architectures; and programming and budgeting. However, CMO's authority does not expressly extend to the use of CIA human intelligence assets for the collection and analysis of MASINT.
    When first created, the CMO worked (organizationally) directly for the Director, DIA as the executive agency for MASINT. As a result of several DIA reorganizations, CMO's position within DIA has moved to within the Collections branch, organizationally subordinate to the National Military Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC). However, the GDIP Staff, which is directly subordinate to the Director of Military Intelligence Staff and which is not directly in the CMO's chain of command, has a direct influence on the CMO's authorities. Specifically, the GDIP Manager, who is responsible for recommending GDIP resources for inclusion in or exclusion from the President's budget, orchestrates the budget process, allocates fiscal guidance, directs reductions and reallocations, and approves the GDIP budget. The GDIP Manager is assisted by three Defense Intelligence Functional Managers (FMs) for Collection, Processing, and Infrastructure. These FMs are charged with the preparation, supervision, and monitoring of GDIP programs and budgets within their areas of responsibility. The Director of the NMICC is also the GDIP FM for Collection. This puts the Collection FM and management staff directly above the CMO in the current organizational structure to represent MASINT and other disciplines/functions. This organizational construct limits CMO's actual influence over MASINT system development, tasking/operations, and programmatics. The MASINT Panel participants unanimously voiced opinions that the CMO is virtually powerless to direct and coordinate the MASINT effort. Additionally, CMO only has direct control over approximately 1/4 of the total MASINT funding./4/ The remainder is within the service and agency accounts. (It should be noted that much of this remainder pays for systems that not strictly MASINT systems or operations - therefore, much of this should not be the purview of the CMO.)
  2. The CMO has true functional management over only those MASINT funds within the GDIP. Because CMO is a management organization, most of its funds are actually obligated by the Services or Agencies. For example, 84% of the GDIP MASINT funding is obligated by USAF (this equates to 30% of the USAF's GDIP TOA), and USAF provides 93% of the manpower./5/ These are important statistics in light of previous recommendations. Further, some respondents stated that CMO's direct authority over GDIP-only funds tends to focus CMO's efforts on GDIP issues. That is, CIAP and other (TIARA) programs do not get proper CMO attention because CMO does not have insight or leverage into these programs (the "Golden Rule" applies - "he who owns the gold rules"). Therefore, such programs may suffer a lack of community-wide direction. CMO needs insight into all "national" (CIAP) and "tactical" (TIARA) systems, missions and developments.
  3. The CMO's Mission Area Assessment identifies, as a critical need characteristic for future MASINT systems, a centralized/coordinated direction and oversight./6/ Under the current construct, the Services and Agencies have control of over 75% of all MASINT resources./7/ CMO has no direct control or oversight of these resources, rightfully so in some cases. But the fact remains, the CMO's ability to provide quality centralized management is hampered by organizational and budgetary barriers.
  4. There is "no one in charge" of MASINT. An in-depth review of the MASINT "chain of command" reveals that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a congruent chain of command for the MASINT "system of systems." That is, there is no continuous chain of responsibility flowing from the Director, DIA, through Director CMO to the Services/Agencies, to the collection systems, to the users and back. Despite the official DCI and DoD responsibilities and authorities assigned to the CMO, very little authority is actually applied in reality. This can be directly attributed to the fractured chain of command, limited CMO manning, and organizational construct under DIA denies CMO from providing a real community leadership role. CMO must actually assume the authorities (with additional billets described later) which it has been charged.
  5. The Director, DIA -- not the Director, CMO -- is the real spokesman for MASINT at the Military Intelligence Board (MIB). This contrasts unfavorably with the Director, NSA and the Director, CIO, who are the (logical) spokespersons for their technical disciplines. The panel voiced concern that the Director, DIA is often forced to "choose" between MASINT issues and all other issues without having the technical expertise in the MASINT area. As an example, although budget cuts are worked in a formal process, MASINT R&D is considered by some as the GDIP budget's "soft underbelly," liable to be the first to take funding cuts (before, say, operational systems or manpower billets). It was acknowledged that some of the R&D cuts are due to poor execution of funds -- although execution rate determinates can be misleading. Nonetheless, CMO should have the real voice in MASINT matters to ensure that balanced, well-considered, logical decisions are made.
  6. With specific regard to the budgeting process, because the DIA GDIP Management Staff has significant authority in the current organizational structure over CMO, some respondents criticized that policy decisions often that do not reflect the professional thinking within the CMO. Additionally, since DIA is not an acquisition organization, CMO must transfer allocated funds to the services to work specific technology issues. This is done through the DIA comptroller. The process is slow and cumbersome, and does not provide the CMO the flexibility they need to ensure thoughtful technologies and reactive operations. Finally, because CMO's R&D budget must use the GDIP budgeting accounting process, obligation rates often lag behind the established "norms." Accordingly, these funds can be easily targeted for reduction even though their need is real.
  7. Because of prior position cuts, until very recently, the CMO has been left without the necessary leadership (General officer or SES-level) that has the real authority to coordinate the MASINT community.
  8. Based on panel respondent estimates, the CMO is understaffed, both in real terms based on current billets authorizations, and based on real need. Currently, the CMO is authorized 30 DIA billets -- 27 of which are filled; 6 CIA billets -- 5 of which are filled; 2 each Army and Navy billets - none of which are filled; 1 Air Force SES position -- the individual for this position was just recently hired; and 15 officer billets for the Consolidated MASINT Technical Collection Office (CMTCO) -- 14 of which are filled./8/) Although a specific number needs refined analysis, several respondents discussed numbers of approximately 75-100 authorized CMO billets as being more in line with the tasked mission of the office. The current limitation of people relegates the CMO into an organization that is reactive in nature and "bound by the in-box." Additionally, CMO is not manned or postured to do material development. This development, in most cases, should be, and remains, the purview of the Services and Agencies. However, CMO should have oversight and coordination authorities for these programs. Additionally, partly because of size and IC organizational structure, CMO is not aware of all MASINT-related programs conducted throughout the USG. This is particularly true of multi-, hyper- and ultra-spectral sensing being pursued by various agencies.
  9. The MASINT Committee and its subcommittees (which predate the CMO) exist primarily as a means of cross-flowing information between agencies and services. This committee is analogous to the SIGINT committee. Several participants questioned whether these committees (and subcommittees) are only necessary because CMO is not properly sized/staffed to meet its responsibilities./9/ However, a number of respondents stated these committees are extremely useful and should be maintained.

Findings/Recommendations

  1. The Director, Central MASINT Office has the necessary legal authority to carry out the functions of a coordinated MASINT program. However, because of a lack of personnel, grade and organizational structure, the Director, CMO does not have the real authority to carry out his/her responsibilities. To ensure community-wide coordination of efforts, CMO's charter under DCID 2/11-1 should specifically include the management oversight of all MASINT budget builds including CIA MASINT programs. This charter should also provide the Director, CMO the authority to "determine" the systems are or can be a MASINT contributors. This would be to determine what systems could provide MASINT collection, and which could be logically managed within the MASINT program." This CMO authority concept may not be well received by the Services and Agencies, but is actually CMO's assigned task today.
  2. The Director of CMO needs to be a General Officer or SES-level position, with not only the statutory or executive order authority to be the spokesman for, but the real authority for MASINT, as is the Director, NSA for SIGINT. The Director, DIA has recently hired a new SES as the Director, CMO. As of the writing of this report, any new titles/responsibilities/authorities to be granted this person are unknown. However, the Director CMO, needs to be a permanent member of the MIB, NFIB and other senior DCI and DoD boards/panels as the representative for MASINT. His authority to establish MASINT community direction, standards, etc, should be on par with those of Director, NSA and Director, CIO (or the new NIMA). Director, CMO should also be a formal member of a senior steering committee that can vet MASINT issues applicable to the entire IC. (The Intelligence Community Management staff study recommends a construct for this to occur.)
  3. A MASINT management reorganization will be painful, but is necessary to ensure the viability of this critical future discipline. Such a reorganization should focus on joint units, offices, and organizations. Such an organization should be within the TCA (see the Intelligence Community Management staff study). Specifically, MASINT management requires a "stand alone" capability like that of NSA - though all would agree, not the size. This should requires the equivalent of a U.S. MASINT System (USMS) like the U.S. SIGINT System or the U.S. Imagery System. If there is no consolidation of the IC structure (i.e. a TCA) the CMO may need to be an organization independent of the DIA structure, but not necessarily independent of the Director, DIA. For "care and feeding" purposes, the CMO can continue to exist within DIA, but must be an organization that reports directly to the Director, DIA, not the staff elements of DIA. Additionally, the CMO must have the authority to use existing (DIA) budgeting organizations (on an "outsourcing basis") to facilitate their obligation and transfer of funds as necessary. CMO could also be organized outside of DIA directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command Control Communications and Intelligence. In either case, CMO needs to be responsible for all USG MASINT efforts (just like NSA is for SIGINT), and responsible to the DCI and SECDEF for satisfaction of MASINT information needs. In either case, the CMO must be given the real authority to take on the responsibilities laid out in existing charter.
  4. The CMO should be given the NSA-equivalent of the "SIGINT seal of approval." (Under the TCA construct, this becomes a mute issue.) That is, CMO should be given a U.S. MASINT System (USMS) lead status with the ability to provide real guidance relative to programming, research and development, standards, tasking and operations. CMO should have more authority over service and agency developments and acquisitions (this should be a chairman of the board construct). This is not to undermine service/agency Title 10 authorities, but rather to provide a coordinated approach to resource expenditures. Again, this may not be well received by the services/agencies, but is actually CMO's assigned task today. In conjunction with, and through the authority of the DDCI/CM's Infrastructure Support Organization (ISO), the CMO should establish MASINT system standards, with the services/agencies (the consolidated NRO) developing the material solutions.
  5. Increase the size of the CMO. A specific number needs further analysis, however, respondents argue that a staff of at least 75-100 people is needed. This number is based on an independent (e.g. no TCA) organization. Refined numbers for a division within the TCA will have to be determined. However, a TBD percentage of these billets should be military, with the services providing their experts to the organization. In the joint environment, the Director, CMO needs to facilitate the "cross-pollination" of services, organizations, and agencies to ensure the long term needs of customers can best be satisfied. Additionally, the CMO should have representatives assigned to the theater CINCs just as does NSA, DoD HUMINT, etc.
  6. The role of the MASINT Committee should be further reviewed for adequacy/need. Most study participants voiced a good deal of support for the MASINT Committee, stating that it provides a useful forum for the Agencies and Services to voice their concerns, opinions and positions as (CMO) policy decisions are developed. They believe this allows for infusion of some much needed objectivity into the MASINT decision process. However, there is a question of what the Committee's true charter is, particularly when viewed in the light of a stronger, more robust (also read: joint) CMO. There is no readily apparent savings or added value to dissolving the MASINT Committee, but the committee construct as a whole should be viewed for future relevancy.
  7. CMO must be able to state and maintain the necessary management positions (both popular and unpopular) relative to MASINT budget/programmatic recommendations and decisions. Such decision must be further incorporated within the CMS budget process (again, see the Intelligence Community Management staff study for further discussion). Such coordinated budgeting can only happen if CMO is given and takes more direct control of the entire MASINT effort from budget through policy formulation.

Additional Thoughts

  1. MASINT is a science-intensive discipline. Its one true characteristic is the need for practitioners well-versed in the broad range of physical and electrical sciences. These people cannot be honed from military service schools in one or two years. These people need to come from academia fresh with the scientific knowledge from experimentation and research. Nor can they continue to be "proficient" in their areas of expertise if they are maintained in government employ for an entire career. Such scientists must have portability. That is, they must be able to leave government employment and rejoin the ranks of academics in order to maintain their scientific knowledge. The IC needs the personnel equivalent of commercial off-the-shelf technology (COTS). As part of the overall IC management initiatives, we discussed examining the feasibility of pursuing trial personnel management programs that provide incentives to recruit the necessary scientific experts for the IC's needs. Such programs need to be pursued with the full understanding that such experts may not spend a 20-30 year career in government employment. The Committee recognizes the magnitude of such a proposal, and stops short of attempting to enact this recommendation into law. However, the we believe plans, such as limited government pensions, movement of private pensions and savings plans into (and out of) the federal retirement plans, bonuses, etc., hold the promise of helping to ensure the Community can retain these experts for national service. We also believe there is a need to address the issue of being able to rehire retired military experts. Although costly, the returns in terms scientific knowledge would be well worth the investment.
  2. For intelligence collection/support systems, there is a continuum that runs from those systems that provide pure intelligence collection and those that provide pure operational (i.e., SMO) support. In reality, all U.S. IC systems fall within the two extremes. There is a need to "plot" where individual systems fall, determine the IC strengths, its weaknesses (the holes) and use existing systems to cover the holes before setting off to build new systems or capabilities.
  3. The intent of this report is not to "oversell" MASINT, but rather to call attention to some areas of concern, weakness, and, in fact, strengths. MASINT is not the most critical intelligence source for U.S. customers today. However, for any one particular incident or collection opportunity, no discipline always is. True all-source collection and analysis is critical. This report does try to emphasize that MASINT is a critical discipline that has the unique potential of being more so in the future. MASINT provides information that other sources cannot. This is not to say it is specifically a niche field, but can satisfy niche requirements.
  4. The group identified (via various inputs) some recurring thoughts that would identify the MASINT system's greatest needs. These deserve reiterating:

Conclusion

There are a number of varied thoughts relative to the future of MASINT. Whether it remains a specifically-named intelligence discipline or not is less important than ensuring the viability of the technically and scientifically derived information from the many collection sources. User knowledge and insight as to what the MASINT product can provide for the future battlefield or for national objectives is imperative. Strong leadership is necessary to steer this "intelligence discipline of the future" into the next century.

FOOTNOTES

  1. MASINT panel #3 discussions; individual responses to MASINT questionnaire
  2. MASINT Panel #1, #2, and #3 discussions and individual interviews.
  3. Panel respondents, MASINT panel # 1, 2 and 3 discussions.
  4. MASINT Panel #2 and #3 discussions, and with CMO
  5. USAF MASINT briefing
  6. MASINT 2010, Planning the U.S. MASINT System for the 21st Century
  7. MASINT panel #2 and #3, discussion with acting Director, CMO, Mr. Jim Fahnestock
  8. CMO figures.
  9. MASINT panels 1, 2, and 3 and personal interviews.

This document is sponsored by the U.S. House of Representatives on the United States Government Printing Office web site.

Questions or comments regarding this service? Contact wwwadmin@www.access.gpo.gov.

[ BACK ] [ HOME ] [ GPO HOME ]

Page #IC21007 June 5, 1996