MILNET Briefing: Iraq Study Group Report

MILNET Brief
Analysis of the ISG Study Group Report, 12/06/06

Let us begin by stating that the Iraq Study Group proposal has plenty of faults. They even admit them. Like any plan for outside interference in a country already troubled by outside interference, the Iraq Study Group's proposal makes the same basic mistake any diplomatic effort makes in the region. Its foundation is on the good will of Iraq's neighbors, supposes help from countries like Iran and Syria.

And yes, those are definitely wonderful ideas, and were it at all possible, the plan proposed by the Iraq Study Group might work. Unfortunately, the opposite is true. By depending on Iran and Syria to show good faith, the plan is a non-starter.

"Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconcilliation....Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq."

As expected the ISG is living in a world of diplomatic idealism, surfeit from reality. There are two major reasons that this entire bit of fluff is meaningless:

Iran is not at all interested in "saving" Iraq. Rather, they are busy fostering the downfall of democracy in Iraq. Why? Because democracy is the last thing they want, anywhere in the world. You do not have to read far into ANY Iranian public discourse to see that. Why then does the Iraq Study Group assume that a proposal with Iran helping Iraq has a chance? MILNET says this notion is a non-starter, simply because Iran can and will make lots of noise on helping Iraq, but their intentions as shown by centuries of history including the last decade that show exactly the opposite.
Ditto for Syria. If anything Syria would like to see restoration of the original Baathist party in Iraq, not Saddam's version but henchmen of the same Baathist party that rules Syria. To Syria, Iraq looks like a rather large and well placed Lebanon. Clearly Syria makes noises like they will work with Iran but the truth is that Syria and Iran are looking forward to the day (in typical Arab fashion regretably) when they can fight out the last battle between Sunni and Shiite, with the old tribal vengence that will make today's violence in Iraq and Lebanon look like Sunday School children's brawls.

The ISG is right about the goal...they call for Iran and Syria to quit sending support to their respective tribal elements (Sunnis and Shiites), yet make it a U.S. problem to resolve.

That, sadly, is impossible without ringing the country with U.S. soldiers. Not a bad idea, but also not one we have enough troops to support and certainly is not one of the ISG's recommendations.

What will get Iran and Syria to quit their meddling in Iraq? Only other Arab nations. We note with some disgust that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan or any other Arab nation are not mentioned in the report. The Arab Nations must control their brethern, they will not listen to anyone else. And of course there are the Russian, French, and German businesses that continue to profit from Iraqi chaos and the growth of Iran. We need to make supporting Iran extremely costly, not profitable. We need to make it extremely costly for Iran to send in supplies or funds to insurgents inside Iraq. We cannot do that alone and the ISG has missed an excellent opportunity to make that direct and clear by insisting the U.S. should lead the effort...once again we ask, where are the Europeans, and our so called friend Russia in all of this.

Another recommendation pointed to right up front in the Iraq Study Group's report seems out of place, or for the more accepting reader, at least disengenious.

"The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained committment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel's right to exist), and Syria."

The ISG says the Middle East Peace Process must move forward with a new re-charged committment by the U.S. By the U.S.? The parties to the problem there are Hezbollah, Hamas, Fatah, Israel, and the so called Palestinians. The nations of Lebanon, Syria and Iran are involved in the destruction of Israel. That has to be fixed.

There is little if anything U.S. diplomacy can do except appear to be brokering a peace they cannot create. This is quite typical diplomatic B.S. Anything that could be done was done years ago. Not simply because it was a Democrat or Republican doing it, but because there is so little the U.S. can do to moderate that crisis.

If the Palestinians cannot agree amongst themselves who is to run and how they are going to run their "new state" inside Israeli borders, than how can anyone else force them to get along? They have to resolve this themselves. Does anyone believe that a U.S. diplomat, hated by most of the parties (except Israel one would assume) is going to offer advice on getting along? Take a look at our own electoral system and country split nearly 50-50, or our Congress which cannot get it right even when it comes to protecting our own sorry asses here at home. No, the U.S. diplomats are not going to help. Offering some security might help except we have drawn down our miltary to such a level that we'd be lucky to protect Connecticut.

Thus throwing in the Middle East process is at best a red-herring. Iraq's situation will not improve one bit if there is peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

The ISG report did get one thing right...incredibly on the mark, yet it is glossed over somewhat.

"The most important questions about Iraq's future are now the responsibility of the Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny."

Unfortunately, that is much easier said than done. Indeed, we return to Iran and Syria. Without their cooperation at the Iraqi border, Iraq never gets better because the insurgents never run out of their chief resource, fighters. Also key in that same equation are the external terrorist groups sending in Sunni or Shiite reinforcements to the indigenous insurgents as well. Take Hezbollah for instance. Does anyone believe that Iran's support of troops and funding for Hezbollah doesn't also extend East to Iraq? That is a large Shiite pool of reinforcements that appears to be never-ending. And does anyone believe the Iranian government isn't rejoicing in that fact? From their perspective, the Shiites are winning the war between Shiite and Sunni.

Next the ISG goes off the deep end, handing the insurgents a timetable...all they have to do is wait until the first quarter of 2008 and then they can overpower the Iraqi Army.

"By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, and advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq."

This is just plain nuts. Oh it sounds good, but the reality is that U.S. troops will fare worse than reporters embedded with combat troops. They won't duck under cover, and will pick up weapons and engage the enemy. This also has the makings of a search and rescue crisis very similar to that detailed in the Blackhawk Down episode...one which the Al Qaeda recruiters already relish as a great defeat for the U.S.. And just how does the U.S. manage to embed themselves in the Iraqi Army, few can speak the language? Or how about also, at the same time, going after Al Qaeda operatives in Iraq? Does the ISG think they have signs up like Motel 6? They live and breath right amongst the rest of Iraqis. Clearly naive.

The point not taken up by the ISG is the ability for Iraqi Army units to fight their brethren. Let's suppose a particular Iraqi soldier is told to go and fight a group of militiamen from al-Sadr's loyal Shiite followers. If this Iraqi soldier is a Shiite, what are the chances his heart is not into the fight? Our culture may not understand the dilemma, but that Iraqi soldier feels it immediately.

So what will happen to U.S. forces embedded with Iraqi Army units? They will be slaughtered along with the Iraqis, and a few token prisoners will be disemboweled on Arab News TV channels to the delight of Iran and Syria.

The ISG strategy is flawed...is supposes that the Iraqi government will listen or effect the Iraqi Army training timetable when the U.S. says it will pull out its troops and that the Iraqi Army must take over. The problem with Iraqi troops is not the Iraqi government but with the Iraqi troops! The mental state of Iraqis recruited into the Army is not anywhere where it needs to be. Our own troops are coming home to tell us this, we need to listen. Iraqi troops couldn't defend a single hamlet in Iraq, how can we expect them to defend the entire country? Does anyone believe that in a year, we'll be able to train them to do that job? More like 2010 if we are lucky. This is not a one year job!

The ISG report tells us the following facts already known prior to these "great minds" compiling them for us:

"...the ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing."
"...Many Iraqis are embracing sectarian identies."
"...The lack of security impedes economic development."
"...Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is critical to U.S. interests."

The list goes on...including stating that Iraq has become Al Qaeda's largest base of operations, something most terrorism experts would dispute. The ISG makes a link between Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents, who, the ISG says, are set on restoring Sunni control of Iraq. The ISG also, rightly, pinpoints the deadly cycle between Sunni insurgent attacks and Shiite reprisals.

Also key is the fleeing of sectarian oriented Iraqs to parts of the country or outside the country to avoid being killed by the opposite sect. This has long term effects on the mix of Sunni and Shiite, and clearly leads to further "cleansing" of areas within Iraq. It would be pretty naive to expect that once one area is "properly cleansed", the violence would not then move to a new area to begin anew. The ISG does not address this issue at all.

We invite you to read the entire ISG report, however we caution that it is not filled with any pearls of wisdom, mostly reciting known facts along with supposition that defies analysis.

What the ISG gets correct are assessments about the negative aspects of the situation in Iraq, yet provide little doable constructive ideas on how to change those dynamics. In short, the report is a useless a waste of taxpayers money and offers nothing close to concretely viable solutions to the Iraqi situation. It is a throw of the dice. Many other options not given by the ISG would be as useful and have similar chances at success.